Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Susana Lopez
COA08
In Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Susana Lopez, a state employee sued for retaliation, alleging she was fired for filing internal complaints and requesting FMLA leave. The HHSC argued she was terminated for chronic training delinquency and unauthorized cell phone use. Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the Court of Appeals analyzed whether Lopez's firing was a 'pretext' for retaliation. The court found that because Lopez admitted to the policy violations and failed to provide evidence of 'similarly situated' employees being treated differently, she could not overcome the agency's legitimate reasons. The court held that the agency retained its sovereign immunity and dismissed the case, emphasizing that subjective belief and timing are not enough to prove a retaliatory motive.
Litigation Takeaway
"To defeat a 'neutral' excuse in court—whether it is an employer's policy or a parent's justification for denying visitation—you must provide objective evidence that the reason is factually false or applied inconsistently. Suspicious timing or personal feelings of unfairness are legally insufficient to prove that an opponent’s stated reason is a mere pretext for retaliation."
In Re Alejandra Suarez Jaramillo
COA13
In this mandamus proceeding, Alejandra Suarez Jaramillo challenged a trial court's scheduling order that set a discovery supplementation deadline five weeks before the order was even signed. Jaramillo argued that this retroactive and "impossible" deadline effectively barred her from presenting a defense. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the claim under established mandamus standards, which require both a clear abuse of discretion and the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal. The court held that while the retroactive deadline was procedurally unusual, the relator failed to provide a record showing that her defense was 'severely compromised.' Specifically, because she did not identify which vital witnesses or documents were excluded or how they went to the 'very heart' of the litigation, she failed to demonstrate that the error could not be corrected through a normal appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"A trial court's procedural error—even one as logically absurd as a retroactive deadline—does not guarantee emergency relief unless you build a specific record proving that the error 'severely compromised' your ability to present your case."
P. J. S., Appellant v. K. S. S., Appellee
COA03
In P. J. S. v. K. S. S., a former husband challenged a summary judgment requiring him to pay a 'Guaranteed Amount' shortfall to his ex-wife as outlined in their Partition Agreement Incident to Divorce (PAID). The husband argued that because his payments were 'subject to' and secondary to a bank's priority debt, he was not obligated to pay if business profits were insufficient. The Third Court of Appeals disagreed, analyzing the contract language to find that 'subject to' established an order of distribution (who gets paid first) rather than a condition precedent (whether he has to pay at all). Because the agreement lacked specific conditional wording like 'if and only if,' the court held the husband was personally liable for the shortfall regardless of the business's net profits.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas, 'subject to' language in a settlement agreement typically establishes payment priority rather than excusing the debt entirely; if a payor intends to limit their liability to available business profits, the agreement must use express conditional language or explicitly disclaim personal liability for shortfalls."
RANCHO DE LOS ARBOLES LLC AND ELLEN EAKIN v. TOWN OF CROSS ROADS, TX
COA02
Rancho De Los Arboles LLC and its principal sued the Town of Cross Roads after the Town began enforcing zoning ordinances to shut down their long-running short‑term rental use. Rancho sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging Texas-constitutional property violations (including takings/due course of law theories) and asserting ultra vires conduct. The Town filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity, and the trial court dismissed all claims with prejudice. Applying the Miranda plea-to-the-jurisdiction framework, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals explained that a dismissal with prejudice is proper only when the pleadings or record affirmatively negate jurisdiction as a matter of law (i.e., the defect is incurable). Where the problem is merely insufficient pleading of jurisdictional facts that could be cured by amendment—such as failing to plead takings elements with specificity or failing to name the proper officials for an ultra vires claim—the plaintiff must be given a chance to replead. The court affirmed dismissal of those claims that were jurisdictionally barred on the record, but held the trial court reversibly erred by dismissing the remainder with prejudice without allowing Rancho an opportunity to amend. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the potentially curable constitutional and ultra vires theories.
Litigation Takeaway
"A plea to the jurisdiction is not automatically a “case killer.” If governmental immunity is raised and your petition is merely thin—not incurably barred—push hard for the right to amend. Preserve error by requesting leave to replead and objecting to any “with prejudice” dismissal, especially when asserting constitutional property/takings or ultra vires claims tied to real estate value in a divorce-related crossover dispute."
In the Matter of B.T.
COA02
In In the Matter of B.T., the Second Court of Appeals reviewed a juvenile court's order transferring a young man to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice to finish an eighteen-year murder sentence. While the court found that the transfer was required by law because the respondent could not complete his minimum confinement before turning nineteen, it identified an error regarding court costs. The appellate court held that because the respondent had been declared indigent, that status was presumed to continue through the appeal. Consequently, the court affirmed the prison transfer but modified the judgment to strike all assessed court costs.
Litigation Takeaway
"Once a party's indigent status is established under the Family Code, it is legally presumed to continue throughout the litigation; attorneys should always audit final judgments and bills of costs to ensure clerks do not improperly assess fees against indigent clients."
Richardson v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Richardson v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reviewed a defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim and challenges to court costs. The appellant argued trial counsel made specific mistakes (e.g., failing to object or pursue certain defensive theories), but the court analyzed counsel’s performance under Strickland by looking at the “totality of representation” rather than isolated alleged errors. Because the record reflected an active, strategic defense—particularly cross-examination emphasizing the lack of recovered stolen property and gaps in the State’s physical evidence—the appellant failed to show deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Separately, the court audited the bill of costs and held that clerk-assessed fees must be supported by the record; it struck an unsupported $55 subpoena service fee where no return of service or evidence justified it. The court also held that an administrative bill of costs cannot override the trial court’s judgment on timing of payment; because the judgment made costs payable upon release, the appellant was not required to pay while confined. The convictions were affirmed, and the bill of costs was modified to delete the unsupported fee.
Litigation Takeaway
"IAC claims are hard to win when the record shows counsel was “in the fight”—courts evaluate the whole trial, not a checklist of alleged missteps. In family cases (especially termination), build a record reflecting active advocacy and strategy to blunt Strickland attacks. Also, don’t accept boilerplate costs at face value: line-item audit bills of cost and move to strike fees not supported by the record, and enforce decree/judgment language on when costs are actually payable (e.g., not until release from confinement)."
Morrison v. Morrison
Supreme Court of Texas
In Morrison v. Morrison, a former wife sought to enforce a divorce decree after her ex-husband allegedly damaged their marital home and failed to return various items of personal property. Although the original decree split the home sale proceeds 50/50, the trial court awarded the wife 100% of the proceeds as damages without making specific findings regarding the fair market value (FMV) of the losses. The Supreme Court of Texas analyzed the distinction between the power to 'enforce' a decree under Family Code Chapter 9 and the prohibition against 'modifying' a substantive property division. The Court held that while trial courts can award money judgments for breaches, they impermissibly modify a decree when they reallocate community assets without a direct evidentiary link to the proven fair market value of the damaged or missing property.
Litigation Takeaway
"To successfully recover damages for damaged or missing assets after a divorce, you must provide specific evidence of fair market value; a court cannot simply reallocate property interests as a penalty for bad behavior without a dollar-for-dollar evidentiary accounting."
HIGH RISK PREGNANCY DOCTORS, PLLC AND VIOLETTA LOZOVYY, Appellants v. LINCOLN PROPERTY COMPANY D/B/A LINCOLN HARRIS CSG AND DOUGLAS MACLAY III, Appellees
COA02
In High Risk Pregnancy Doctors, PLLC and Dr. Violetta Lozovyy’s dispute with a leasing agent and landlord, the plaintiffs claimed they were induced to sign a commercial lease by an oral promise that the lease would be “ineffective” or otherwise “dealt with” if Dr. Lozovyy failed to obtain hospital staff privileges within 120 days. The written lease, however, unambiguously required those privileges and contained no contingency or “escape hatch.” The Fort Worth Court of Appeals, applying the Rule 91a standard, held the fraud claim failed as a matter of law because “justifiable reliance” cannot be based on an oral representation that is directly contradicted by the clear terms of the signed contract. The court also held the DTPA claim was time-barred: the two-year limitations period was not tolled by the discovery rule because the alleged injury—the contradictory contract language—was discoverable at signing, and failing to read the contract is a lack of reasonable diligence. The court affirmed dismissal of all claims.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the written agreement says one thing and an alleged oral promise says another, Texas courts treat reliance on the oral promise as legally unjustifiable—making fraud-based attempts to unwind a signed deal vulnerable to early dismissal. In family cases, this is strong authority to defeat “side-deal” or “work-around” claims attacking MSAs/Rule 11 agreements and to resist late-filed fraud/DTPA-style claims where the complaining party could have discovered the issue by reading what they signed."
In the Interest of K.K. and K.K., Children
COA12
In this parental termination case, the appellant (J.K.) filed a notice of appeal six days after the mandatory 20-day deadline for accelerated appeals. Although the notice was filed within the 15-day 'grace period' allowed by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3, the Twelfth Court of Appeals notified J.K. that a 'reasonable explanation' for the delay was required to maintain jurisdiction. Because the appellant failed to respond to the court’s inquiry or provide any explanation for the late filing, the court held it was powerless to grant an extension. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, emphasizing that procedural rules apply equally to pro se litigants and licensed attorneys.
Litigation Takeaway
"Appellate deadlines in parental termination cases are extremely strict and accelerated; missing the 20-day filing window—and failing to provide a prompt, reasonable explanation for the delay—will result in the permanent loss of your right to appeal."
Opinion by Justice Triana
COA03
In this case, a grandfather sought sole managing conservatorship of his three grandchildren following the death of their father, citing the mother's extreme and abusive disciplinary measures. The mother argued that her 'strict' parenting was protected by the legal 'parental presumption,' which usually favors keeping children with their parents. However, the court analyzed evidence showing the mother forced the children to stay outdoors overnight in freezing temperatures and neglected their medical and psychological needs, leading to fainting spells and suicidal ideation. The Third Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that the grandfather successfully rebutted the parental presumption because the mother’s conduct posed a significant threat to the children’s physical health and emotional development.
Litigation Takeaway
"The 'parental presumption' is not absolute; a non-parent can win custody by documenting a clear pattern of extreme disciplinary tactics, medical neglect, and the resulting psychological trauma to the children."