Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Ellis v. State
COA14
Timothy Ray Ellis was convicted of felony murder following the death of his girlfriend’s intellectually disabled son, who was subjected to extreme isolation, malnutrition, and unauthorized physical restraint. On appeal, the court analyzed whether Ellis’s actions—including padlocking the refrigerator and performing makeshift surgery—constituted 'acts clearly dangerous to human life' during the commission of the felony of injury to a disabled individual. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the systematic neglect and physical dominion Ellis exercised were legally sufficient to support the murder charge and that technical errors in the jury instructions did not constitute egregious harm.
Litigation Takeaway
"'Coercive control'—evidenced by isolation, food restriction, and psychological dominance—is a recognized pattern of family violence that can be used to rebut custody presumptions and secure protective orders, even when physical assault is not the primary factor."
Anderson v. Altom
COA02
After a dispute at a Little League game, a board member called the police on a parent, suggesting the parent 'may' become a threat. The parent sued for defamation, but the defendants moved to dismiss the case under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, ruling that reporting potential criminal activity to law enforcement is a matter of public concern protected by the TCPA. The court held that speculating about future behavior—using language such as 'may' or 'might'—constitutes a non-actionable opinion or 'allusion' rather than a verifiable false statement of fact, which is a necessary element of a defamation claim.
Litigation Takeaway
"Reporting 'concerning behavior' or 'potential threats' to the police is generally protected from defamation lawsuits under the TCPA. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must identify specific, verifiable false statements regarding past or present facts; mere speculation about future danger or 'allusions' to potential crimes are insufficient to support a defamation claim and can result in the plaintiff paying the defendant’s attorney’s fees."
Hawkins v. State
COA14
In Hawkins v. State, a defendant out on bond for a prior murder was charged with a second murder after GPS data from his court-ordered ankle monitor placed him at the scene. Hawkins sought to suppress the location data, claiming the search warrant was invalid under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion, holding that individuals wearing court-ordered monitors as a condition of their release have no reasonable expectation of privacy in that data. The court also clarified that the State can challenge a defendant's standing to contest a search for the first time on appeal because standing is a threshold legal requirement.
Litigation Takeaway
"GPS tracking data from a court-ordered ankle monitor is a powerful and admissible tool in family law "crossover" cases. Because individuals under court-mandated monitoring have no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their movement data, that information is discoverable and generally exempt from Fourth Amendment-style privacy objections. This is particularly useful in custody or protective order litigation to prove violations of stay-away zones or unauthorized contact."
In Re Catherine Goodman
COA02
After the death of an individual with outstanding debts, a claimant filed a lawsuit in a Texas district court to recover funds after the estate administrator rejected their claim. However, Texas Estates Code Section 355.064(a) mandates that a claimant must file suit in the specific court of original probate jurisdiction where the estate is pending within 90 days of a rejection. The Second Court of Appeals held that filing in a court of general jurisdiction (like a district court) rather than the specific probate court failed to satisfy the statute. Because the 90-day window had closed, the claim was legally barred. The court granted mandamus relief, ordering the district court to dismiss the case because it had no basis in law.
Litigation Takeaway
"When pursuing an estate for unpaid child support, alimony, or property division, you must strictly adhere to the Texas Estates Code. If an estate administrator rejects your claim, you have exactly 90 days to file suit in the specific court handling the probate. Filing in the family court that issued your decree is a fatal error that will result in your claim being permanently barred once the 90-day deadline passes."
Cunningham v. Smith
COA02
In Cunningham v. Smith, an incarcerated litigant challenged the dismissal of his lawsuit for want of prosecution (DWOP) after he failed to appear at a scheduled dismissal hearing. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the case under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a, noting that while the litigant claimed he mailed a motion to retain, he failed to file a verified motion to reinstate after the case was dismissed. The court held that incarceration does not excuse a party from procedural requirements. Because the plaintiff bypassed the trial court and filed a notice of appeal instead of a motion to reinstate, he waived his due process complaints. The court affirmed the dismissal, finding no abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
"Incarceration is not a "get out of jail free" card for legal deadlines. If your case is dismissed while you are incarcerated, you must file a verified motion to reinstate in the trial court to preserve your right to appeal; filing a notice of appeal alone is insufficient to save your claims."
K. F. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In K. F. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the Third Court of Appeals addressed whether a permanent injunction banning all contact between a mother and her child could be dismissed as a "frivolous" appeal. The mother's attorney filed an Anders brief, suggesting there were no valid legal arguments to challenge the trial court's order. However, the appellate court disagreed, citing recent Texas Supreme Court precedent that treats indefinite no-contact orders with the same constitutional weight as the termination of parental rights. The court held that such restrictive orders require "clear and convincing" evidence and a specific finding that a total ban is the least restrictive means to protect the child. Consequently, the court rejected the Anders brief and ordered the appointment of new counsel to argue the merits of the case.
Litigation Takeaway
"An indefinite or long-term "no-contact" order is effectively the "death penalty" of parental rights; it requires the highest evidentiary standard—clear and convincing evidence—and must be the least restrictive option available to the court."
Pentcheva v. Mundt
COA03
In this case, a biological mother sought to challenge a court order terminating her parental rights through a "bill of review." The trial court denied her request, treating the original termination order as a final, unchangeable judgment. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals analyzed whether the order was truly final given that it arose from a combined "Petition for Termination and Adoption" but failed to address the adoption claim or the co-petitioner (the stepmother). Applying established legal standards for finality, the court determined that because the adoption remained pending and the order did not dispose of all parties and claims, the termination order was merely "interlocutory" (non-final). The court held that the trial court's denial of the mother's challenge was premature and reversed the ruling, remanding the case for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a legal action combines both termination of parental rights and adoption, the case is not legally final until both claims are officially resolved or dismissed by the court. If the adoption piece is left "hanging," the termination order remains open to legal challenges indefinitely, as the standard appellate deadlines never begin to run."
In Re Richard Haddad
COA04
After a father was awarded the right to designate his child’s primary residence and moved to Virginia, the mother filed for a modification within months of the final order. She alleged communication issues and presented photos of bruises (which were later linked to the child's martial arts activities). The trial court granted temporary orders moving the child back to Texas. On appeal, the Fourth Court of Appeals found that the mother's affidavit failed to meet the strict requirements of Texas Family Code Section 156.102, which requires a showing of physical endangerment or significant emotional impairment for modifications sought within one year of a final order. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief, vacating the trial court's orders.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas, the law prioritizes custodial stability during the first year after a final order; to change a child's primary residence during this 'cooling-off period,' a parent must provide specific, factual evidence of endangerment or significant emotional harm, rather than just general complaints about co-parenting friction."
Pimentel v. Maverick Maintenance & Supply, LLC
COA04
In Pimentel v. Maverick Maintenance & Supply, LLC, the plaintiff filed suit in Harris County based on the defendant's principal office location. The defendants successfully moved to transfer the case to Karnes County by arguing that the claims were legally barred by an affirmative defense, effectively 'mini-trialing' the case at the venue stage. The Fourth Court of Appeals reversed the transfer, holding that Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 15.064(a) expressly prohibits courts from considering the ultimate merits of a claim when determining venue. The court concluded that if venue facts are established, a trial court must retain the case regardless of the claim's perceived weakness.
Litigation Takeaway
"Venue is fixed by facts—like where a business is located—not by whether your claims are likely to win. You can stop an opponent from transferring your case by showing that venue rules are satisfied, even if they argue your underlying lawsuit is meritless or barred by legal defenses."
In re Luke B. Berry, M.D.
COA04
In this case, a doctor sought to block discovery of records from business entities he controlled, arguing that because the entities were not parties to the lawsuit, he should not have to produce their records. He also challenged the trial court's authority to reverse its own previous rulings that had initially shielded this information. The Fourth Court of Appeals denied mandamus relief, holding that trial courts maintain 'absolute control' over interlocutory discovery orders and may revisit or overrule them at any time before final judgment. Crucially, the court clarified that under Texas discovery rules, an individual party can be compelled to produce records held by non-party entities if that individual has 'possession, custody, or control' over the documents.
Litigation Takeaway
"Business owners cannot hide behind an 'entity shield' to avoid discovery in divorce or property litigation; if a party has the legal right to access an entity's records, they can be compelled to produce them personally. Furthermore, practitioners should remain aware that discovery 'wins' are interlocutory and subject to being revisited or reversed by the trial court as the case develops."