Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
S. T. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
After a child was injured by a mother's partner, the Department of Family and Protective Services initially sought to terminate the mother's parental rights. However, following the mother’s successful completion of most of her service plan, the Department recommended a monitored return of the child. When the mother later tested positive for marijuana and allowed an unauthorized visitor, the trial court terminated her rights. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals reversed the termination, analyzing the 'best interest' of the child through the Holley factors. The court held that because the Department had previously deemed the home safe for a return and the subsequent violations did not involve physical harm, the evidence was factually insufficient to support the permanent 'death penalty' of civil litigation: the termination of the parent-child bond.
Litigation Takeaway
"Progress in a service plan and Department concessions—like a recommended monitored return—create a powerful defense; if the State later pivots back to termination, they must prove that new, technical violations outweigh your demonstrated ability to provide a safe and stable home."
Akiyode v. McGee
COA14
In Akiyode v. McGee, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether a party could use Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.2 to "pause" (abate) a premature appeal while waiting for a jury trial on remaining claims to conclude. The appellant attempted to appeal an order that explicitly left counterclaims open for a future jury trial, arguing that the appellate court should abate the case until a final judgment could be entered. The Court rejected this argument, clarifying that TRAP 27.2 is a tool for ministerial corrections or minor clarifications of an order’s finality—not a jurisdictional "waiting room" for pending trials. Because substantive claims remained to be adjudicated, the Court held the order was interlocutory and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never file a notice of appeal on a partial or "interlocutory" order with the expectation that the appellate court will hold the case until your trial is finished. Rule 27.2 only allows for the correction of ministerial errors or technical finality issues; it cannot be used to keep a premature appeal alive while the trial court conducts substantive proceedings like a jury trial on remaining claims."
Howell Sand Company, Inc. v. Triple L Utilities, Inc.
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit for want of prosecution (DWOP) following two distinct six-year periods of inactivity. The plaintiff attempted to avoid dismissal by announcing 'ready' for trial after receiving a notice of intent to dismiss and offered excuses of financial hardship and a mistaken belief that a defendant was in bankruptcy. The court analyzed the case using the 'entire history' test, determining that a trial court’s inherent power to dismiss is not curtailed by a last-minute announcement of readiness if the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence throughout the life of the suit. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case or denying reinstatement, as the plaintiff's excuses were insufficient to prove the delay was not the result of conscious indifference.
Litigation Takeaway
"A last-minute 'announcement of ready' or a request for a trial setting will not save a stale case from dismissal for want of prosecution if there is a historical lack of diligence; furthermore, 'lack of funds' is not a legal justification for letting a family law modification or enforcement action languish for years."
In re Eandre Juwon Mott
COA09
In this parentage action, an incarcerated relator sought a writ of mandamus to compel a Jefferson County trial court to hold a hearing on a petition filed five years earlier. The Ninth Court of Appeals denied the petition, finding that the relator failed to provide a proper record or proof of service on the child's mother. The court analyzed the case under the high standards for mandamus relief, concluding that because the relator could not prove the case was "at issue" or that he had diligently pursued a setting, the trial court had no ministerial duty to act.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that requires more than just showing a case has been pending for a long time; you must provide a complete record proving that all parties have been served and that you have made recent, diligent efforts to secure a hearing."
El Paso V Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Reyes
COA08
In El Paso V Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Reyes, a healthcare facility challenged the qualifications of a nurse and a family physician who provided expert reports regarding a patient's pressure wounds. The defendants argued the experts lacked specific nursing home experience. The court analyzed the requirements under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 74, applying a 'lenient standard' that prioritizes the 'type of care' (wound management) over the specific title or facility setting. The court held that the experts' general experience in long-term care and medicine was sufficient to satisfy the threshold requirements, affirming the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss.
Litigation Takeaway
"Don't assume you need a hyper-specialized expert to survive a Chapter 74 challenge; focus on qualifying general practitioners or nurses by linking their experience to the specific 'type of care' or medical protocols at issue rather than the specific facility type."
Carlos v. State
COA07
In Carlos v. State, a defendant on community supervision for family violence and injury to a child had his probation conditions administratively modified (requiring time in an Intermediate Sanction Facility) after violating his terms. Later, the State filed a formal motion to revoke his probation based on the exact same violations. The defendant argued that this violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because he had already been "punished" for that conduct. The Seventh Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that probation modifications are not constitutional "punishment" and that administrative adjustments without a formal hearing do not constitute a final adjudication. The court held that the State is not barred from later seeking formal revocation or adjudication based on conduct that was previously addressed through administrative means.
Litigation Takeaway
"An opposing party’s "administrative" probation modification—such as being sent to a treatment or sanction facility—does not legally resolve their underlying misconduct. In family law litigation, this means a party who has committed domestic violence remains at risk of imminent incarceration for those acts even if they were already "dealt with" by a probation officer, providing powerful evidence of instability in custody and access disputes."
Carlos v. State
COA07
Jayden Louis Carlos challenged the revocation of his community supervision for reckless bodily injury to a child and assault by impeding breath, arguing that the same violations had already been addressed through an administrative modification requiring him to complete an Intermediate Sanction Facility program. The Amarillo Court of Appeals distinguished an administrative modification from a formal adjudication following a motion and evidentiary hearing. Because community-supervision proceedings are remedial rather than punitive, and the earlier modification was neither punishment for double-jeopardy purposes nor a final disposition of the violations, the trial court could rely on the same conduct in a later revocation proceeding. The court also held that Carlos failed to preserve his due-process complaints and that, even if preserved, they lacked merit because no prior formal hearing or disposition had occurred. The court affirmed the adjudication and revocation.
Litigation Takeaway
"An administrative probation sanction does not necessarily put family-violence or child-injury conduct in the past. If no formal revocation hearing and disposition occurred, the State may later seek revocation based on the same violations. In custody and possession litigation, counsel should obtain the complete community-supervision file because administrative modifications may document dangerous conduct and show that a parent still faces incarceration, undermining claims of stability."
In the Matter of C.C., a Juvenile
COA10
In this juvenile law case, a minor (C.C.) challenged a court's jurisdiction to transfer his case to criminal court. He argued that his summons was not served at least two days before the hearing date listed on the document, violating Texas Family Code § 53.07(a). The Tenth Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory language and determined that the 'two-day' requirement refers to the date the hearing actually occurs, rather than the date originally printed on the summons. Because C.C. was served in June and the hearing did not take place until August, the court held the service was timely. The court also ruled that once jurisdiction is established through initial service, subsequent postponements do not require new summons and that appearing for a hearing without objection waives minor clerical errors.
Litigation Takeaway
"Service of process defects regarding hearing dates are often cured by time. If you are served late for an initial date but the hearing is postponed, the statutory window is measured against the actual hearing date. Critically, if you appear and announce 'ready' at a hearing, you waive the right to challenge these types of clerical or timing defects in the summons."
Sanchez v. Gonzales
COA13
In Sanchez v. Gonzales, the appellant attempted to proceed with an appeal without paying filing fees by claiming indigency. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals abated the case multiple times to ensure the trial court complied with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f), which requires a specific written order to deny a claim of indigency. After the trial court conducted a hearing and issued a compliant order finding that the appellant was not indigent, the appellant still failed to remit the required fees. The appellate court analyzed the interplay between indigency protections and mandatory filing requirements, ultimately holding that the appeal must be dismissed for want of prosecution because the appellant failed to comply with the court's fee notices once his indigency claim was formally denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"To stop a stalled or tactical appeal, family law litigants should aggressively challenge false claims of indigency by requesting a Rule 145(f) hearing; once a trial court issues a formal written order finding the opponent can afford costs, their failure to pay filing fees provides a direct path to dismissing the appeal."
Pugh v. Winfield-Pugh
COA14
In a divorce proceeding, Barbara Winfield-Pugh sought to confirm a residence and a vehicle as her separate property. Although property possessed at the time of divorce is presumed to be community property, Barbara provided a 2005 deed and a 2013 title application showing she acquired the assets years before her 2021 marriage. The husband challenged this characterization but failed to appear at the evidentiary hearing to offer rebuttal evidence. The court analyzed the case under the 'Inception of Title' doctrine, which dictates that the character of property is determined at the moment a party first has a right to it. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that Barbara's uncontradicted testimony combined with pre-marital documentary evidence met the 'clear and convincing' standard required to prove separate property.
Litigation Takeaway
"To successfully protect separate property in a Texas divorce, 'Inception of Title' is the gold standard; maintaining original deeds, titles, or purchase agreements dated prior to the marriage provides the necessary documentary evidence to overcome the community property presumption, especially when the other spouse fails to provide contradictory evidence."