Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1262 opinions found
In the Interest of K.L., A Child
COA07
In this parental termination case, a mother appealed a court order terminating her rights after she failed to appear at the final hearing, claiming she lacked actual notice of the trial setting. The Seventh Court of Appeals affirmed the termination, ruling that the mother waived her due process challenge by failing to raise the issue in the trial court through a motion for new trial. Furthermore, the court held that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a, notice provided to a party's attorney is legally imputed to the client. The court emphasized that the mother’s specific instructions to her attorney regarding the hearing—given just days prior to the trial—established that she had actual knowledge of the proceeding, thereby satisfying constitutional notice requirements.
Litigation Takeaway
"Notice given to an attorney is legally considered notice to the client; if a party fails to appear for trial, any claim regarding a lack of notice must be preserved in the trial court via a motion for new trial or it will be waived on appeal."
Mangawe v. The State of Texas
COA02
Bengamiah Mangawe appealed a conviction for continuous sexual abuse, arguing that vague testimony regarding dates (like 'November-ish') failed to meet the 30-day statutory duration requirement. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the evidence under a deferential standard, noting that a detective's testimony about Mangawe’s non-verbal 'nod' or confirmation of the timeline during an interview was substantive evidence. The court held that the jury is the sole arbiter of credibility and can resolve chronological conflicts in favor of the verdict, even when dates are approximate or admissions are not captured on audio.
Litigation Takeaway
"Vague chronological approximations like 'November-ish' are sufficient to prove a pattern of conduct if anchored by a witness who can testify to a party's non-verbal confirmation or 'nod' regarding the timeframe."
In the Interest of S.A., A.A., A.L.A., Children
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of parental rights for M.R. and B.J.A. after their three children were found to have suffered severe physical abuse, neglect, and drug exposure. Despite the mother’s technical completion of some service plan requirements, the court found that her failure to secure stable housing, inconsistent visitation, and lack of accountability for the children's injuries—including a fractured tibia and positive drug tests—created a continuing endangering environment. The court held that under the Texas Family Code, the evidence of endangering conduct and environments was clear and convincing, and termination was in the best interest of the children.
Litigation Takeaway
"Simply 'checking the boxes' of a court-ordered service plan is not enough to prevent the termination of parental rights; Texas courts require evidence of actual behavioral change and a demonstrated ability to provide a safe, stable environment."
Keenan Deandre Black v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Black v. State, the court addressed a conflict where a trial judge orally waived a $6,000 fine during sentencing, yet the final written judgment still included the charge. Additionally, the defendant argued his probation should not be revoked because his supervision officer had allegedly modified his deadlines. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the 'Rendition vs. Entry' doctrine, affirming that a judge's oral pronouncement in open court is the legally operative event that controls over a conflicting written document. Furthermore, the court held that community supervision is a judicial order, not a private contract, meaning only a judge—not a probation officer—has the authority to modify its terms. The court modified the judgment to delete the fine but upheld the probation revocation.
Litigation Takeaway
"The judge’s oral ruling from the bench is the ultimate authority; if your written decree contains errors or extra terms not mentioned by the judge, the oral record can be used to fix it. More importantly, never rely on 'side deals' or verbal permission from caseworkers or third parties to deviate from a court order—only a formal, judge-signed modification can legally protect you."
Keenan DeAndre Black v. The State of Texas
COA02
In this case, a trial court orally waived a $6,000 statutory fine for a defendant found to be indigent, yet the subsequent written judgment erroneously included the fine. On appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed the conflict between the judge's verbal ruling and the written record. The court analyzed the 'bench controls the pen' doctrine, which dictates that an oral pronouncement made in open court is the legally binding judgment, while the written order is merely a record of that act. Finding a clear conflict, the court held that the oral waiver must prevail and modified the written judgment to delete the $6,000 fine.
Litigation Takeaway
"The 'bench controls the pen': in Texas, if a trial judge’s oral ruling contradicts the written decree, the oral version wins. Always compare the court reporter’s transcript to the final written order to catch 'judgment creep'—additional terms or fees added by opposing counsel that the judge never actually ordered."
YOLANDA HERNANDEZ, Appellant v. EKISRA FRED LOUNNARATH AND AMX PCS, INC., Appellee
COA05
When a party fails to appear for trial, leading to a dismissal for want of prosecution, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a(3) requires the court to reinstate the case if the failure was due to an 'accident or mistake' rather than 'conscious indifference.' In this case, a law firm missed a trial setting because of a clerical calendaring error and a mistaken belief that a proposed scheduling order would be signed. The trial court denied reinstatement, finding the attorney's reliance on unsigned orders unreasonable. The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that even if an attorney’s mistake is negligent or 'objectively unreasonable,' it does not constitute conscious indifference. As long as the failure to appear was not intentional or a purposeful disregard of the court's authority, the trial court must reinstate the case.
Litigation Takeaway
"A simple clerical error or an 'unreasonable' misunderstanding of a court deadline is sufficient to reinstate a dismissed case, as the law protects litigants from losing their day in court due to an attorney’s non-intentional administrative mistakes."
Messele Kelel v. Dallas Central Appraisal District
COA05
In Messele Kelel v. Dallas Central Appraisal District, a property owner challenged a $74,250 tax valuation, presenting evidence of lower-priced comparable sales and internal settlement offers from the appraisal district as low as $30,000. The trial court granted a 'no-evidence' summary judgment in favor of the appraisal district, effectively dismissing the owner's claims. The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed this decision, ruling that the owner's evidence—specifically the comparable data and the district's own lower offers—constituted 'more than a scintilla' of evidence. The court held that while this evidence did not prove the property's value as a matter of law, it was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that must be resolved at trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"To defeat a 'no-evidence' motion for summary judgment regarding property value, you do not always need a formal expert appraisal; even informal evidence like tax records, comparable sales, or internal settlement offers can meet the 'scintilla' threshold to keep your claim alive for trial."
In re Steven Broomfield and Lisa Broomfield
COA06
Relators sought a writ of mandamus to compel a Panola County court to grant a mandatory transfer of a SAPCR proceeding to Smith County, where an adoption was pending, pursuant to Texas Family Code Section 155.201(a-1). The child's mother had filed a controverting affidavit, and the trial court had scheduled a hearing on the matter. The Sixth Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory framework, noting that while Section 155.201(a-1) is mandatory, Section 155.204(e) requires a hearing when a transfer is contested. The court held that mandamus relief was inappropriate because the Relators failed to show that the trial court had refused to rule or that an unreasonable amount of time had passed, especially since a hearing was already on the docket.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus relief is not a shortcut to bypass statutory hearing requirements; even for "mandatory" transfers, you must allow the trial court a reasonable opportunity to conduct a scheduled hearing and issue a ruling before seeking appellate intervention."
In Re Germania Farm Mutual Insurance Association
COA13
In an insurance appraisal dispute, a trial court struck a contractually appointed neutral umpire and unilaterally appointed a replacement based on the homeowner's claim of bias. The evidence of bias was solely a prior order from an unrelated case where another judge had set aside one of the umpire's awards. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion, concluding that 'prior bad acts' in unrelated matters do not meet the high evidentiary bar for 'evident partiality.' The court emphasized that specific evidence of bias in the current proceeding is required and that trial courts cannot ignore contractually mandated selection processes when appointing replacements.
Litigation Takeaway
"Parties cannot disqualify a court-appointed professional—such as a custody evaluator or receiver—based on vague reputations or prior adverse rulings in unrelated cases; disqualification requires specific, admissible proof of bias or partiality within the current litigation."
Caldwell v. Quaid
COA14
In a divorce proceeding involving complex property characterization, the Husband designated an expert for tracing and valuation but failed to provide the actual tracing reports until six days before trial. The trial court excluded the late-disclosed tracing testimony while permitting testimony on the timely-disclosed valuation. On appeal, the Husband argued the exclusion constituted an improper 'death-penalty' sanction. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, clarifying that the exclusion was a mandatory application of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6. The court held that because the ruling did not preclude the Husband's entire defense or claim, it did not rise to the level of a death-penalty sanction and was a proper exercise of discretion due to the lack of good cause or showing of non-prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
"Discovery deadlines are strictly enforced for expert reports in property disputes; a trial continuance does not automatically reset these deadlines. Practitioners should never use 'to be provided' as a placeholder in expert designations and must produce the substance of tracing opinions within the discovery period to avoid the 'automatic' exclusion of evidence under Rule 193.6."