Weekly Digest
October 31 – November 6, 2026
29 opinions this week
Joseph Thompson and Thompson Custom Properties, LLC v. High Equity Investments, LLC
COA03
Thompson prevailed on one breach-of-contract claim—the only claim authorizing attorney’s fees—and sought $327,617.30 after making his own entry-specific reductions for nonrecoverable work. High Equity countered with counsel’s testimony that the recoverable claim was factually distinct and substantially less demanding than the other disputes, identified billing entries that remained unsegregated, and opined that only 20% of the total fees was attributable to the recoverable claim. Applying Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa and Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, the Third Court of Appeals held that segregation may be proved through a reasoned percentage allocation and that a trial court need not accept the fee applicant’s more granular methodology. Because the billing records established the services, hours, personnel, and rates, while the opposing testimony supported the 20% allocation, the court upheld the $115,299.41 fee award.
Litigation Takeaway
“Attorney-fee segregation is a contested evidentiary issue, not a calculation controlled by the fee applicant. A party challenging fees should offer a qualified witness who reviews the invoices, identifies work attributable to nonrecoverable claims, compares the claims’ relative complexity and demands, gives concrete examples, and proposes a reasoned alternative percentage. Conversely, a fee applicant should connect every category of work to a legal basis for recovery and explain—not merely assert—why common work is intertwined or why the chosen allocation is reasonable.”
E. L. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
The Texas Third Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of a mother’s parental rights after the Department presented evidence of recurring marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine use; threats and aggression toward a caseworker; refusal to continue safety measures; and persistent instability affecting the children. Analyzing the evidence cumulatively, the court held that it was legally and factually sufficient to establish both that the mother knowingly allowed the children to remain in endangering conditions under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and that she engaged in a voluntary, continuing course of endangering conduct under § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Although the mother met some of the children’s needs and maintained a bond with them, the children’s need for permanence, their behavioral and emotional difficulties, and their improvement in a stable placement also supported the finding that termination was in their best interests.
Litigation Takeaway
“Endangerment should be proved or defended through a complete chronology rather than by treating each event in isolation. Repeated drug use, threats, resistance to safety plans, and resulting instability can collectively establish both an endangering environment and an endangering course of conduct—even when the parent meets some immediate needs and the children remain bonded to the parent. Counsel should separately develop the elements of subsections (D) and (E), connect drug use and volatility to parenting risk, preserve communications and placement evidence, and directly address favorable evidence.”
McClure v. State
COA05
In this criminal appeal, James Hunter McClure challenged his sexual-assault conviction, arguing in part that the prosecution was time-barred and that testimony concerning two similar alleged sexual assaults was inadmissible. The Fifth Court of Appeals held that the DNA-based exception to the limitations period applied because biological evidence collected during the investigation produced an unknown male profile that did not match the complainant or another readily ascertainable person. It further held that defense cross-examination suggesting an innocent or consensual explanation for McClure’s DNA opened the door to the other complainants’ testimony as rebuttal evidence. Given the material similarities among the incidents, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rules 404(b) and 403. The court affirmed the conviction but remanded for recalculation of mandatory jail-time credit and correction of the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“Cross-examination can change the evidentiary landscape. When counsel suggests consent, accident, fabrication, mistake, or another innocent explanation, the court may admit otherwise excluded similar-incident evidence to rebut that theory. Before advancing an alternative explanation—especially after a conditional pretrial ruling—family-law litigators should identify what prior acts, communications, records, or third-party testimony the questioning may make admissible, preserve relevance and Rule 403 objections, and request a limiting instruction when appropriate.”
Sanjay Khanduja, Independent Administrator with Will Annexed to the Estate of Dr. R.K. Dhingra v. Malachite Venture Corp.
COA01
The Estate sued Malachite and others over title to real property, alleging that a deed in Malachite’s chain of title contained a forged signature. After Malachite moved for summary judgment—but before the trial court rendered judgment—the Estate filed a notice nonsuiting all of its claims against Malachite. Applying Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 162 and 163, the First Court of Appeals concluded that the party-specific nonsuit was timely, became effective immediately upon filing without a court order, and caused no legally cognizable prejudice shown by the record. Because the nonsuit extinguished the Estate’s claims against Malachite, the trial court could not later adjudicate their merits by summary judgment. Malachite’s independent counterclaims and cross-claims remained pending to the extent they sought affirmative relief. The appellate court reversed the challenged judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
“A party may nonsuit all of its claims against one litigant in a multiparty case before judgment is rendered, even when a summary-judgment motion is pending. The nonsuit takes effect upon filing and prevents a later merits ruling on those claims, but it does not extinguish another party’s independent counterclaims, cross-claims, sanctions requests, attorney’s-fee claims, or costs. Family-law counsel should file before rendition, identify exactly which claims and parties are being dismissed, and audit the pleadings for relief that survives.”
Pahuja v. Colors of Brazil, LLC
COA07
After a two-week bench trial, the appellants timely requested findings of fact and conclusions of law and filed a notice of past-due findings, but the trial judge resigned without issuing them. Because the case involved disputed matters and potentially multiple grounds for the judgment, the Seventh Court of Appeals concluded that the record did not affirmatively show the omission was harmless. The court held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18 authorized the successor judge to issue the missing findings and conclusions, and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.4 required abatement and remand to correct the omission rather than reversal for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“After a family-law bench trial, timely request findings and file a Rule 297 notice if they become past due—even if the trial judge leaves office. When missing findings prevent meaningful appellate review, explain the disputed issues and alternative grounds for the judgment; if a successor judge can supply the findings under Rule 18, the usual remedy is abatement for correction, not an automatic new trial.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Hatif Bin Basharat and Maham Tariq and in the Interest of F.H.M., I.H.M., and A.H.M., Children
COA05
In a Texas divorce involving three children, the father argued that Texas had to decide custody because it was the children’s UCCJEA home state and he satisfied Texas residency requirements. The mother sought dismissal in favor of Ontario, citing alleged domestic violence and prior Canadian child-protection involvement, her expiring visitor status and inability to work in Texas, limited finances and housing, family support in Canada, and the location of relevant witnesses and records. The Fifth Court of Appeals explained that home-state jurisdiction under Texas Family Code § 152.201 gives a court authority to decide custody but does not require it to exercise that authority. Applying the inconvenient-forum factors in § 152.207 and reviewing for abuse of discretion, the court held that the developed evidentiary record supported Ontario as the more appropriate forum. It also concluded that the father’s Texas residency did not mandate a Texas custody proceeding and that the Hague Convention’s habitual-residence analysis did not control because no Hague return proceeding was involved. The court affirmed the dismissal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Home-state status is not the end of a UCCJEA forum dispute. A party seeking to keep or move a custody case must build an admissible, factor-by-factor record under Texas Family Code § 152.207, particularly concerning family violence, immigration and work authorization, finances, housing, support networks, and the location of witnesses and records. Counsel should also distinguish custody jurisdiction from divorce jurisdiction and specify whether Texas should dismiss or stay only the custody claims while retaining other issues.”
Stone v. Stone
COA03
After an earlier appeal invalidated an indefinite “as agreed” possession provision, the trial court entered a specific possession schedule for a mother living in Portugal and appointed a friend of the court under Texas Family Code § 107.021 to draft an order reflecting the court’s announced ruling. The mother argued that the appointment improperly delegated judicial authority, denied due process, exceeded the appellate mandate, and resulted in overly restrictive possession terms. The Third Court of Appeals concluded that the friend’s role was ministerial because the judge decided the substantive terms, allowed the parties to review and object to the proposed order, ruled on those objections, and independently signed the final order. The court also held that the definite schedule complied with the mandate, makeup possession was not required, and longer possession periods coordinated with school breaks were reasonable given the children’s schooling in Texas and the mother’s residence abroad. The court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“A trial court may appoint a friend of the court to reduce an announced custody ruling to writing, but the judge must retain all substantive decision-making authority. Counsel should obtain a detailed ruling on the record, compare the proposed order provision by provision with that ruling, make specific objections before entry, and ensure that possession terms are definite, enforceable, and supported by the family’s practical circumstances.”
In Re Frontier Custom Builders, Inc.
COA09
Frontier Custom Builders sought mandamus relief after the trial court barred it from further questioning a material witness based on alleged witness influence. Although the trial court stated that death-penalty sanctions were unwarranted, the Ninth Court of Appeals examined the order’s practical effect and concluded that it was case-determinative because it prevented Frontier from developing material liability evidence. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215.2 and TransAmerican, the court held that the record did not show that lesser sanctions had been tested, meaningfully considered, or found ineffective. Because the restriction was more severe than necessary and could not be adequately remedied on appeal, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“Courts evaluate sanctions by their practical effect, not their label. Before a family court excludes evidence or testimony in a way that effectively decides custody, property, enforcement, or another disputed issue, it must connect the remedy to the misconduct and create a record showing why lesser sanctions would not work. Counsel facing such an order should propose narrower alternatives, preserve the excluded proof, request findings, and promptly consider mandamus relief.”
Soria v. State
COA11
Juan Soria III appealed his family-violence assault conviction after the complainant, his former wife, remained in the courtroom following her initial testimony, heard other witnesses testify, and was later recalled by the defense. The Eleventh Court of Appeals explained that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 36.03 and Texas Rule of Evidence 614(d) do not automatically require exclusion of a victim-witness. The party seeking exclusion must make a timely, specific request and show that hearing other testimony would materially affect the victim’s testimony. Because Soria neither requested her exclusion at the appropriate time nor made the required evidentiary showing—and because her later testimony did not concern the assault details addressed by the intervening witnesses—the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court found no demonstrated harm and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Invoking “the rule” alone may not exclude a victim-witness. Counsel must timely request that witness’s exclusion, establish on the record how exposure to other testimony could materially influence later testimony, obtain a ruling, and connect any claimed violation to specific changes in the witness’s account. In related divorce, custody, or protective-order litigation, precise transcript comparisons are far more persuasive than generalized claims of coaching or influence.”
In the Interest of A.R., a Child
COA02
In a Title IV-D SAPCR modification proceeding, Father timely requested de novo review of an associate judge’s rulings that found family violence, made Mother sole managing conservator, and denied Father possession of or access to the child. The referring court denied Father’s requests but did not find waiver or untimeliness and did not approve or adopt the associate judge’s rulings. Applying Texas Family Code §§ 201.015, 201.1041, and 201.1042, the court of appeals held that a timely, compliant de novo request prevents an associate judge’s proposed order from becoming the referring court’s judgment by operation of law. Because neither the associate judge’s rulings nor the referring court’s bare denials constituted a final, appealable judgment, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction without reaching Father’s substantive challenges.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not confuse an associate judge’s enforceable ruling with a final, appealable judgment. A timely and specific de novo request in a Title IV-D case generally prevents automatic finality, and the referring court’s bare denial does not create appellate jurisdiction. Counsel should attend the de novo hearing, secure a clear ruling concerning waiver, adoption, or the merits, confirm finality before appealing, and consider mandamus when the referring court improperly refuses to conduct required de novo review.”
In the Interest of J.R.M., a Child
COA13
After a SAPCR modification case was dismissed for want of prosecution, newly retained counsel filed a Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a(3) motion to reinstate supported by his own affidavit. Although counsel stated that the motion’s allegations were within his personal knowledge, the record showed that he entered the case only after dismissal and had not personally participated in the earlier prosecution, mediation, or docket activity. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that the conclusory affidavit did not properly verify the motion because counsel lacked personal knowledge of the material historical facts. As a result, the motion neither triggered Rule 165a’s mandatory-hearing requirement nor extended the appellate deadline under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a). Because the notice of appeal was filed seventy-nine days after the dismissal order, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“A Rule 165a motion to reinstate must be verified by someone with actual personal knowledge of the relevant prosecution history; new counsel cannot establish personal knowledge merely by reviewing the file or reciting affidavit language. Use the client, former counsel, or multiple competent affiants as necessary, and independently calendar the ordinary thirty-day appellate deadline. If the verification’s validity is uncertain, file a protective notice of appeal rather than assume the motion extended the timetable.”
Prosperity Bank v. Steed
COA02
During Christina and Robert Steed’s divorce, the trial court appointed a receiver—without notifying Prosperity Bank—to control and sell real property owned by the spouses’ LLC and pledged as collateral for a $1 million loan. The Second Court of Appeals held that the real estate was “fixed and immovable property” under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 695 and that the bank, as a deed-of-trust lienholder, was an adverse party entitled to at least three days’ pre-appointment notice. Neither the divorce court’s authority under Texas Family Code § 6.502(a)(5) nor its equitable receivership power displaced Rule 695, and the bank’s later participation did not cure the notice violation. The court reversed the order denying the bank’s motion to dissolve and rendered an order dissolving the receivership.
Litigation Takeaway
“Before seeking a receiver over real estate in a divorce, identify and give Rule 695 notice to every lender, lienholder, and other adverse claimant. Urgency, alter-ego allegations, and the court’s Family Code authority do not excuse pre-appointment notice, and a later hearing will not cure the defect. Counsel should consider a temporary restraining order or another less drastic remedy while notice is provided; an improperly appointed receiver is subject to dissolution and interlocutory appeal.”
Hernandez v. State
COA11
Christian Emmanuel Hernandez appealed his assault-family-violence conviction, arguing that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 36.14 required the trial court to add his requested instruction directing the jury to acquit if it had a reasonable doubt. Reviewing the charge as a whole, the Eleventh Court of Appeals concluded that the existing application paragraph already correctly placed the burden of proof on the State and expressly required a not-guilty verdict if the State failed to prove any element beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Hernandez’s proposed language was virtually identical to—and adequately covered by—the charge given, refusing it was neither error nor harmful. The court overruled the issue and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“A party is not entitled to a duplicative jury instruction merely because it restates or emphasizes a correctly submitted legal principle. To preserve a meaningful charge complaint, counsel should identify a substantive omission, tie the requested language to controlling and current authority, explain why the existing charge is inadequate, and show how the omission could affect the verdict. In family-violence matters overlapping with criminal proceedings, counsel should also review the actual criminal charge and verdict before assessing the conviction’s effect on custody, possession, protective orders, or related family-law issues.”
Rubio v. State
COA13
In this criminal appeal with direct relevance to Texas family-law expert practice, Rubio challenged a forensic scientist’s qualifications under Texas Rule of Evidence 702 and conducted voir dire, but the trial court never expressly or implicitly ruled on the objection. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1, the court held that an objection and supporting examination do not preserve error without an adverse ruling or an objection to the trial court’s refusal to rule. The court also rejected Rubio’s remaining evidentiary and cumulative-harm arguments because some complaints were unpreserved and none established reversible error, and it affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“Making a Rule 702 objection and conducting extensive voir dire are not enough to preserve an expert challenge for appeal. Counsel must obtain an express or implicit ruling on each asserted ground—or object on the record if the trial court refuses to rule—and should follow up on any objection the court carries or takes under advisement.”
In the Interest of J.K., a Child
COA02
After Mother filed a bill of review more than a year after a default judgment terminated her parental rights, Father invoked Texas Family Code § 161.211(a), which generally bars direct or collateral attacks on qualifying termination orders after six months. The trial court treated the deadline as jurisdictional and dismissed the case on a plea to the jurisdiction. The Second Court of Appeals held that the statute restricts the availability of relief but does not clearly withdraw the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. It therefore reversed and remanded without deciding whether the statutory bar, Mother’s due-process allegations, or the bill-of-review requirements ultimately entitled either party to judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“A mandatory deadline is not necessarily jurisdictional. Counsel defending a termination order should assert § 161.211(a) as a statutory bar through an appropriate merits-based procedure—not solely through a plea to the jurisdiction—and preserve alternative defenses. A petitioner who defeats a jurisdictional dismissal still must overcome the six-month bar and prove every requirement for bill-of-review relief.”
In re Dorothy Marshall Living Trust
COA05
The Dorothy Marshall Living Trust sought mandamus relief challenging former Justice Robert Burns’s assignment to a civil case because the administrative-region list identified his specialty as criminal matters. The Dallas Court of Appeals concluded that the petition challenged the assigning judge’s conduct rather than a reviewable act by the named respondent, failed to state precise relief, and lacked an authenticated record showing a ruling or refusal by Judge Burns. Alternatively, the Trust did not satisfy the predicate-request requirement because a footnote in a recusal motion was not a specific objection or request for relief, and it waived its specialty-based challenge by failing to object within the deadline under Texas Government Code § 74.053(c). The court held that the alleged specialty mismatch was waivable rather than a nonwaivable jurisdictional defect and denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“Treat notice of a visiting or assigned judge as an immediate deadline: investigate and file any specialty-based objection by the earlier of seven days after actual notice or the start of the first hearing. To preserve mandamus relief, make a specific request to the judge who will be named as respondent, obtain a ruling or refusal, precisely identify the relief sought, and submit a fully authenticated record; a passing reference in a footnote or unrelated recusal motion is insufficient.”
In the Interest of J.B.L., a Child
COA04
The Department sought to terminate Mother’s parental rights based in part on alleged endangerment arising from drug use. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that clear and convincing evidence did not support Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E) because the Department did not connect Mother’s historical or post-removal drug use to a conscious course of conduct that endangered J.B.L. during pregnancy or while the child was in her care. Although due process required review and deletion of the challenged subsection (E) finding because of its potential future consequences under subsection (M), the court affirmed termination as modified based on the unchallenged subsection (N) and (O) grounds and the supported best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
“Evidence of drug use does not automatically prove subsection (E) endangerment. Counsel must establish when the conduct occurred, how it impaired parenting or exposed the child to danger, and that it formed a conscious course of conduct. Parent-side appellate counsel should separately challenge unsupported subsection (D) or (E) findings even when another ground supports termination, because deleting those findings may prevent their use in a later case involving another child.”
Julian Castillo Huerta v. The State of Texas
COA12
A child told her mother that Huerta caused a hickey but did not disclose the alleged sexual contact until a later Children’s Advocacy Center interview. Huerta argued that the mother or grandmother, rather than the CAC interviewer, was the proper outcry witness under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.072. Applying the rule that the outcry witness is the first adult to receive a discernible statement describing the offense—not merely a general suggestion of abuse—the Twelfth Court of Appeals held that the trial court acted within its discretion in designating the CAC interviewer. The earlier communications lacked sufficient detail, the grandmother’s information was secondhand, and any error was harmless because the child testified without objection to the same material facts.
Litigation Takeaway
“In cases involving a child’s abuse disclosure, build a precise chronology of what the child said, to whom, and when. The first adult to hear a general concern is not necessarily the first witness to receive a legally significant description of abuse. Counsel should establish the exact content of each disclosure, distinguish direct statements from secondhand reports, identify the governing hearsay rule, and preserve error by objecting to materially similar evidence when it is offered.”
In the Interest of A.S., B.S., and E.S., Children
COA05
In this divorce and conservatorship dispute, Father challenged the trial court’s failure to rule again on his motion for new trial, its statement that plenary power had expired, and its exclusion of his untimely disclosed witnesses and exhibits under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the new-trial motion was automatically overruled 75 days after the final decree because no signed written order had determined it. Although the trial court apparently miscalculated when its plenary power expired, it had no duty to rule again on the already-denied motion, and Father did not show that the error was harmful. The court also upheld the evidentiary rulings because Father failed to establish good cause or lack of unfair surprise or prejudice and did not provide a complete reporter’s record. The court affirmed the final divorce decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“Calendar post-judgment deadlines from the date the judgment is signed: a motion for new trial is automatically denied on day 75 unless the court signs a written order, even though plenary power may continue for another 30 days. A hearing, docket entry, or informal communication is not a substitute for a signed order. Family-law litigants must also timely disclose evidence and witnesses, build a record supporting any Rule 193.6 exception, and provide a complete appellate record to obtain meaningful review.”
In the Interest of A.R. and K.G., Children
COA06
The Department sought to terminate Father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), alleging that his drug use, domestic violence, criminal history, and instability endangered A.R.’s conditions or surroundings, and under § 161.001(b)(1)(N) for constructive abandonment. The Sixth Court of Appeals concluded that the Department’s witnesses offered largely generalized concerns and allegations, without clear and convincing evidence identifying a dangerous environment in which Father knowingly placed or allowed A.R. to remain. Under In re N.G., the court reviewed the challenged ground (D) finding despite the unchallenged ground (N) finding because a ground (D) finding can carry consequences in later termination proceedings. The court modified the judgment to delete the unsupported ground (D) finding but otherwise affirmed termination based on the unchallenged constructive-abandonment and best-interest findings.
Litigation Takeaway
“Termination evidence must be tied to the precise statutory ground: allegations of drugs, family violence, criminal conduct, or instability do not establish ground (D) without proof of a specific endangering environment, the child’s exposure to it, and the parent’s knowledge. Appellate counsel should challenge unsupported ground (D) and (E) findings even when another ground independently supports termination, because deleting those findings can protect the parent in future cases involving other children.”
Ex parte Otha Gary Washington
COA14
Washington sought habeas relief after a Texas trial court denied him bail under article I, section 11d(b) of the Texas Constitution on a charge that he shot his girlfriend with a firearm. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the Fourteenth Court held that section 11d(b) establishes alternative grounds for detention, so the State did not need to prove a risk of willful nonappearance if clear and convincing evidence showed that bail could not reasonably ensure safety. The alleged firearm assault, the complainant’s contemporaneous fear of retaliation and death, and Washington’s two prior aggravated-assault convictions—including a firearm assault against a family member—supported the safety finding. The court therefore affirmed the denial of habeas relief despite the absence of flight-risk evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
“A criminal bail-denial ruling is not a final finding that family violence occurred, but the evidence underlying it can be highly consequential in protective-order, conservatorship, and possession litigation. Counsel should obtain and independently present admissible evidence such as victim statements, firearm evidence, medical and police records, and prior similar convictions, while carefully distinguishing the burdens and issues in criminal and family court and coordinating around bond conditions, no-contact orders, and Fifth Amendment concerns.”
In the Interest of L.M., a Child
COA05
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed suit to terminate Mother’s parental rights and was appointed L.M.’s temporary managing conservator. Under Texas Family Code § 263.401(a), the trial court’s jurisdiction expired on March 23, 2026, because trial had not commenced and no qualifying extension had been granted by the statutory deadline. The Fifth Court of Appeals held that the extension order signed the following day was void and could not revive jurisdiction; neither the parties’ participation nor a later nunc pro tunc order cured the defect. The court vacated the termination order and dismissed both the underlying suit and the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Treat the § 263.401 dismissal date as a jurisdictional deadline, not a flexible scheduling date. In a DFPS termination case, counsel must ensure that trial actually commences or that the court grants a statutorily compliant extension before jurisdiction expires. A late extension, party agreement, participation, or nunc pro tunc order cannot revive the case, and appellate counsel should independently verify the deadline even when no party objected below.”
Theriot v. Scallion
COA14
After a default order increased Ashton Aaron Theriot’s child-support obligation and confirmed a medical-support arrearage, Theriot sought a bill of review, claiming lack of service and jurisdictional defects. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals explained that although complete nonservice relieves a bill-of-review plaintiff from proving a meritorious defense and opposing-party misconduct, the plaintiff must still prove that service did not occur. Because the record contained a facially valid citation signed by the district clerk and bearing the court’s seal, Theriot’s uncorroborated assertions and mistaken contention that a judge had to sign the citation did not overcome the presumption of valid service. The court also declined to consider challenges to the underlying support order because the bill of review had not been granted and rejected Theriot’s jurisdictional arguments. It affirmed the order denying the bill of review.
Litigation Takeaway
“A party seeking to set aside a default family-law judgment based on nonservice needs admissible, independent evidence that service never occurred; allegations, technical objections, and the party’s uncorroborated testimony generally will not defeat a facially valid return. Counsel defending the judgment should preserve the citation, return, and supporting delivery records, while counsel challenging it should obtain corroborating witnesses, address records, delivery evidence, or other proof of actual nonservice. Errors in the underlying order cannot be litigated unless the bill of review is first granted.”
In the Interest of L.Z.R., a Child
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered whether legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding under Texas Family Code § 161.001(f)(1) that, despite the Department’s reasonable reunification efforts, a continuing danger prevented Mother from safely regaining custody of her child. Applying the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and heightened sufficiency review applicable to parental-termination cases, the court evaluated Mother’s circumstances at the time of trial rather than her promises of future improvement. Her unsuitable housing, lack of dependable income, unresolved substance abuse, missed and positive drug tests, criminal exposure, history of instability, and credibility problems collectively permitted a firm belief or conviction that the danger remained. The court affirmed the continuing-danger and best-interest findings, termination of Mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and the Department’s appointment as sole managing conservator.
Litigation Takeaway
“In a Department-filed termination case, § 161.001(f)(1) is an independent proof-and-drafting requirement: counsel must present clear and convincing evidence of reasonable reunification efforts and continuing danger, and the order must state specific findings in a separate section. Promises of future housing, sobriety, employment, or criminal compliance generally will not overcome objective evidence that those risks remain unresolved at trial. A parent seeking more time should offer a concrete, corroborated transition plan because the request may otherwise reinforce that immediate return is unsafe.”
Sajida Corporation, Shareef Enterprises Inc., and Imaad Thouseef v. Seawall Investors, LLC as Assignee of Omair Bashir, and JB Rental Properties, LLC
COA14
A failed package sale of two convenience-store properties led the purchasers to assert contract, tort, declaratory, and equitable claims against the sellers. After the trial court awarded substantive relief and attorney’s fees to the purchasers, the sellers appealed. Applying Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, the Fourteenth Court held that overlapping facts do not excuse a fee claimant from segregating fees incurred solely on recoverable claims from those incurred solely on nonrecoverable claims; only discrete legal services that advance both types of claims may remain unsegregated. Because the purchasers’ evidence neither adequately segregated the fees nor established that all claimed services satisfied that exception, the court reversed the attorney’s-fee award and remanded for redetermination, while affirming the remainder of the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a case combines claims with different attorney’s-fee rules, begin segregating fees when the claims are pleaded—not when preparing the fee affidavit. Use task-specific billing and fee testimony to identify work performed solely for recoverable claims, exclude work performed solely for nonrecoverable claims, and explain which discrete services actually advanced both. Shared facts, witnesses, or documents alone do not make all fees recoverable.”
In the Interest of P.S.-S., a Child
COA07
The father appealed the termination of his parental rights, challenging only the legal and factual sufficiency of the finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. The Seventh Court of Appeals applied the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, the Holley factors, and Texas Family Code sections 161.001(b)(2) and 263.307(b), emphasizing that best interest must be proved independently of any predicate termination ground and that incarceration alone is insufficient. The court nevertheless concluded that the father’s lengthy incarceration, uncertain release date, limited efforts to maintain contact, failure to complete available parenting materials, and speculative plans for placement and post-release care—considered alongside the child’s stable placement with a maternal uncle who intended to adopt her and her sibling—supported a firm conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest. The court affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
“Incarceration alone does not prove that termination is in a child’s best interest, but prolonged confinement combined with minimal parent-child contact, incomplete available services, and an unverified reunification or relative-placement plan can support termination when the child has a stable path to permanence. Counsel for an incarcerated parent should document consistent communication, completion of every available service, specific institutional barriers, and a concrete, verified caregiving plan; petitioners must still build a best-interest record independent of the predicate grounds.”
Ahmeti v. CNB Global, Inc.
COA07
CNB Global sued Mefmet Ahmeti and three business entities arising from a restaurant asset purchase, then obtained a no-answer default judgment after attempting substituted service through the Texas Secretary of State. The court applied Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 124, Texas Business Organizations Code §§ 5.251 and 5.253, and the strict-compliance standard governing service before a default judgment. Although the Secretary’s certificate showed that process had been forwarded to Ahmeti at the entities’ registered-agent address, § 5.253 required process to be sent to each named entity at its most recent address on file. Because the record affirmatively showed that process was sent to the wrong recipient and address, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the entities. The appellate court held that service on the entities was invalid, reversed the default judgment against them, and remanded that portion of the case while affirming the judgment in part.
Litigation Takeaway
“Treat every family-owned company joined in a divorce or property dispute as a separate defendant. Before seeking entity-specific relief by default, verify that the record strictly complies with every applicable service requirement—including proof that the Secretary of State forwarded process to the entity’s most recent address on file. Service on an owner, spouse, or registered agent, actual notice, and overlapping ownership do not cure defective service or establish personal jurisdiction over the entity.”
In Re W. Murray Thompson Construction Co., Inc.
COA13
After a construction-accident jury returned findings that supported a take-nothing judgment for the general contractor, the trial court granted the plaintiffs a new trial based on contractual-control and evidentiary-insufficiency grounds. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 320 and the standards established by In re Columbia Medical Center of Las Colinas and In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., the court of appeals held that a new-trial order setting aside a jury verdict must state specific, legally appropriate reasons that are supported by the record. Because the trial court’s stated grounds did not survive merits-based review, and an appeal after retrial would not adequately protect the contractor’s original verdict and judgment, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the trial court to vacate the new-trial order and reinstate the take-nothing judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“A trial court cannot set aside a jury verdict merely by issuing a detailed new-trial order; every stated reason must be legally valid and supported by the trial record. In divorce and SAPCR jury cases, counsel should identify whether each challenged finding is binding or advisory, obtain a signed order specifying each new-trial ground, and promptly consider mandamus when unsupported grounds deprive a client of a favorable verdict and judgment.”
Team DGR, LLC v. Kang
COA06
After Young Mo Kang filed a personal-injury suit outside the facial two-year limitations period, Team DGR, LLC sought traditional summary judgment, arguing that limitations barred the claim despite Kang’s assertion that accident-related cognitive impairment tolled limitations under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 16.001. Applying Draughon v. Johnson and Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., the court held that a traditional summary-judgment movant must conclusively negate a properly raised tolling doctrine and that the relevant inquiry is whether the claimant could understand, participate in, and control the litigation—not merely whether the claimant retained counsel or performed ordinary activities. Because Kang’s medical evidence raised a genuine fact issue regarding his litigation capacity, Team DGR failed to establish its limitations defense as a matter of law, and the trial court properly denied summary judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“A party seeking traditional summary judgment on limitations must conclusively negate any properly raised unsound-mind tolling claim. Retaining counsel, filing claims, driving, or handling routine tasks may show functionality, but those facts do not conclusively prove that a person could understand and direct litigation when competent medical evidence indicates cognitive impairment. Family-law counsel should evaluate litigation-specific capacity and choose carefully between traditional and no-evidence summary-judgment procedures.”