In the Interest of J.K., a Child

In the Interest of J.K., a Child, 02-26-00060-CV, November 05, 2026.

On appeal from 78th District Court, Wichita County, Texas

Synopsis

Texas Family Code Section 161.211(a)’s six-month bar on attacking certain parental-rights termination orders does not deprive the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over a later-filed bill of review. Because the statute did not support dismissal for want of jurisdiction, the Second Court of Appeals reversed and remanded without deciding whether the bill of review was otherwise barred or meritorious.

Relevance to Family Law

The immediate significance of In re J.K. is procedural: a family-law litigant cannot convert Section 161.211(a)’s six-month limitation into a subject-matter-jurisdiction defect. A trial court retains the power to adjudicate an untimely bill of review challenging a termination order, even though the statute may ultimately foreclose the requested relief.

The distinction matters beyond termination litigation. In custody, modification, divorce, and post-divorce property proceedings, counsel must distinguish between a court’s adjudicative authority and a limitations, finality, preservation, or procedural defense. Mischaracterizing a merits-based time bar as jurisdictional can produce the wrong procedural vehicle, the wrong evidentiary framework, and an avoidable reversal.

The opinion does not diminish the importance of finality in termination cases, extend ordinary appellate deadlines, or establish that Mother can satisfy the demanding requirements for an equitable bill of review. It holds only that Section 161.211(a) does not authorize dismissal for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Father initially filed a suit affecting the parent–child relationship concerning J.K. in 2021. That proceeding ultimately led to modification litigation and, in January 2024, Father’s petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother was personally served with the termination pleading. She did not answer or appear for the temporary-orders hearing, although the record reflected that she received the resulting orders electronically.

Mother was later served, through authorized substituted service by email and Instagram, with an order setting a March 28, 2024 final hearing. The day before the hearing, she filed a pro se pleading seeking the presiding judge’s recusal. The administrative judge summarily denied that request, and the termination hearing proceeded on March 28. Mother did not appear.

After hearing evidence, the trial court rendered a default judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights. The written order, signed April 5, 2024, found statutory termination grounds under Section 161.001(b)(1) and stated that Mother had made a general appearance but failed to attend the final hearing after receiving notice. Mother received electronic notice of both the proposed order and the signed termination order. She did not file a motion for new trial.

On May 30, 2025—more than a year after entry of the termination order—Mother filed an original petition for bill of review. Her amended petition alleged several grounds for relief, including a due-process claim based on an asserted lack of notice of the termination trial.

Father filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on Texas Family Code Section 161.211(a). That statute provides that the validity of certain termination orders is not subject to direct or collateral attack after six months from the date the order was signed. Father argued that the untimely filing deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court agreed, granted the plea, and dismissed Mother’s bill of review for want of jurisdiction.

Issues Decided

• Whether Section 161.211(a)’s six-month restriction on direct or collateral attacks against certain termination orders deprives the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over an untimely bill of review.
• Whether the trial court properly granted Father’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Mother’s bill-of-review proceeding for want of jurisdiction.
• Whether the case should be remanded for further proceedings when Section 161.211(a) may remain relevant as a nonjurisdictional defense.

Rules Applied

Texas Family Code Section 161.211(a) provides that, notwithstanding Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329, the validity of a termination order affecting a person who was personally served, executed specified affidavits, or had parental rights terminated under Section 161.002(b) is not subject to direct or collateral attack after six months from the date the order was signed.

Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns a court’s legal authority to decide a class of cases. Whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists is reviewed de novo. A plea to the jurisdiction may challenge either the sufficiency of the jurisdictional allegations or the existence of jurisdictional facts. When the plea attacks the pleadings, courts construe those pleadings liberally in favor of the pleader and consider the pleader’s intent. See Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–27 (Tex. 2004).

Statutory requirements are not treated as jurisdictional merely because they are mandatory or may defeat a claim. The jurisdictional inquiry instead turns on whether the Legislature clearly made compliance a condition of the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. A statutory time bar can therefore be enforceable without eliminating the trial court’s adjudicative authority.

A bill of review is an independent equitable proceeding used to challenge a final judgment after the ordinary period for plenary relief has expired. The filing of a bill of review does not itself establish entitlement to relief. The petitioner must still plead and prove the applicable bill-of-review elements, subject to any defenses and statutory restrictions.

Application

Mother’s bill of review was filed well outside Section 161.211(a)’s six-month period. Father therefore had a substantial statutory-finality argument. But Father raised that argument through a plea to the jurisdiction, and the trial court dismissed on the theory that expiration of the six-month period eliminated its subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Second Court of Appeals rejected that characterization. Section 161.211(a) restricts when the validity of specified termination orders may be attacked, but the provision does not state that a trial court loses subject-matter jurisdiction after six months. The expiration of the statutory period may affect whether the petitioner has a viable claim or may obtain relief; it does not eliminate the court’s power to hear the proceeding.

That distinction controlled the appeal. The question was not whether Mother’s bill of review was timely, whether her notice allegations were true, or whether she could prove the elements necessary to set aside the termination judgment. The question was whether Section 161.211(a) authorized dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Because it did not, the jurisdictional dismissal could not stand.

The court accordingly returned the case to the trial court, where the parties may litigate the statute’s nonjurisdictional effect, Mother’s due-process allegations, the traditional bill-of-review requirements, and any other properly preserved defenses. Reversal of the jurisdictional dismissal did not vacate the termination order or award Mother bill-of-review relief.

Holding

Texas Family Code Section 161.211(a) does not deprive a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over a bill of review filed more than six months after the challenged termination order. The statutory deadline may operate as a time bar, but it is not a limitation on the trial court’s adjudicative authority.

The trial court therefore erred by granting Father’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing Mother’s bill of review for want of jurisdiction. The Second Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The court did not hold that Mother’s bill of review was timely or that she was entitled to set aside the termination judgment. Those issues remained for consideration under the proper procedural and substantive standards on remand.

Practical Application

For counsel defending a termination judgment, In re J.K. requires careful selection of the procedural vehicle. Section 161.211(a) should not be presented as eliminating subject-matter jurisdiction. Counsel should instead frame the provision as a statutory bar to relief and, when procedurally appropriate, raise it through special exceptions, a Rule 91a motion, traditional or no-evidence summary judgment, or trial on the merits. The proper vehicle will depend on the pleadings, the nature of the asserted due-process claim, and whether evidence outside the pleadings is necessary.

For bill-of-review petitioners, the opinion provides only a procedural opening. Filing outside six months remains dangerous, particularly when the record establishes personal service and notice of the signed termination order. Counsel must separately establish the bill-of-review elements and explain why Section 161.211(a) does not defeat the requested relief. Constitutional claims should be pleaded with specificity, including the alleged notice defect, the manner in which it prevented participation, and the evidence supporting the claim.

In custody and modification litigation, the case reinforces the need to distinguish subject-matter jurisdiction from statutory restrictions on relief. Continuing exclusive jurisdiction, standing, mandatory transfer, limitations, finality, and procedural defaults are not interchangeable concepts. A motion should identify the precise legal consequence of the alleged defect and explain why the requested disposition follows.

The same discipline applies in divorce and property litigation. A missed deadline to challenge a property division, an improper collateral attack, or the expiration of plenary power may foreclose relief without necessarily depriving the court of subject-matter jurisdiction over an independent proceeding. Counsel should avoid using “jurisdictional” as a catchall description for every mandatory deadline.

Finally, prevailing at the jurisdictional stage does not decide the underlying case. After remand, both sides should be prepared to address Section 161.211(a)’s substantive effect, the adequacy of service and notice, the petitioner’s diligence, available appellate remedies, and each element of the bill of review.

Checklists

Defending a Termination Judgment

• Confirm the date the termination order was signed.
• Determine whether the challenger was personally served, signed an affidavit identified in Section 161.211(a), or falls within Section 161.002(b).
• Identify whether the challenge is direct, collateral, or an independent bill-of-review proceeding.
• Plead Section 161.211(a) as a statutory bar rather than a subject-matter-jurisdiction defect.
• Select a procedural vehicle that matches the nature of the defense and the evidence required.
• Preserve alternative defenses, including limitations, res judicata, waiver, lack of diligence, and failure to establish the bill-of-review elements.
• Develop a complete record of citation, substituted-service orders, hearing notices, electronic-service receipts, appearances, and notice of the signed judgment.
• Avoid requesting dismissal “for want of jurisdiction” solely because the six-month period expired.

Evaluating a Potential Bill of Review

• Obtain the complete clerk’s record and reporter’s record from the termination proceeding.
• Calculate ordinary postjudgment, restricted-appeal, and Section 161.211(a) deadlines.
• Determine exactly when and how the client received each pleading, setting, proposed order, and signed judgment.
• Identify whether the client made a general appearance or filed any pleading acknowledging the proceeding.
• Evaluate whether the alleged defect concerns service of process, notice of trial, notice of judgment, or another due-process issue.
• Plead facts supporting each applicable bill-of-review element.
• Explain the client’s conduct after receiving actual or constructive notice.
• Anticipate Section 161.211(a) as a merits-based defense even though it is not jurisdictional.
• Preserve constitutional arguments with fact-specific pleadings and supporting evidence.
• Do not characterize reversal of a jurisdictional dismissal as relief from the underlying termination judgment.

Building the Notice Record

• Retain citations, returns of service, and affidavits supporting substituted service.
• Preserve signed orders authorizing service by alternative means.
• Download electronic-filing and electronic-service histories.
• Document when a party received, opened, or viewed electronically served documents.
• Maintain copies of emails, social-media messages, and delivery confirmations used for court-authorized service.
• Ensure hearing notices identify whether the setting is temporary, final, or dispositive.
• Obtain rulings on continuance, recusal, disqualification, and notice objections.
• Make a clear record of the trial court’s findings concerning service, notice, appearance, and default.

Selecting the Correct Procedural Vehicle

• Ask first whether the asserted defect truly concerns the court’s adjudicative authority.
• Review the statutory text for an express jurisdictional limitation.
• Distinguish jurisdictional facts from facts affecting the claimant’s right to relief.
• Use a plea to the jurisdiction only when the challenged requirement is genuinely jurisdictional.
• Consider special exceptions when the petition inadequately pleads the basis for avoiding a statutory bar.
• Consider Rule 91a when the pleaded claim has no basis in law or fact and the rule otherwise applies.
• Use summary judgment when disposition depends on evidence, undisputed dates, or conclusive service records.
• Preserve alternative grounds for disposition in the trial court and on appeal.
• Obtain a written order that accurately states the ground on which relief was granted.

Citation

In re J.K., No. 02-26-00060-CV (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 5, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

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