Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In Re The Commitment of Gerald Lee Ricks
COA01
In this Texas SVP commitment appeal, the dispute was whether Gerald Ricks had a statutory “behavioral abnormality” making him likely to commit future predatory sexual violence, not whether he was a repeat sexually violent offender. The First Court of Appeals held the evidence was sufficient because the State tied Ricks’s repeated child-sex offenses, relapse while on supervision and in treatment, continued attraction to female children, minimization, and inconsistent testimony to a forensic psychiatrist’s opinion that he remained high risk. The court also rejected Ricks’s complaint that he was barred from questioning the State’s expert about the State’s withdrawal of another expert, holding the issue was not preserved and, even if preserved, no reversible error was shown.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law cases involving abuse or child-safety concerns, past misconduct can support present-risk restrictions when it is paired with relapse, treatment failure, minimization, ongoing deviant interests, and qualified expert testimony connecting those facts to future danger. Just as important, if a court limits cross-examination of an opposing expert, make a precise record and offer of proof or the complaint may be lost on appeal."
In Re Ka C. Wong, M.D.
COA08
After a defense jury verdict in a medical-negligence case, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s amended motion for new trial through a bare one-page order that gave no reason beyond stating it had considered the motion, response, and argument of counsel. The El Paso Court of Appeals applied In re Columbia, In re United Scaffolding, and related Texas Supreme Court authority requiring post-verdict new-trial orders to state an understandable, reasonably specific, legally valid, and case-specific reason. Because the order identified no legal standard and no specific defect in the verdict, it failed facial review at step one, so the court did not reach the merits of any alleged contradiction or insufficiency in the verdict. The court held the trial court abused its discretion and conditionally granted mandamus directing the trial court to vacate the deficient new-trial order.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a Texas trial court sets aside a jury verdict and grants a new trial, the order itself must explain why with a legally recognized, case-specific reason. In family-law jury cases, a conclusory new-trial order is an immediate mandamus target before the case is retried."
In the Interest of T.R.C.
COA09
In In re T.R.C., the Beaumont Court of Appeals considered whether the Department proved the statutory prerequisites for termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(f)(1). The case centered on a medically fragile child with Type 1 diabetes and the Department’s concerns about Mother’s care, but the court refused to rely on generalized safety concerns, voluminous medical records, or adverse impressions in place of element-specific proof. Applying the clear-and-convincing evidence standard, the court held the record did not legally suffice to show that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to Mother or that, despite those efforts, a continuing danger in the home prevented return. The court therefore reversed the termination order and rendered judgment denying termination, and it separately reversed the Department’s permanent managing conservatorship appointment because the trial court failed to make the finding required by Family Code section 153.002(c)(1).
Litigation Takeaway
"When a family-law remedy depends on specific statutory elements, the court cannot fill evidentiary gaps with a difficult record, broad safety narratives, or stacks of medical records. For termination under section 161.001(f)(1), the Department must prove actual reasonable reunification efforts and a continuing danger that still prevents return; for everyone else, the case is a reminder to force element-by-element proof and insist on required statutory findings."
Lydick v. Herrera
COA03
In Lydick v. Herrera, the applicant sought a final protective order after a dating-relationship altercation in which the respondent admitted striking and biting him. The trial court heard conflicting testimony about who started the fight, reviewed body-camera footage, 911 evidence, photos, and other exhibits, and found credible evidence that the applicant was the initial aggressor, that he punched and tried to pin down the respondent, and that her use of force was defensive and necessary to protect herself. Applying Texas Family Code sections 71.004, 81.001, and 85.001, the court of appeals held that defensive measures are excluded from the definition of family violence and that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the denial of the protective order. The appellate court therefore affirmed, emphasizing deference to the trial court’s credibility findings in contested protective-order cases.
Litigation Takeaway
"An admitted strike does not automatically equal family violence. In protective-order litigation, the winning issue may be who was the aggressor and whether the force used was reasonably defensive. Lawyers should build the sequence of events carefully, anchor self-defense or aggression theories in objective evidence like bodycam, 911 calls, and injury photos, and remember that trial-court credibility findings are hard to overturn on appeal."
Kelvin Williams v. Houston Housing Authority
COA14
In Williams v. Houston Housing Authority, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed a temporary injunction because the Housing Authority presented no competent evidence at the injunction hearing. Although the applicant referenced pleadings, summary-judgment materials, and counsel’s factual assertions, it offered no sworn testimony and no exhibits were admitted into evidence. Applying Texas temporary-injunction standards, the court held that the movant had to prove a probable right to recovery and a probable, imminent, irreparable injury with evidence actually introduced at the hearing. Attorney argument is not evidence, and affidavits or attachments in the court file do not count unless formally admitted or accepted by agreement. Because the record contained no evidentiary support for the required elements, the trial court abused its discretion. The court reversed, dissolved the injunction, and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"A temporary injunction is only as strong as the hearing record. In family-law cases, do not rely on pleadings, verified motions, affidavits sitting in the file, or lawyer argument alone—put on sworn testimony, offer exhibits, and get them admitted, or the order may be reversed on appeal."
Flores v. State
COA02
In Flores v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals considered whether the trial court improperly designated a forensic interviewer as the child’s Article 38.072 outcry witness in a child-sex-assault case. Rather than deciding whether the designation was wrong, the court assumed error and focused on harm. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b), the court held any error was nonconstitutional and harmless because the challenged testimony was cumulative of the child complainant’s testimony and the SANE nurse’s similar testimony, including the allegedly important condom detail. The conviction was affirmed because the complained-of outcry evidence did not affect substantial rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven family cases, winning the evidentiary objection is only half the battle: if similar child-abuse evidence comes in through other witnesses, records, or the child, an appellate court may treat any error as harmless. Trial lawyers should not only object specifically and preserve error, but also build a record showing why the challenged testimony supplied a unique, outcome-moving fact rather than merely repeating other evidence."
In the Interest of A.S.L., a Child
COA05
In In re A.S.L., the mother challenged the divorce property division under Texas Family Code section 7.001, arguing the trial court failed to adequately account for about $44,000 in post-filing credit-card debt she said she incurred for living expenses and for the father’s alleged use of community funds to reduce roughly $52,000 of his own debt. The Dallas Court of Appeals applied abuse-of-discretion review and focused on whether the appellate record allowed it to measure the effect of the complained-of debt allocations on the overall just-and-right division. Because the decree did not assign values to most assets or liabilities, the record did not establish the value of the community estate as a whole, and no findings of fact or conclusions of law were requested, the court presumed the trial court resolved disputed facts in favor of the decree. The court held mother failed to show any alleged error materially affected the overall division and therefore failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to appeal a Texas divorce property division, testimony about unfair debt allocation is not enough. Build a full valuation record, quantify the estate and the claimed error’s effect on the net division, and request findings of fact and conclusions of law; otherwise, the abuse-of-discretion standard and implied findings will usually defeat the appeal."
Maria Sanchez v. Ysidro Hernandez
COA01
In Sanchez v. Hernandez, the First Court of Appeals held that the trial court improperly characterized disputed bail-bond-related properties as each spouse’s separate property held 50/50 as tenants in common after a jury found the properties were not community property and found no fraud on the community. The court emphasized that property possessed during marriage is presumed community property under Texas Family Code section 3.003, and that presumption can be rebutted only by clear and convincing tracing evidence to a recognized separate-property source. Because no evidence showed either spouse acquired the properties as separate property, the trial court had no basis to impose its own separate-property characterization contrary to the verdict. The court reversed the decree and rendered judgment consistent with the jury’s findings.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas divorce cases, title and informal family explanations are not enough to prove separate property—if you want to overcome the community-property presumption, you need clear, disciplined tracing evidence. And once a jury answers the characterization questions submitted, the trial court cannot invent a new property characterization in the decree just to reach a perceived fair result."
In Re Jessica Acosta
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding arising from a divorce case, the trial court held Jessica Acosta in contempt for failing to make payments required by agreed temporary orders, including monthly business-account distributions and vehicle payments. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the contempt order was void to the extent it punished alleged violations that occurred before October 23, 2025, the date the temporary orders were actually signed. The court explained that contempt can enforce only a written, signed, and operative court order; retroactive due dates in a later-signed order do not create retroactive contempt exposure. Because the trial court imposed a single punishment for multiple alleged violations, most of which were based on pre-signing conduct, even the one post-signing allegation could not stand. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the contempt order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not plead contempt for conduct that occurred before the operative temporary order was signed, even if the order later recites earlier due dates. Separate pre-signing claims into non-contempt remedies, and avoid bundling valid and invalid contempt allegations into one undifferentiated punishment because one defective allegation can void the entire contempt order."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Meilyn Rutz Danski De Oliveira and Edrey Clarence Oliveira and in the Interest of S.L.D.O., a Child
COA13
In De Oliveira, the father challenged Texas’s authority to make the initial custody determination in a divorce/SAPCR, arguing the child had not lived in Texas during the six months before suit and that West Virginia, not Texas, was the proper forum. The court applied the UCCJEA’s home-state framework in Texas Family Code §§ 152.201(a)(1) and 152.102(7), focusing on the child’s long residence in Texas from birth until late 2022 and whether later stays in West Virginia, Florida, and Brazil were temporary absences. Because the evidence showed those moves were provisional, tied to family travel and attempted reconciliation, and did not establish a settled new home state, the court treated them as temporary absences included in the home-state calculation. The court held Texas had home-state jurisdiction within six months before filing, a parent continued to reside in Texas, unjustifiable-conduct arguments did not require Texas to decline jurisdiction, and the decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In UCCJEA fights, the winning issue is often not where the child was right before filing, but whether time away from Texas was only temporary. Build a precise timeline, prove whether any move was provisional or permanent, and make sure your pleadings on domicile and residence do not undermine your jurisdiction position."