Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
Gustavo Gonzalez, Jr. v. The State of Texas
COA03
In Gustavo Gonzalez, Jr. v. State of Texas, the Third Court of Appeals held that legally sufficient evidence supported aggravated sexual assault findings even though the child complainant used age-appropriate, nontechnical terms like “private” and “butt” instead of anatomical language. Reviewing the full record in the light most favorable to the verdict, the court relied on the child’s outcry, written SANE statement, body-diagram markings, and descriptions of pressure, stretching, and pain to conclude the jury could reasonably infer penetration of both the sexual organ and anus. The court also rejected the argument that the jury charge needed a special definition of “penetration,” holding the term carries its ordinary meaning and requires no additional instruction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven family cases, do not discount a child’s disclosure just because the child lacks anatomical precision. Texas courts will evaluate the child’s words in context, and age-appropriate terminology can carry major evidentiary weight when supported by diagrams, outcry testimony, medical or forensic witnesses, and sensory details like pain, pressure, or stretching. For family-law litigators, this is strong crossover authority for supervised possession, protective orders, emergency relief, and endangerment-based conservatorship restrictions."
Ryan Tolle v. Perth Tolle
COA14
In this pre-September 1, 2023 Texas SAPCR modification case, the father sought to modify conservatorship but his Rule 194 disclosures merely repeated the statutory standards of material and substantial change and best interest without identifying any underlying facts. The court held that former Rule 194.2(b)(3) required a general factual narrative supporting the claim, not just boilerplate legal conclusions. Because the suit was filed in 2022, the old disclosure rules applied despite a later amended petition. After the father failed to show good cause or lack of unfair surprise under Rule 193.6, the trial court properly excluded his modification evidence, and with no evidence left on essential elements, properly granted a directed verdict against him.
Litigation Takeaway
"In legacy family cases filed before September 1, 2023, disclosures must tell the factual story behind a modification claim. If you only recite statutory buzzwords like material and substantial change or best interest, the court can exclude your evidence and your case may be over before it reaches the factfinder."
Wood v. Wood
COA14
In Wood v. Wood, the parties’ premarital agreement and later MSA treated certain Schedule F retirement accounts as separate property to be divided equally, and their MSA required binding arbitration of disputes over drafting a decree that conformed to the agreement. When a dispute arose over decree language and use of a QDRO service to implement the retirement-account division, the wife argued the arbitrator exceeded his authority and substantively redivided property. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that the arbitrator acted within the scope of the MSA’s drafting-arbitration clause because the dispute submitted was how to implement the agreed division in the decree. The court further held that directing QDRO-related procedures was a permissible implementation mechanism, not an unlawful recharacterization or divestiture of separate property, and affirmed denial of vacatur under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 171.088(a)(3)(A).
Litigation Takeaway
"If an MSA sends decree-drafting disputes to binding arbitration, that authority can extend beyond mere wording disputes to the practical mechanics needed to carry out an agreed property division—especially with retirement assets. Lawyers should draft arbitration clauses carefully, spell out whether implementation issues like QDROs are included, and preserve any vacatur complaints precisely in the motion to vacate."
In re David J. Alarid
COA06
In In re Alarid, the Texarkana Court of Appeals denied mandamus relief without reaching the merits because the relator failed to provide a proper Rule 52 mandamus record. The court found that some attached documents were neither certified nor sworn, some materials appeared not to have been filed in the trial court, and the Rule 52.3(k) certification did not properly state that the petition’s factual assertions were supported by competent evidence in the appendix or record. Strictly enforcing Rules 52.7 and 52.3(k), the court held that these record defects were fatal and denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus can be lost on procedure alone. In family-law emergency and contempt matters, lawyers must ensure every material document filed below is included as a certified or sworn copy, exclude convenience exhibits that were not filed in the trial court, and use Rule 52.3(k) certification language that tracks the rule exactly. A strong merits argument will not save a defective mandamus record."
Victor Hugo Prado v. The State of Texas
COA01
In this injury-to-a-child appeal, the court rejected challenges to Prado’s convictions based on jury unanimity, legal sufficiency, and accomplice-witness corroboration, holding that commission and omission were alternative manner-and-means, that the evidence of prolonged malnourishment, visible injuries, deprivation, and Prado’s control over the children’s environment was sufficient to prove knowing or intentional injury by omission, and that independent testimony and documentary evidence adequately corroborated the mother’s testimony. The court did, however, agree that because both convictions arose from a single criminal action, duplicative court costs could not be imposed in both judgments under article 102.073, so it modified one judgment to delete those costs and affirmed as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
"For Texas family-law cases, this opinion is a strong roadmap for proving endangerment through omission, not just direct abuse. A parent or paramour who controls the home and knowingly fails to feed, protect, or obtain care for a child can be framed as dangerous based on pattern evidence from daycare workers, relatives, photos, records, and other third parties. It also reminds lawyers to build corroboration beyond one compromised household witness and to audit multiple orders for duplicative cost or fee assessments."
In the Interest of Z.S., Z.S., M.S. III, Children
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights after concluding the evidence clearly and convincingly showed endangerment under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and that termination was in the children’s best interest. The court relied on severe unsanitary living conditions, untreated medical issues, exposure to sexual-abuse risk, domestic violence, and ongoing parental drug use during the case. It analyzed endangerment cumulatively, holding that the parents knowingly allowed the children to remain in dangerous surroundings and engaged in a continuing course of conduct that jeopardized the children’s physical and emotional well-being. The children’s improvement in their maternal grandmother’s placement further supported the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment cases are won or lost on the full pattern of danger, not one isolated event. Evidence of filthy home conditions, unsafe caregivers, domestic violence, drug use, poor visitation conditions, and lack of meaningful change after services can support termination—and in non-termination family cases, the same facts can justify supervised possession, sole conservatorship, or other protective restrictions."
In re Gentri Renee McLean
COA11
In In re McLean, the Eleventh Court of Appeals considered whether a trial court could temporarily transfer the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence from the mother to the father in a pending modification suit. The father relied on evidence that the mother had denied visitation, the children had school absences, and the mother tested positive for cocaine. The court held that Family Code section 156.006(b)(1) requires more than proof of parental misconduct or decree violations; the movant must show that the children’s present circumstances would significantly impair their physical health or emotional development. Because the record lacked child-focused evidence tying the complained-of conduct to present significant impairment, the temporary modification was legally insufficient. The trial court therefore abused its discretion, and mandamus relief was conditionally granted.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want temporary orders changing primary custody in Texas, you need proof of present, child-specific significant impairment—not just evidence that the other parent is obstructive, irresponsible, or tested positive for drugs. Denied visitation may support enforcement, but it does not automatically justify a temporary change of primary residence."
In the Interest of B.E.S.D. and T.D.G., Children
COA11
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in the best interest of the children under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). The court reviewed the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and applied the nonexclusive Holley factors, emphasizing that the same evidence supporting predicate endangerment grounds can also support best interest. The court focused on the mother’s repeated marijuana use during multiple pregnancies, repeated positive drug tests at childbirth, long CPS history, prior removals, domestic violence, instability, and failure to make lasting changes despite services. As to the father of B.E.S.D., the court likewise held that his refusal to cooperate, role in the unsafe environment, and conduct supporting the predicate findings also supported best interest. The termination order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Pattern matters. Texas courts may infer future danger from a parent’s past conduct, and a best-interest finding does not fail just because every Holley factor was not proved. In family-law cases involving conservatorship, modification, or supervised possession, lawyers should build the record chronologically around recurring substance abuse, domestic violence, instability, noncompliance, and failure to benefit from services—not isolated incidents."
In the Interest of A.K.B., a Child
COA04
In In re A.K.B., maternal grandparents sought court-ordered access to their grandchild after the father cut off contact. They alleged they had been deeply involved in the child’s upbringing and raised concerns about the father’s parenting, household, and the child’s emotional distress from losing the relationship. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that Family Code §§ 153.432 and 153.433 work together, so at the standing stage a grandparent’s affidavit must allege specific facts that, if true, could overcome the fit-parent presumption and show that denial of access would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional well-being. Because the affidavits showed only a close, beneficial relationship, parenting disagreements, and generalized claims of emotional harm—not concrete facts tying denial of access itself to significant impairment—the trial court properly dismissed the suit for lack of standing.
Litigation Takeaway
"Grandparent-access cases in Texas live or die on the affidavit. A close bond, past caregiving, and criticism of a parent’s choices are not enough; the pleading must allege specific, nonconclusory facts showing that denial of access itself will significantly impair the child and that the claim can overcome the fit-parent presumption. For parents, this is a strong early-dismissal case; for grandparents, it is a warning to plead extraordinary facts with precision before filing."
In re LOH Elkhart, LLC d/b/a Elkhart Oaks Care Center, Live Oak Healthcare, LLC, Senior Living Properties, LLC, SLP Management Holdings, LLC, and LOH Management, LLC
COA12
In this mandamus proceeding, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that a party cannot revive a case dismissed for want of prosecution by filing an unverified motion to reinstate and later trying to supply Rule 306a proof after the trial court’s plenary power has expired. The plaintiff’s case was dismissed, and her later motion to reinstate alleged lack of notice but was not verified and did not state the date she first received notice or actual knowledge of the dismissal order. The court strictly applied Rules 165a and 306a, explaining that a verified motion is required to extend plenary power and that delayed-notice relief requires a sworn Rule 306a(5) motion proving the date of first notice or actual knowledge. Because those requirements were not timely met, the trial court’s plenary power expired before it signed the reinstatement order, making that order void. Mandamus relief was therefore proper.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your family-law case gets DWOP’d, lack of notice alone does not save you. To extend deadlines, you must promptly file a verified motion and, if relying on delayed notice, strictly comply with Rule 306a(5) with sworn proof of the exact date notice or actual knowledge was first received. If the other side gets a reinstatement order without a verified Rule 165a motion or proper Rule 306a proof, that order may be void and vulnerable to mandamus."