Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Caldwell v. Quaid
COA14
In a divorce proceeding involving complex property characterization, the Husband designated an expert for tracing and valuation but failed to provide the actual tracing reports until six days before trial. The trial court excluded the late-disclosed tracing testimony while permitting testimony on the timely-disclosed valuation. On appeal, the Husband argued the exclusion constituted an improper 'death-penalty' sanction. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, clarifying that the exclusion was a mandatory application of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6. The court held that because the ruling did not preclude the Husband's entire defense or claim, it did not rise to the level of a death-penalty sanction and was a proper exercise of discretion due to the lack of good cause or showing of non-prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
"Discovery deadlines are strictly enforced for expert reports in property disputes; a trial continuance does not automatically reset these deadlines. Practitioners should never use 'to be provided' as a placeholder in expert designations and must produce the substance of tracing opinions within the discovery period to avoid the 'automatic' exclusion of evidence under Rule 193.6."
In re Steven Broomfield and Lisa Broomfield
COA06
Relators sought a writ of mandamus to compel a Panola County court to grant a mandatory transfer of a SAPCR proceeding to Smith County, where an adoption was pending, pursuant to Texas Family Code Section 155.201(a-1). The child's mother had filed a controverting affidavit, and the trial court had scheduled a hearing on the matter. The Sixth Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory framework, noting that while Section 155.201(a-1) is mandatory, Section 155.204(e) requires a hearing when a transfer is contested. The court held that mandamus relief was inappropriate because the Relators failed to show that the trial court had refused to rule or that an unreasonable amount of time had passed, especially since a hearing was already on the docket.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus relief is not a shortcut to bypass statutory hearing requirements; even for "mandatory" transfers, you must allow the trial court a reasonable opportunity to conduct a scheduled hearing and issue a ruling before seeking appellate intervention."
Messele Kelel v. Dallas Central Appraisal District
COA05
In Messele Kelel v. Dallas Central Appraisal District, a property owner challenged a $74,250 tax valuation, presenting evidence of lower-priced comparable sales and internal settlement offers from the appraisal district as low as $30,000. The trial court granted a 'no-evidence' summary judgment in favor of the appraisal district, effectively dismissing the owner's claims. The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed this decision, ruling that the owner's evidence—specifically the comparable data and the district's own lower offers—constituted 'more than a scintilla' of evidence. The court held that while this evidence did not prove the property's value as a matter of law, it was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that must be resolved at trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"To defeat a 'no-evidence' motion for summary judgment regarding property value, you do not always need a formal expert appraisal; even informal evidence like tax records, comparable sales, or internal settlement offers can meet the 'scintilla' threshold to keep your claim alive for trial."
In Re Aaron Nicholas Thomas
COA09
The Relator sought a writ of mandamus to vacate a default judgment in a suit to modify the parent-child relationship (SAPCR), claiming the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request to participate via Zoom as a disability accommodation and by entering judgment without proper service. The Ninth Court of Appeals denied the petition, finding that the Relator’s own medical evidence—which stated he could sit and work for eight hours—contradicted his claim that he could not attend court in person. Furthermore, the court determined that the Relator had made a general appearance, which waived any defects in service under Rule 124, and that a standard appeal provided an adequate legal remedy to challenge the final judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Making a general appearance in a case waives your right to challenge service of process later, and requests for disability accommodations must be backed by specific medical evidence that directly links a condition to an inability to attend court in person."
EarnhartBuilt, LLC v. Preferred Materials, LLC, Procore Technologies, Inc., Express Lien, Inc. d/b/a Levelset, Michael Mann, and J. Earnhart, Inc.
COA05
In EarnhartBuilt, LLC v. Preferred Materials, LLC, a materials supplier filed a lien to collect $17,000 for concrete delivered to a construction project. The property owner sued, claiming the lien was "fraudulent" under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 12.002 because it was filed after the statutory deadline. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed the "knowledge" and "intent" requirements of the statute, distinguishing between a lien that is merely legally invalid and one that is fraudulent. The court held that because the underlying debt for the materials was legitimate, the supplier did not have the requisite "actual knowledge" of fraudulence at the time of filing, even if the lien was procedurally defective. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the supplier.
Litigation Takeaway
"A lien is not "fraudulent" simply because it is legally unenforceable or filed late. To recover statutory damages for a fraudulent lien, a party must prove the filer actually knew the lien was fraudulent—meaning a misrepresentation of the truth—at the moment of filing. If there is a bona fide underlying debt, technical or procedural failures will generally not trigger the severe penalties of the fraudulent lien statute."
Gannon v. The State of Texas
COA02
After Dayton Joseph Gannon was convicted of aggravated robbery for brandishing a knife and aggressively posturing toward a victim through a laundromat's glass door, he appealed, arguing that the threat of injury was not 'imminent' because the victim was armed and separated from him by a physical barrier. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory meaning of 'imminent'—defined as 'near, at hand, or on the verge of happening'—and determined that a threat is judged by the aggressor's volatility and conduct rather than the victim's defensive capabilities. The court held that the display of a deadly weapon combined with combative posturing is sufficient to establish an imminent threat, regardless of whether the victim has a weapon or is behind glass.
Litigation Takeaway
"A threat of family violence remains 'imminent' even if the victim takes defensive measures or is separated from the aggressor by a barrier; the legal focus is on the aggressor's display of weaponry and volatility rather than the victim's relative safety."
Kist v. Kist
COA14
Kathryn Kist sought to lift a geographic residency restriction to relocate her four children from Texas to Indiana, presenting evidence of a $70,000 job offer, free housing from her parents, and access to private schooling. She argued that the father, Jonathan, was largely uninvolved and that staying in Texas was a financial hardship. Jonathan contested the move, presenting evidence of his involvement and the children's stability in their current environment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the conflict using the Lenz factors and Texas public policy favoring 'frequent and continuing contact' with both parents. The court held that because the trial court faced conflicting testimony regarding the father’s involvement and the children's best interests, it did not abuse its discretion in maintaining the residency restriction or in characterizing Jonathan's post-petition home purchase as his separate property.
Litigation Takeaway
"Financial gain and a better support system out-of-state are not enough to guarantee a relocation; you must prove the move serves the children's best interests while maintaining the other parent's relationship. Because these cases are so fact-dependent, a trial court's decision to maintain the status quo is extremely difficult to overrule on appeal."
Keenan DeAndre Black v. The State of Texas
COA02
In this case, a trial court orally waived a $6,000 statutory fine for a defendant found to be indigent, yet the subsequent written judgment erroneously included the fine. On appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed the conflict between the judge's verbal ruling and the written record. The court analyzed the 'bench controls the pen' doctrine, which dictates that an oral pronouncement made in open court is the legally binding judgment, while the written order is merely a record of that act. Finding a clear conflict, the court held that the oral waiver must prevail and modified the written judgment to delete the $6,000 fine.
Litigation Takeaway
"The 'bench controls the pen': in Texas, if a trial judge’s oral ruling contradicts the written decree, the oral version wins. Always compare the court reporter’s transcript to the final written order to catch 'judgment creep'—additional terms or fees added by opposing counsel that the judge never actually ordered."
Mangawe v. The State of Texas
COA02
Bengamiah Mangawe appealed a conviction for continuous sexual abuse, arguing that vague testimony regarding dates (like 'November-ish') failed to meet the 30-day statutory duration requirement. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the evidence under a deferential standard, noting that a detective's testimony about Mangawe’s non-verbal 'nod' or confirmation of the timeline during an interview was substantive evidence. The court held that the jury is the sole arbiter of credibility and can resolve chronological conflicts in favor of the verdict, even when dates are approximate or admissions are not captured on audio.
Litigation Takeaway
"Vague chronological approximations like 'November-ish' are sufficient to prove a pattern of conduct if anchored by a witness who can testify to a party's non-verbal confirmation or 'nod' regarding the timeframe."
Westyn Gregory Whetstone v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Whetstone v. State, a defendant was convicted of Class B misdemeanor criminal trespass, but the trial court's written judgment incorrectly recorded the offense as a more serious Class A misdemeanor involving a habitation. On appeal, the Seventh Court of Appeals performed an independent review of the record and found that the State had explicitly abandoned the higher charge before the jury was instructed. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b), the court analyzed the discrepancy as a clerical error and held that it had a mandatory duty to reform the judgment to 'make the record speak the truth.' The court modified the judgment to reflect the correct statute and offense degree, ensuring the defendant's criminal history accurately reflected the actual adjudication.
Litigation Takeaway
"Always verify the underlying record of a criminal conviction used in family law litigation; clerical errors can 'inflate' a minor offense into a serious crime, potentially unfairly biasing a judge's decision regarding child custody or parental fitness."