Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1262 opinions found
Salmeron v. Atascocita Forest Community Association
COA01
Homeowners who had sued to stop an HOA foreclosure were electronically served with the HOA’s plea to the jurisdiction and notice of submission, but they did not respond by the submission date and the trial court granted the plea and dismissed the case. On motion for new trial, the homeowners argued Hurricane Beryl caused a power/internet “system outage” that prevented timely receipt of e-service and warranted relief under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21(f)(6), along with a three-day extension under Rule 21a(c) and relief under the Craddock framework. The First Court of Appeals held that Rule 21(f)(6) does not provide automatic tolling based on a general disaster; the movant must present specific, evidence-backed facts showing when notice was actually received or when the outage ended and why they could not act (including seeking a continuance) once access was restored. Because the homeowners offered no concrete timeline for restoration of electricity/access or diligent efforts to monitor e-service—and their participation in a later hearing undercut the claim that they were unable to engage with the court—the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying new trial and letting the dismissal stand. The court also held the three-day rule for mail service does not apply to e-service, and the motion for new trial was too conclusory to satisfy Craddock’s “no conscious indifference” requirement.
Litigation Takeaway
"E-service deadlines start immediately and aren’t automatically extended by storms or outages. If you miss a deadline and claim a “technical failure,” you must prove it with a detailed outage timeline (when access returned/when notice was actually seen), show diligent efforts to check the case, and seek prompt relief (e.g., continuance/extension) as soon as you can—otherwise the judgment/dismissal is likely to stand."
The Great American Pool, L.L.C. d/b/a American Pools of Houston v. Mary J. Phenneger and Joedy Phenneger
COA01
In a dispute that the trial court sent to arbitration, The Great American Pool, L.L.C. attempted to appeal the trial court’s order granting Mary and Joedy Phenneger’s motion to compel arbitration. The First Court of Appeals analyzed its subject-matter jurisdiction, reiterating that Texas appellate courts generally may review only final judgments unless a statute expressly authorizes interlocutory review. Because an order compelling arbitration does not dispose of all parties and claims—it merely changes the forum and typically stays the case—and because the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides interlocutory appeal rights for orders denying arbitration (but not for orders granting arbitration), the court held the order was an unappealable interlocutory order. Lacking statutory authorization for interlocutory review, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction (granting appellant’s requested dismissal).
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat a hearing on a motion to compel arbitration as make-or-break: if the court compels arbitration, you usually cannot take an immediate interlocutory appeal. To challenge an erroneous order compelling arbitration, be prepared to pursue mandamus (and build a record), or you may be forced to arbitrate to the end before any ordinary appeal is possible."
Reginald Donell Rice v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's dismissal of an inmate's lawsuit, holding that Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code allows for the immediate dismissal of claims supported by false affidavits of poverty. The court analyzed the conflict between the specific requirements of Chapter 14 and the general procedural protections of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145. It concluded that because Chapter 14 is a specialized statute designed to curb frivolous inmate litigation, trial courts have the discretion to dismiss such suits without holding an evidentiary hearing or requiring service of process if the inmate's certified trust account statement contradicts their claimed income.
Litigation Takeaway
"When facing a family law filing from an incarcerated parent, immediately subpoena their certified inmate trust account statement; any discrepancy between their deposits and their affidavit of indigence allows for a dismissal under Chapter 14 without the need for a hearing or service of process."
In the Matter of Marriage of Melissa Ramirez and Silvestre Fermin Torres and In the Interest of R.S.T. and A.D.T, Children
COA13
In a family law dispute, Melissa Ramirez filed a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs. Despite this, the trial court ordered her to pay half of the mediation fees without first holding an evidentiary hearing or issuing detailed findings as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f). Ramirez challenged the order using Rule 145(g)'s expedited review process. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals dismissed the challenge for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that because the trial court failed to follow the mandatory procedural steps of Rule 145(f), the resulting order was not technically issued 'under this rule,' making the expedited appellate process unavailable.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a trial court orders an indigent party to pay costs (such as mediation or amicus attorney fees) without first holding a formal hearing or providing detailed factual findings, you cannot use the expedited motion process in Rule 145(g) to challenge the order; instead, you must file a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the court to follow proper procedure."
In Re Marisol Garza
COA13
In a contract dispute that lasted over eleven years, the defendant moved for dismissal for want of prosecution after a 46-month period of total inactivity by the plaintiff. The trial court denied the motion, but the Thirteenth Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus relief. The appellate court analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a and the court's inherent power, determining that the burden to prosecute a case rests solely on the plaintiff. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion because the plaintiff failed to show good cause for the extensive delays, and the COVID-19 pandemic did not justify a nearly four-year lapse in activity.
Litigation Takeaway
"Don't let 'zombie' litigation linger; if an opposing party files a suit to secure temporary orders and then abandons the case for years, you can force a dismissal. The duty to move a case forward belongs entirely to the person who filed it, and even significant events like the COVID-19 pandemic do not excuse years of total inactivity."
Jennifer Jo Stricker v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Stricker v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed a trial court's exclusion of a public spectator during jury selection due to a large venire panel filling the courtroom. The appellate court analyzed the closure under the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, applying the four-prong Waller v. Georgia test. Because the trial court failed to consider reasonable alternatives to accommodate the spectator or make specific findings on the record justifying the closure, the court held that the exclusion constituted a structural error. Consequently, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial without the need for a showing of actual harm.
Litigation Takeaway
"Limited seating or a crowded gallery is not a valid legal reason to exclude public spectators from a jury trial; doing so without specific constitutional findings creates a 'structural error' that can automatically void your entire case on appeal regardless of the evidence."
Opinion by Justice Rivas-Molloy
COA01
A former law-firm associate sued his prior employer for post-termination wages, arguing that because he remained “attorney of record” in a pending federal case until the court signed an order allowing withdrawal, the employment relationship (and his right to salary) necessarily continued through the withdrawal date. The Houston First Court of Appeals analyzed the claim under Texas contract principles and at-will employment, distinguishing ethical/professional duties owed to a tribunal during the withdrawal process from the private contractual terms governing compensation. The court held that an attorney’s continued “of record” status does not, as a matter of law, extend an employment contract or create an entitlement to wages after the firm has clearly terminated the employment relationship; it also rejected challenges to the trial court’s evidentiary/discovery rulings and refusal to judicially notice California law as not showing reversible error. The take-nothing judgment for the firm was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Being “attorney of record” after termination creates ethical obligations, not a paycheck: firms can defeat “withdrawal gap” wage claims by documenting a clear, unequivocal termination date (access shutoff, keys/credentials returned) and promptly moving to withdraw, while employment agreements should expressly state compensation ends upon termination regardless of withdrawal timing."
Owens v. Johnson
COA01
In Owens v. Johnson, a military service member sought to reduce his child support payments, claiming his income had decreased due to changes in his service status and a significant increase in insurance costs. Despite his testimony, he failed to provide official financial documentation, such as Leave and Earnings Statements (LES), to support his claims. The trial court chose to credit the mother's testimony and disbelieve the father's uncorroborated assertions, setting a higher support amount and confirming child support arrears. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, emphasizing that trial judges are the sole judges of witness credibility and that a party's self-serving testimony can be disregarded if it lacks objective corroboration.
Litigation Takeaway
"When seeking to modify child support, testimony is not a substitute for a paper trail. If you claim a decrease in income but fail to produce readily available financial records like pay stubs or tax returns, the court has the discretion to completely disregard your testimony and maintain your current support obligations."
Cristy West v. Jimmie Ward
COA09
In West v. Ward, Cristy West filed for divorce claiming an informal (common law) marriage to professional football player Jimmie Ward. Ward denied the marriage existed, asserting they were only engaged. The court analyzed the case under Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2), focusing on whether there was a "present agreement" to be married. Despite social media posts where the parties used terms like 'wifey,' the court found that West's own private text messages—where she referred to herself as 'single' and discussed a 'future' wedding—contradicted the claim of a present marriage. The appellate court affirmed the jury's verdict that no marriage existed, holding that a future intent to marry is not a substitute for a current agreement to be married.
Litigation Takeaway
"Private communications often carry more weight than social media 'holding out.' Even if you represent yourselves as married on Instagram, private texts referring to each other as 'fiancé' or identifying as 'single' can be fatal to a common law marriage claim."
Yuqian Gan v. Arnoldus Mathijssen
COA03
During a divorce between Yuqian Gan and Arnoldus Mathijssen, the trial court awarded the husband a disproportionate share of the community property because the wife had unilaterally depleted joint bank accounts and paid family members post-separation. The court also lowered the husband's child support payments to account for his significant travel expenses for visitation. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals upheld the property division, ruling that the wife's "financial self-help" constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. However, the court reversed the child support award, holding that the trial court's failure to include specific, mandatory written findings required by Texas law when deviating from support guidelines was a reversible error.
Litigation Takeaway
"Even if there is a valid reason to deviate from standard child support amounts—such as high travel costs for visitation—the court must include specific statutory 'math' and findings in the order, or the ruling will be overturned. Furthermore, using community funds for personal benefit after a separation can be legally classified as a breach of fiduciary duty, justifying an unequal division of property."