Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1262 opinions found
William Delawrence Lewis v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Lewis, the First Court of Appeals considered whether evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for failure to stop and render aid when the defendant claimed he never collided with the crashed vehicle. Witnesses and reconstruction evidence showed Lewis drove a high-performance car at extreme speeds while “pacing” another car in apparent competitive driving for more than a mile; the other car then lost control, crashed, and caused a death and serious injury, and Lewis did not stop. Applying Tex. Transp. Code §§ 550.021 and 550.023 and precedent holding that “involved” is broader than “collision,” the court focused on whether Lewis’s conduct contributed to the accident. The court held that even without definitive proof of physical contact, a rational jury could find Lewis was “involved” because his high-speed, side-by-side driving was a contributing factor in the sequence of events, and credibility conflicts about contact were for the jury. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas, you don’t always need proof of an actual impact to show someone was “involved” in a dangerous incident—participation in high-risk, competitive driving can be enough. In custody and divorce cases, that makes it easier to frame reckless behavior (and related criminal exposure) as endangering conduct for best-interest restrictions and as fault/waste considerations in a “just and right” property division."
Cove Funding, LP and its Subsidiary HPS Admin, LLC v. Marcy Barba and Jorge Barba
COA03
In a post-judgment enforcement proceeding, a third-party lender intervened in a receivership, asserting a priority security interest and requesting the turnover of assets. The trial court denied the turnover motion but did not issue specific findings regarding the validity of the lender's lien. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals analyzed whether the order met the 'discrete issue' finality standard for receiverships or qualified as a mandatory injunction. The court held that because the order was a simple denial that did not conclusively adjudicate the underlying ownership rights or substantial interests of the third party, it was an interlocutory order over which the appellate court lacked jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"To prevent third-party claimants from disrupting a receivership through interlocutory appeals, practitioners should seek a simple denial of turnover requests rather than a formal adjudication of the claim's merits. Conversely, third parties seeking to appeal a denial must ensure the order contains specific findings that finally adjudicate their substantial rights or act as a mandatory injunction."
National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company v. Payne & Keller Company, By and Through Its Duly-Appointed Receiver, Peter D. Protopapas
COA14
In this case, a receiver attempted to domesticate a South Carolina order in Texas under Chapter 35 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code (the Texas version of the UEFJA). Third-party insurers intervened and filed motions to vacate, then attempted to appeal the filing as a final judgment. The Court of Appeals analyzed whether domesticating a non-final foreign order "upgrades" its status to a final Texas judgment. The court held that because the underlying South Carolina order was interlocutory on its face, its domestication in Texas resulted only in an interlocutory order, not a final appealable judgment. Consequently, because the trial court had not ruled on the motions to vacate and no statute authorized an interlocutory appeal for such a filing, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Domesticating a foreign order in Texas under Chapter 35 only creates an appealable judgment if the original foreign order was final; if the out-of-state order is temporary or interlocutory, it remains unappealable in Texas, potentially freezing enforcement if a motion to vacate is pending."
Bustamante v. Bustamante
COA01
In Bustamante v. Bustamante, the First Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court's order granting a bill of review—which vacated a prior 2023 judgment without resolving the underlying merits—could be immediately appealed. The court analyzed Texas jurisdictional principles, noting that appellate review is generally limited to final judgments unless a statute specifically authorizes an interlocutory appeal. Because the order only 're-opened' the litigation and did not fall under the authorized list of interlocutory appeals in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"The granting of a bill of review is a non-appealable interlocutory order if the underlying merits remain unresolved. Practitioners must proceed through a second trial on the merits before they can challenge the propriety of the bill of review on appeal."
Tumey v. Crawford
COA14
In Tumey v. Crawford, the appellant attempted to appeal a trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). However, the appellee’s request for mandatory attorney’s fees remained unresolved in the trial court. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 51.014(a)(12), which specifically authorizes interlocutory appeals only when a TCPA motion is denied, not when it is granted. Following the principle that judgments are not final until all claims—including attorney's fees—are resolved, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal and dismissed the case.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas, you cannot immediately appeal the granting of a TCPA dismissal if the issue of attorney’s fees is still pending; for family law litigants, this means a successful movant can effectively block an opponent's appeal by keeping the fee adjudication active in the trial court."
In Re Alejandra Suarez Jaramillo
COA13
In this mandamus proceeding, Alejandra Suarez Jaramillo challenged a trial court's scheduling order that set a discovery supplementation deadline five weeks before the order was even signed. Jaramillo argued that this retroactive and "impossible" deadline effectively barred her from presenting a defense. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the claim under established mandamus standards, which require both a clear abuse of discretion and the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal. The court held that while the retroactive deadline was procedurally unusual, the relator failed to provide a record showing that her defense was 'severely compromised.' Specifically, because she did not identify which vital witnesses or documents were excluded or how they went to the 'very heart' of the litigation, she failed to demonstrate that the error could not be corrected through a normal appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"A trial court's procedural error—even one as logically absurd as a retroactive deadline—does not guarantee emergency relief unless you build a specific record proving that the error 'severely compromised' your ability to present your case."
E-VOLVE ENERGY HOLDINGS, LLC v. MP2 ENERGY, LLC
COA05
In a dispute sent to AAA arbitration, E‑Volve sought to vacate/modify an award confirmed by the Collin County trial court, arguing the arbitrator exceeded her authority and made erroneous offset/damages determinations. The Dallas Court of Appeals first held the confirmation order was a final, appealable judgment because it contained clear, unequivocal Lehmann finality language (“disposes of all claims and all parties and is final and appealable”), even if the order lacked detailed recovery terms. On the merits, applying the FAA/TAA’s narrow vacatur/modification standards, the court held the party challenging an award bears the burden to provide a complete, authenticated arbitration record. Because no transcript of the final arbitration hearing existed (and appellant provided only unauthenticated materials), the appellate court was required to presume the missing evidence supported the award, making review of the alleged errors impossible. The court affirmed confirmation of the arbitration award.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want any meaningful chance to overturn or modify a private arbitration result—especially in high-stakes divorce/custody arbitrations—secure a court reporter and preserve an authenticated record. Without a transcript, appellate courts will presume the evidence supported the arbitrator, and challenges that the arbitrator exceeded their powers or got the facts wrong will usually be dead on arrival."
Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Susana Lopez
COA08
In Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Susana Lopez, a state employee sued for retaliation, alleging she was fired for filing internal complaints and requesting FMLA leave. The HHSC argued she was terminated for chronic training delinquency and unauthorized cell phone use. Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the Court of Appeals analyzed whether Lopez's firing was a 'pretext' for retaliation. The court found that because Lopez admitted to the policy violations and failed to provide evidence of 'similarly situated' employees being treated differently, she could not overcome the agency's legitimate reasons. The court held that the agency retained its sovereign immunity and dismissed the case, emphasizing that subjective belief and timing are not enough to prove a retaliatory motive.
Litigation Takeaway
"To defeat a 'neutral' excuse in court—whether it is an employer's policy or a parent's justification for denying visitation—you must provide objective evidence that the reason is factually false or applied inconsistently. Suspicious timing or personal feelings of unfairness are legally insufficient to prove that an opponent’s stated reason is a mere pretext for retaliation."
EDWARD GENE MOODY JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS
COA02
In Moody v. State, the defendant challenged a felony DWI conviction, arguing (1) the search-warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause for a compelled blood draw and (2) the State failed to prove the two prior DWI convictions (“jurisdictional priors”) required to elevate the offense to a felony. Applying the highly deferential totality-of-the-circumstances review and the “four corners” rule, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held the magistrate had a substantial basis to find probable cause where the affidavit described a vehicle accident, witness reports that the defendant smelled of alcohol and threw beer cans into a ditch, the officer’s own odor-of-alcohol observation, failed field sobriety tests, and the defendant’s admission he drank two 24-ounce beers. The court also held the evidence was legally sufficient to link Moody to the 1995 and 2022 DWI judgments for enhancement purposes; remoteness did not undermine the priors’ validity, and the State provided documentation and corroborating testimony connecting Moody to those convictions. The court affirmed the felony DWI conviction and sentence.
Litigation Takeaway
"In custody and SAPCR cases, don’t dismiss “old” alcohol-related convictions or a parent’s calm demeanor during an incident. Build an endangerment narrative using (1) certified priors (even decades old) and (2) contemporaneous, concrete “four corners” facts from police/fire/witness reports (accident details, odor, discarded containers, refusals, admissions) to support testing requests and restrictions like supervised visitation."
In Re Constance Benavides a/k/a Constance Chamberlain
COA13
After an eviction judgment was entered following a property dispute, the Relator, Constance Benavides, attempted to stay her removal by filing a supersedeas bond. However, the trial court did not set the bond amount until over a month after the judgment, and Benavides filed the bond shortly thereafter. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Property Code § 24.007, which mandates that a bond must be filed within ten days of a judgment to stay an eviction 'under any circumstances.' The court held that the statutory deadline is absolute and contains no exceptions for judicial or administrative delays, ultimately denying mandamus relief and allowing the eviction to proceed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In property crossover evictions, the ten-day deadline to post a supersedeas bond is a 'trap' that admits no excuses; you must aggressively move to set and file the bond within 240 hours of the judgment signature or face immediate removal from the premises, regardless of a pending appeal."