Opinion Library

In re Adrian and Mary Zuniga

COA13

Adrian and Mary Zuniga filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel a trial court to set their civil case for trial after the court removed it from the docket despite multiple announcements of readiness. While the petition was pending at the Thirteenth Court of Appeals, the trial court scheduled a trial date for April 2026. The appellate court analyzed whether the trial court was still 'refusing' to act and determined that because a trial date had been set, the Relators could no longer demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion or an entitlement to extraordinary relief. Consequently, the court held that the challenge was effectively mooted by the new trial setting and denied the petition.

Matthew Janssen v. The State of Texas

COA07

In Janssen v. State, an appellant expressed a clear desire to abandon his appeal during an on-the-record hearing but failed to submit the signed, written motion to dismiss required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). The Seventh Court of Appeals addressed whether this procedural omission prevented the dismissal of the case. The court utilized Rule 2, which allows for the suspension of specific procedural rules for 'good cause' or to expedite a decision. Analyzing the appellant's oral statements in the supplemental record, the court found that his clear intent to abandon the appeal constituted sufficient good cause to bypass the signature requirement. The court held that it possesses the authority to dismiss an appeal when the record unequivocally reflects the appellant's desire to abandon the proceedings, even in the absence of a signed motion.

In Re Jose Raquel Lerma

COA13

In In re Jose Raquel Lerma, the relator sought mandamus relief to compel a trial court to rule on pending motions regarding his imprisonment and speedy trial demand. The court analyzed whether the mere act of filing documents with a district clerk is sufficient to trigger a judge's ministerial duty to rule. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that a relator must establish a three-prong test: (1) the trial court had a legal duty to rule, (2) the court was asked to rule, and (3) the court failed or refused to do so within a reasonable time. Because the record only showed the filings were made with the clerk and did not show the judge was actually aware of the motions or asked to rule on them, the court denied the petition.

In Re Jose Raquel Lerma

COA13

In In re Jose Raquel Lerma, a Relator sought a writ of mandamus to compel a trial judge to rule on pending motions that had been filed but not acted upon. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals denied the petition, holding that a trial court’s ministerial duty to rule is not triggered by the mere act of filing a document with the clerk. The court analyzed the requirements for mandamus relief in 'failure to rule' cases, emphasizing that a relator must demonstrate the trial court had actual awareness of the motion and was specifically asked to rule. Because the Relator failed to provide a record of 'presentment'—such as correspondence with the court or a formal request for a ruling—the court found he did not establish a clear right to the relief sought.

WYLIE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT v. LACY MARIE SCHUITEMAN AND CHRISTOPER MICHAEL CONGER

COA05

Wylie Independent School District appealed a trial court judgment that granted a money judgment for delinquent taxes but failed to include a foreclosure provision or an award of costs. While the appeal was pending, a third-party purchaser bought the subject property and paid the school district the full amount of taxes, interest, penalties, and costs. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed whether a live controversy still existed and concluded that because the underlying financial obligation was satisfied in full, the school district's request for enforcement remedies was moot. The court held that the satisfaction of the debt stripped the court of jurisdiction, resulting in the vacatur of the challenged judgment and dismissal of the appeal.

In Re Jose Raquel Lerma

COA13

In this case, the relator sought a writ of mandamus after a trial court failed to rule on several pending motions. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed whether the mere act of e-filing a motion with the clerk's office is sufficient to trigger a judge's ministerial duty to rule. The court held that mandamus relief is unavailable unless the relator provides an evidentiary record proving the trial court was actually aware of the motion and was specifically asked to rule. Because the relator's evidence only showed that the motions were filed and not that they were brought to the judge's personal attention, the court denied the petition.

COA10

In this juvenile delinquency proceeding, S.W. appealed an order committing her to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department. Her court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief asserting the appeal was frivolous and a motion to withdraw. The Tenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Family Code § 51.101(a), which requires counsel appointed at the initial detention stage to represent the child 'until the case is terminated.' Drawing a parallel to the Texas Supreme Court’s 'continuing duty' doctrine in parental rights termination cases (In re P.M.), the court interpreted 'termination' to mean the exhaustion of all appeals through the Texas Supreme Court. Consequently, while the court affirmed the commitment order, it denied the attorney's motion to withdraw.

IN THE ESTATE OF LONNIE K. LEDBETTER JR., DECEASED

COA02

Following the death of Lonnie Ledbetter Jr., his children sued his surviving spouse, alleging she exerted undue influence to divert millions of dollars into a private trust. During evidentiary hearings, the spouse invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when questioned about her identity, and evidence emerged of suspicious, large-scale asset transfers. In response, the trial court took the 'sua sponte' (on its own motion) step of appointing a neutral receiver to manage the trust assets. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 64.001(a)(7) and equitable principles, determining that trial courts possess the inherent authority to protect the subject matter of litigation from dissipation. The court held that because a party’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment in a civil case allows for a negative inference, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a receiver to preserve the property while the lawsuit was pending.

Kist v. Kist

COA14

Kathryn Kist sought to lift a geographic residency restriction to relocate her four children from Texas to Indiana, presenting evidence of a $70,000 job offer, free housing from her parents, and access to private schooling. She argued that the father, Jonathan, was largely uninvolved and that staying in Texas was a financial hardship. Jonathan contested the move, presenting evidence of his involvement and the children's stability in their current environment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the conflict using the Lenz factors and Texas public policy favoring 'frequent and continuing contact' with both parents. The court held that because the trial court faced conflicting testimony regarding the father’s involvement and the children's best interests, it did not abuse its discretion in maintaining the residency restriction or in characterizing Jonathan's post-petition home purchase as his separate property.

C. Q. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

COA03

The Department of Family and Protective Services sought to terminate a mother’s parental rights following allegations of drug use and child neglect. While the mother demonstrated significant recent progress, including stable housing and numerous negative urinalyses, she continued to test positive for cocaine in hair follicle tests. Additionally, her live-in fiancé refused to submit to drug testing. The Court of Appeals analyzed the conflicting forensic evidence and the mother's choice of partners under the "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard. The court held that the trial court was entitled to credit the hair follicle results over other tests and that the presence of an untested partner constituted endangering conduct. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the termination of her parental rights.