Weekly Digest
August 29 – September 4, 2026
37 opinions this week
M.D., Jr. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to prove constructive abandonment under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(N). The court focused on the statutory elements: the child had been in the Department’s conservatorship well over six months, the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child through services and case management, Father failed to maintain regular visitation or significant contact, and Father showed an inability to provide a safe environment, especially given the child’s significant medical and developmental needs. The court also rejected Father’s evidentiary complaints on harm grounds, concluding that any hearsay error tied to assault allegations was cumulative of other admitted evidence. Because one predicate ground plus the best-interest finding was enough to support termination, the court affirmed without needing to resolve every challenged ground.
Litigation Takeaway
“In termination and custody-related cases alike, courts care more about documented follow-through than stated intentions. A parent facing constructive-abandonment allegations must build a concrete record of visits, requests for contact, services completed, and safety planning; sporadic effort and unmanaged instability will not suffice. For the prevailing party, this case shows the value of proving one predicate ground cleanly and supporting key facts through multiple admissible sources to blunt appellate evidentiary complaints.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of William Christopher Cannon and Stacie Lynette Cannon
COA06
In Cannon v. Cannon, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that a divorce settlement recited in open court, agreed to by both spouses, and accepted by the trial court became binding once the court rendered judgment on it. After the August 8, 2025 hearing, the husband later objected to the written decree, refused to approve it, and argued the decree was unreliable, incomplete, and unsupported, especially as to provisions for their adult-disabled son. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11, Family Code section 7.006, and Texas rendition law, emphasizing that the key moment is rendition, not later signature or approval of the written decree. Because the material terms were stated on the record, both parties assented, and the judge used present-tense language showing immediate adjudication, the later decree was merely a memorialization of the earlier rendered judgment. The court held that the husband could not revoke consent after rendition to block entry of a conforming decree, and it affirmed the decree in full, including the continuance ruling and support provisions.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you settle a family case in open court, make the record count: state all material terms clearly, get both parties’ personal assent, and obtain present-tense rendition from the judge. After rendition, a party usually cannot undo the deal by refusing to sign the decree or claiming second thoughts; the real fight becomes whether the written decree actually matches what was rendered.”
In the Interest of C.A.B. and P.B., Children
COA05
In an appeal from a post-divorce order terminating spousal support, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the support obligation in the parties’ agreed 2010 divorce decree was contractual alimony, not statutory spousal maintenance under Chapter 8 of the Texas Family Code. Although the decree used the label “Court-Ordered Maintenance” and included Chapter 8 eligibility findings, the court looked to the decree’s operative language and structure: it expressly incorporated the parties’ agreement as enforceable as a contract, tied duration to remarriage or cohabitation rather than a statutory end date, required life-insurance security, and made the obligation survive the payor’s death as a charge against his estate. Because those terms exceeded or departed from Chapter 8’s statutory framework, the court concluded the obligation was contractual in nature. The court further held that Wife’s earlier enforcement efforts invoking Chapter 8 did not change the decree’s legal character. It reversed the termination order and remanded because Chapter 8’s modification and termination provisions did not govern this agreed contractual support obligation.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas divorce cases, labels do not control spousal-support characterization—the decree’s actual terms do. If an agreed decree includes support provisions that go beyond Chapter 8, such as indefinite duration, estate liability, or insurance security, courts may treat the obligation as contractual alimony, which changes the available enforcement, modification, and termination strategies. Before filing or defending a support review action, litigators should analyze the whole decree and plead the case consistent with the obligation’s true legal character.”
In re Frank Morales
COA08
In this original mandamus proceeding, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that the trial court improperly continued ex parte TRO relief that barred a father’s possession of his children. The mother obtained an ex parte TRO based on an unsigned, unnotarized document labeled as an affidavit, and the court later signed another extended TRO months later. The court analyzed Rule 680, Rule 687, and Family Code § 105.001(c)(3), concluding that ex parte TROs must be supported by a verified pleading or valid affidavit, must expire within 14 days, and may be extended only once for a like period absent consent. Because the supporting document was not a valid affidavit and the second extension exceeded Rule 680’s strict time limits, the TRO relief was void. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the noncompliant TRO.
Litigation Takeaway
“Emergency family-law TROs are strictly rule-bound: if you want ex parte relief affecting possession, you need a properly verified record, a valid affidavit, a prompt injunction hearing, and a TRO that expires on time. Courts cannot keep possession restrictions alive through rollover extensions or 'until further order' language, and a parent restrained by a void TRO has a strong basis for mandamus relief.”
Paige Lindsey Marlow v. Christopher Clayton Cooley
COA14
In a bifurcated family-law case, the trial court tried only the threshold issue of whether Paige Marlow and Christopher Cooley had an informal marriage and signed an order finding no marriage existed. Marlow appealed, but the court of appeals held it lacked jurisdiction because the order resolved only that single issue while SAPCR, child-support, and property matters remained pending. Applying Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. and the one-final-judgment rule, the court concluded the order was not final because it did not dispose of all claims and parties and did not clearly state that it did so. The court also found no statute authorizing interlocutory appeal of this type of order, so it dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“A bifurcated ruling on informal marriage is usually not immediately appealable if any SAPCR, support, fee, or property issues remain. Before filing a notice of appeal, family-law counsel should perform a finality audit and consider severance—not just bifurcation—if the goal is to create an appealable judgment.”
In the Interest of J.L. and J.L., Children
COA02
In this CPS termination appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code section 263.403(c) requires the temporary order ending a monitored return to expressly set a new dismissal deadline. Here, after Mother’s monitored return was terminated, the temporary order did not include a reset dismissal date, so the prior dismissal date remained in effect. Because trial began after that existing deadline expired, the case had already been automatically dismissed by operation of law, the trial court lost subject-matter jurisdiction, and the later termination order was void.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Chapter 263 cases, dismissal dates are jurisdictional and order drafting is outcome-determinative. If a monitored return fails, the temporary order terminating it must itself include the new section 263.403(c) dismissal date; a later order cannot fix the omission. Lawyers should independently calculate every deadline and confirm the signed order matches the statute, or risk a void judgment after months of litigation.”
Hayes v. State
COA14
In Hayes v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a constitutional complaint that the trial judge was biased or partial may be raised for the first time on appeal, even without a contemporaneous objection in the trial court. Using the Marin framework and relying on Proenza, Grado, and Tates, the court reasoned that the right to an impartial judge is at least a category-two right because requiring a party to accuse the presiding judge of bias during trial is often unrealistic and can undermine confidence in the proceeding. On the merits, however, the court found the record did not show the extreme favoritism or antagonism required by due process under Liteky, Brumit, and related cases. Because adverse rulings and ordinary courtroom management did not establish disqualifying bias, the conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If the complaint is that the judge’s own conduct showed unconstitutional bias, Texas appellate courts may still review that issue even without a trial objection—but winning on the merits requires a record showing far more than adverse rulings, impatience, or stern courtroom management. In family cases, preserve all ordinary trial errors as usual, but recognize that a true impartial-judge complaint may remain available on appeal as a separate due-process issue.”
In the Interest of P.G., A Child
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(f). The case began after the child was born testing positive for methamphetamine, and the Department removed the child and implemented a court-ordered service plan requiring drug testing, counseling, parenting classes, visitation, employment, and stable housing. On appeal, the mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child and that a continuing danger prevented reunification. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient because the Department created and monitored a meaningful reunification path through services, testing, and visitation opportunities, while the mother remained unstable, attended only a small fraction of visits, tested positive for methamphetamine during the case, and lacked a concrete plan for the child’s care. The court also upheld the best-interest finding and affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas child-related cases, partial compliance with a service plan does not overcome ongoing evidence of current danger. Courts focus on present sobriety, stability, consistent contact, and a realistic caregiving plan—not just whether a parent checked off classes or assessments. For practitioners, the lesson is to build a record showing either a real reunification pathway and unresolved safety risks, or, for the parent, verified proof that those risks are truly resolved by final hearing.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Daniel Maurice Murillo and Lindsey Marie Murillo
COA08
In a post-divorce procedural dispute, the husband tried to separately appeal an order denying his motion to seal records by relying on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a, which generally treats sealing orders as severed and immediately appealable. The El Paso Court of Appeals first examined whether Rule 76a applied at all and held that it did not, because Rule 76a expressly excludes documents filed in actions originally arising under the Family Code from its definition of "court records." Since the underlying case was a divorce, the sealing order remained part of the same family-law case rather than becoming a separate final judgment. The court therefore held that any challenge to the sealing ruling had to proceed within the existing divorce appeal, and it administratively dismissed the second appeal and directed that the filings be placed in the original appellate cause.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family-law cases, do not assume Rule 76a gives you a separate, immediate appeal from an order about sealing records. If the case arises under the Family Code, Rule 76a likely does not apply, so confidentiality issues must be preserved and pursued within the existing family-law case or appeal using the correct procedural vehicle.”
In re Attune Insurance Services, LLC, TWFG Insurance Services, LLC, and Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc.
COA13
In this mandamus proceeding, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that the trial court improperly consolidated, less than thirty days before trial, a debt-collection suit with a separate insurance coverage and bad-faith suit. Although both disputes stemmed from the same fire, the court emphasized that Rule 174 requires more than a shared background event: the cases involved different contracts, different primary parties, different causes of action, and materially different proof. Because the late consolidation threatened prejudice in trial preparation, presentation, and jury comprehension that could not be adequately cured on appeal, the court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the consolidation order.
Litigation Takeaway
“A shared factual backdrop does not justify consolidation when the suits turn on different legal duties, documents, parties, and evidence. And if a trial court orders consolidation on the eve of trial in a way that disrupts preparation and creates unfair prejudice, mandamus may be the right remedy rather than waiting for appeal.”
In the Matter of K.B., a Child
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s modification order committing K.B. to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department after K.B. pleaded true to multiple violations of court-ordered placement conditions. The court held that Texas Family Code section 54.05(f) authorized TJJD commitment because the violations established by a preponderance of the evidence that K.B. had violated reasonable and lawful court orders. The court also analyzed the additional findings required by section 54.05(m) and concluded the record supported them: K.B.’s best interest required out-of-home placement, reasonable efforts had been made to avoid removal through counseling, medication management, home supervision, and multiple residential placements, and K.B.’s home could not provide the care and supervision needed to satisfy probation conditions. Finding no non-frivolous issue under Anders review, the court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a case requires both proof of a triggering violation and separate statutory findings, do not rely on misconduct alone. Build a layered record showing the full history of services, failed lesser interventions, explored placement options, and specific facts proving why the child’s needs cannot safely be met at home.”
Bernardo Diaz v. Delia Cavazos-Gamez
COA13
In this crossover case, the court held that a trial court cannot grant Texas Rule 202 presuit discovery based only on allegations in a verified petition. The petitioner sought depositions and documents to investigate who created and distributed a political campaign mailer that allegedly used confidential records. Although the trial court signed an order reciting the Rule 202.4 findings, the appellate court emphasized that Rule 202 is an extraordinary remedy requiring actual evidence and express findings that either the discovery may prevent a failure or delay of justice in an anticipated suit or that its likely benefit outweighs its burden or expense. Because the petitioner did not supply the necessary evidentiary support, the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief and dismissed the appeal as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“Rule 202 is not a presuit fishing license. If you want records or testimony before filing suit—especially sensitive financial, medical, business, or child-related information—you need evidence, narrow tailoring, and express Rule 202.4 findings, or the order is vulnerable to mandamus.”
Ofelia Rincon, Brigida Guzman, Hilario S. Dominguez, and Andrew Dominguez, Sr. v. Nellie Ramirez
COA03
In Rincon v. Ramirez, a title dispute turned on whether Travis County property acquired through a 1968 contract for deed was community property or the surviving wife’s separate property after legal title was conveyed to her alone in 2001. The Austin Court of Appeals applied Texas’s inception-of-title doctrine and held that characterization is fixed when the spouses first acquire the claim of right under the executory contract, not when a later deed transfers legal title. Because Cruz and Manuela Dominguez entered the contract for deed during marriage, the appellee could not conclusively prove as a matter of law that the property was Manuela’s separate property. The court reversed the summary judgment on the trespass-to-try-title and quiet-title claims and remanded the case.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not let the deed date drive characterization. In Texas family and probate-related property disputes, a contract for deed or other executory real-estate agreement signed during marriage can fix community-property character long before legal title issues, and a party moving for summary judgment must conclusively address inception of title—not just later deed delivery.”
In the Interest of B.B. and B.B., Children
COA11
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The Eleventh Court of Appeals reviewed the record under the clear-and-convincing legal- and factual-sufficiency standards and focused on the cumulative pattern of danger: deplorable and hazardous home conditions, admitted methamphetamine use, repeated refusals to drug test, the children’s positive methamphetamine tests, failure to cooperate with FBSS and Department services, and continuing instability in housing and caregiving. Although the mother showed some favorable facts, including visitation and partial service completion, the court held that this did not outweigh the evidence that she could not provide a safe and stable environment. The court affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
“Best-interest cases are usually won or lost on patterns, not isolated facts. Evidence of unsafe housing, drug use, refused testing, concealed third parties, and failure to follow through with services can outweigh partial compliance like attending visits or finishing classes. For family-law litigators, the case is a strong reminder to prove present safety and stability with concrete evidence, not promises of improvement.”
In re Institute in Basic Life Principles, Inc.
COA06
In this original mandamus proceeding, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion by compelling responses to facially overbroad discovery requests in a civil sexual-abuse suit against IBLP. The requests swept across broad subjects—including religious publications, political-campaign policies, and organization-wide financial records—over expansive time periods untethered to the pleaded claims. Applying settled Texas discovery law, the court emphasized that discovery must be reasonably tailored to the claims and defenses and that mandamus is appropriate because disclosure of sensitive information cannot be undone on appeal. The court conditionally granted mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its blanket order compelling discovery, resolving the case on overbreadth grounds without reaching the relator’s constitutional objections.
Litigation Takeaway
“Even in hard-fought cases, discovery is not limitless. If a trial court compels broad requests that are not narrowly tied to the live issues by time, subject matter, or scope—especially for sensitive records—mandamus may be the best remedy because the harm from disclosure often cannot be fixed later.”
Bernardo Diaz v. Delia Cavazos-Gamez
COA13
In this original proceeding, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule 202 cannot be used as broad presuit discovery to identify actors and obtain documents without strict compliance with Rule 202.4. The petitioner sought presuit depositions and six categories of documents relating to a campaign mailer, and the trial court granted the request while also denying a motion to dismiss. The appellate court emphasized that Rule 202 is a narrow, ancillary remedy requiring an evidentiary basis and express findings that either the deposition may prevent a failure or delay of justice in an anticipated suit or that the likely benefit outweighs the burden and expense when investigating a potential claim. Because the order rested on insufficient evidentiary support and formulaic recitations rather than the required substantive showing, the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief vacating the Rule 202 order and dismissed the related appeal as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“Rule 202 is not a presuit fishing license. In family-law-adjacent disputes involving sensitive financial, medical, school, mental-health, or business records, a party seeking presuit discovery must offer actual evidence supporting the specific Rule 202.4 findings; bare suspicion and broad document requests are not enough. If a trial court orders Rule 202 discovery without that strict showing, mandamus should be considered immediately because the disclosure cannot be undone.”
Eric Robert Kendrick v. The State of Texas
COA06
In this criminal appeal, the defendant argued his lawyer was ineffective for not objecting to extraneous-offense testimony from the complainant’s adult sister. The court applied Strickland and held that, on a silent record, it could not find deficient performance because counsel’s reasons were undeveloped and several reasonable strategies were apparent, including a belief that the evidence was admissible under Article 38.371, Rule 404(b), or would survive Rule 403 balancing. Because the record supported plausible strategic reasons for not objecting, and the defendant also failed to show harmful jury-charge error, the court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you may need to complain on appeal that counsel should have objected to prejudicial relationship or prior-acts evidence, build the record. Texas appellate courts usually will not infer ineffective assistance from silence when a plausible trial strategy can be imagined, so objections, rulings, limiting instructions, and—if necessary—a motion for new trial are critical.”
In re James E. White, IV, Marti White Wright, Clinton Wesley White, James E. White, III, and Hester Ann White
COA08
In this mandamus proceeding, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that a prior trust-modification order was void because it was entered without joining all designated beneficiaries as required by the Texas Trust Code. The trial court in the ongoing family trust dispute therefore abused its discretion by relying on that void order to appoint a successor trustee different from the person named in the trust instrument. Because the error affected control of the trust and ongoing litigation, the court found no adequate appellate remedy, conditionally granted mandamus, ordered the trial court to vacate the improper trustee appointment, and directed it to issue scire facias to bring the named successor trustee into the case.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law cases that intersect with trusts, never assume a person has authority to act for the trust just because another court said so. If the underlying trust order was entered without all required beneficiaries, it may be void, and any later rulings built on it can be attacked by mandamus. Also, when a fiduciary dies during pending litigation, use proper substitution procedures like scire facias so the correct successor is before the court.”
Evangelina Lopez Guzman Zaragoza v. Miguel Zaragoza Fuentes
COA01
In Zaragoza v. Fuentes, the parties disputed whether their marriage had already been dissolved by a 1959 Mexican divorce decree, which the wife claimed was invalid for lack of notice and due process. While the wife’s challenge to that decree remained pending in Mexican courts, the Texas trial court deferred under international comity and dismissed the Texas divorce case without prejudice. The First Court of Appeals agreed that comity supported waiting for the Mexican proceedings because they overlapped with the Texas marital-status dispute, but it held the trial court used the wrong procedural remedy. Because the Texas court had not recognized the Mexican decree, had not made the due-process findings necessary to give it effect in Texas, and expected the Texas case could continue later, the proper remedy was an abatement or stay rather than dismissal.
Litigation Takeaway
“In cross-border family cases, comity-based delay is not the same as recognition of a foreign judgment. If a Texas court is only waiting for foreign proceedings to finish, the case should be stayed or abated—not dismissed—so the parties preserve their pleadings, procedural posture, and prior litigation work.”
Yongyoon Kim v. The State of Texas
COA03
In Yongyoon Kim v. State of Texas, the Austin Court of Appeals held that although a defendant claiming self-defense may offer evidence of a victim’s violent character, Texas Rules of Evidence limit that proof to reputation or opinion testimony unless character is an essential element of the defense. Kim argued the trial court wrongly excluded testimony about a specific prior incident showing the victim’s alleged violence and unusual strength, but the court held Rule 405(b) did not apply because a victim’s character is not an essential element of self-defense. The court also rejected Kim’s alternative theories because he did not show he knew of the prior act before the shooting, so it could not support his state of mind, and he failed to establish a proper non-character basis such as first-aggressor intent or motive. The exclusion of the specific-act evidence was therefore within the trial court’s discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to prove someone acted in line with a violent or aggressive character trait, Texas evidence rules usually limit you to reputation or opinion testimony—not specific bad acts. In family-law cases involving abuse, threats, endangerment, or fear-based decisions, specific incidents require a precise non-character theory and the right predicate, such as prior knowledge for state-of-mind evidence.”
Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters Insurance Company v. Woodway Square 507, LLC
COA01
In Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters Insurance Company v. Woodway Square 507, LLC, the First Court of Appeals held that an agreed minors’ settlement judgment was final because it contained clear Lehmann finality language stating that it fully and finally disposed of all claims and dismissed any remaining claims, cross-actions, counterclaims, third-party actions, and interventions. The court rejected arguments that the order’s title, subject matter, or the parties’ later conduct limited its effect, explaining that unambiguous finality language controls even if the parties did not subjectively intend a global disposition. Because no timely post-judgment motion was filed, plenary power expired thirty days after the judgment was signed, making later summary-judgment orders void and requiring dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family cases, boilerplate finality language can end the entire case even if the order appears to resolve only one issue. If you want only a partial resolution, say so expressly and reserve remaining claims and parties; if you want a final judgment, make that intent unmistakable and immediately calendar post-judgment and appellate deadlines.”
Bernard v. State
COA02
In Bernard v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed child-sexual-assault convictions and rejected the defendant’s evidentiary and procedural complaints. The main dispute was whether certain testimony from the investigating officer amounted to inadmissible backdoor hearsay—specifically, testimony explaining why no SANE exam occurred and testimony that no suspect other than the defendant had been identified. The court held the first statement could reasonably serve a nonhearsay purpose by explaining an investigative omission rather than proving the truth of the out-of-court statement, and it emphasized that backdoor-hearsay analysis turns on whether the sole intent was to place the substance of the statement before the factfinder. As to both challenged statements, the court also relied heavily on harmless-error principles because materially similar evidence came in elsewhere without objection. The court likewise found no reversible Confrontation Clause, leading-question, jury-readback, or cumulative-error issue, largely because preservation, deference to trial-court discretion, and lack of harm defeated the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Not every indirect reference to what a child or witness said is hearsay. If testimony genuinely explains why an investigator, CPS worker, counselor, or other professional took—or did not take—a particular step, a court may treat it as nonhearsay context rather than an improper backdoor outcry. But the bigger lesson for family-law litigators is preservation and consistency: make targeted hearsay objections, force the proponent to state the nonhearsay purpose, and object every time similar evidence is offered, because once the same point comes in elsewhere without objection, any appellate complaint is likely dead on harm.”
In re the Commitment of Gregory Scott Alldredge
COA06
In this SVP commitment appeal, the appellant argued the trial court wrongly allowed an expert to relay unsubstantiated and unadjudicated allegations of non-sexual misconduct. The appellate court did not reach the merits because the only trial objection was hearsay. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1, the court held that an appellate complaint must comport with the objection made in the trial court. A running objection and limiting instruction preserved only the hearsay complaint actually asserted, not a broader challenge to collateral bad-act allegations. The judgment was affirmed for lack of preservation.
Litigation Takeaway
“Be specific and stack your objections. In family-law trials, a hearsay objection alone will not preserve separate complaints that evidence is unsubstantiated, unadjudicated, unfairly prejudicial, improper expert-basis testimony, or otherwise inadmissible. Running objections and limiting instructions help only on the grounds you actually state.”
DeSimone v. Zook
COA03
In DeSimone v. Zook, the Austin Court of Appeals considered whether an agreed SAPCR order requiring a parent to make monthly “voluntary payments” for the child created an enforceable obligation or merely described optional payments. Reading the order as a whole under ordinary contract-construction principles, the court held the provision was mandatory because it stated DeSimone “has agreed” to pay specific amounts on specific dates for a defined period, set a payment method, and included an express termination event. The court rejected DeSimone’s attempt to isolate the word “voluntary,” affirmed the trial court’s judgment for $54,000 in unpaid support-related arrearages, and also affirmed attorney’s fees and rejected any complaint about delayed findings as harmless.
Litigation Takeaway
“If support-like payment terms in an agreed SAPCR or decree are written with definite amounts, due dates, duration, and conditions, Texas courts will likely enforce them as mandatory once signed into an order—even if the provision uses soft language like “voluntary.” Draft carefully, and in enforcement cases focus on the clause’s full structure rather than one favorable word.”
In the Interest of Y.T., a Child
COA12
In *In re Y.T.*, a pro se father appealed a final SAPCR order after failing to appear for trial, challenging notice, supervised visitation, child support, and the order generally. The Tyler Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the father’s brief offered only conclusory complaints and failed to provide meaningful legal analysis, record citations, or supporting authority as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i). Applying the rule that pro se litigants are held to the same briefing standards as lawyers, the court held all appellate issues were inadequately briefed and therefore waived, and it affirmed the final SAPCR order.
Litigation Takeaway
“Family-law appeals can be lost on briefing before the court ever reaches the merits. Whether the complaint involves notice, possession restrictions, or child support, the appellant must connect the law to the record with developed argument, standards of review, and supporting authority; conclusory or grievance-style briefing waives error, even in SAPCR cases and even for pro se parties.”
Benitez v. State
COA01
In Benitez v. State, the First Court of Appeals held that prior child-sex-offense evidence admitted under Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37 is still subject to Rule 403 balancing, but the trial court acted within its discretion by admitting the defendant’s prior 2005 indecency-with-a-child conviction in his later child-sex prosecution. The court analyzed remoteness, limited factual detail, unfair-prejudice concerns, and the State’s need for the evidence under the Gigliobianco/Colone factors, concluding that age alone did not destroy probative value, sparse detail did not make the evidence unfairly prejudicial, and the State could still reasonably need corroborative propensity evidence in a credibility-driven child-abuse case. The conviction was therefore properly admitted because its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family cases involving prior abuse, convictions, CPS history, or other bad acts, Rule 403 objections usually rise or fall on the quality of the balancing record. Benitez is a useful analogy for arguing that remoteness affects weight more than admissibility, that a narrower presentation can reduce unfair prejudice, and that courts deciding child-safety issues may still have a real need for older but highly probative misconduct evidence.”
Lorenzo Ramirez v. The State of Texas
COA07
In this criminal appeal with strong crossover value for family-law trials, the defendant objected under Texas Rule of Evidence 614 when the trial court allowed the 17-year-old complainant’s mother to remain in the courtroom after testifying as the complainant’s guardian. On appeal, he tried to expand that evidentiary objection into facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to Code of Criminal Procedure article 56A.051(b). The Amarillo Court of Appeals held those constitutional complaints were not preserved because they were never timely and specifically raised in the trial court as required by Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The court further held the trial judge did not abuse its discretion on the sequestration issue because the mother qualified as the minor victim’s guardian and the judge reasonably concluded her testimony was already fixed and would not be materially affected by hearing the rest of the evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
“If your real complaint is constitutional, statutory, or as-applied, say so clearly in the trial court. A generic Rule 614 sequestration objection preserves only the evidentiary issue, not a later due-process or constitutional attack. In family cases, lawyers should separately preserve witness-presence, guardian-status, and constitutional objections with specificity.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Veronica Becerra and Jose Cancino and In the Interest of J.L.C. II., Minor Child
COA08
After a 2014 divorce decree failed to divide the parties’ marital home, the former wife later sought both recognition of an alleged informal remarriage and a postdivorce division of the omitted property under Texas Family Code § 9.203. The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s rejection of the informal-marriage claim, holding the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the parties did not agree to be remarried. But it reversed the property ruling, concluding the trial court misapplied § 9.203 by valuing the home as of the 2014 divorce date and awarding each party one-half of that historical equity. The appellate court held that omitted community property must be divided in the later Chapter 9 proceeding in a manner that is just and right at the time of that proceeding, not by a mechanical retroactive 50-50 accounting.
Litigation Takeaway
“An omitted-asset case under Family Code § 9.203 is not a simple equal-split cleanup. Lawyers must plead and prove a current, equitable just-and-right division, with evidence on present value, debt reduction, occupancy, expenses, improvements, and offsets, because a court commits reversible error if it freezes value at the original divorce date and automatically divides past equity 50-50.”
In re Ellis Farley
COA06
In In re Ellis Farley, a pro se relator in a child-custody matter sought mandamus relief against the trial judge and the official court reporter to force production of transcripts, bench remarks, and alleged recordings of in-chambers child interviews without cost. The Texarkana Court of Appeals first analyzed its mandamus jurisdiction under Texas Government Code section 22.221 and held that, unlike trial judges, court reporters are not proper mandamus targets unless relief against them is necessary to enforce the court of appeals’ own jurisdiction, which Farley did not show. The court also held the petition was independently defective under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7 because it omitted required petition components, relied on unsupported factual assertions, and lacked a certified or sworn mandamus record. The court therefore denied mandamus relief without reaching the underlying merits of the record-access complaints.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus in family-law cases is won or lost on jurisdiction and record-building. If a transcript or reporter problem threatens appellate relief, aim the petition at a proper target, explain why any relief against a non-judicial officer is necessary to protect appellate jurisdiction, and file a Rule 52-compliant petition with a certified or sworn record—because urgency and detailed accusations will not substitute for proof.”
D&M Creative Custom Builders, Inc. v. Paul Pearce and Linda Pearce
COA09
In D&M Creative Custom Builders, Inc. v. Pearce, a homebuilder sued homeowners for unpaid extra work under quantum meruit. Before trial, the defendants objected under Texas Rule 193.6 to the builder’s expert and damages disclosures as inadequate. The trial court sustained the objection, ruled the builder had no evidence to prove its claim, dismissed the jury, and signed a take-nothing judgment. The Beaumont Court of Appeals reversed, explaining that Rule 193.6 is an evidentiary rule that permits exclusion of improperly disclosed evidence, but it does not authorize a court to convert that exclusion into a final merits judgment. Because no Rule 166a summary-judgment motion or other proper dispositive procedure was pending, the trial court effectively rendered an unauthorized sua sponte summary judgment. The court held the take-nothing judgment was improper and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law cases, even a valid Rule 193.6 exclusion does not let the court end the case on the spot without the right procedural vehicle. If key expert, tracing, valuation, reimbursement, or fee evidence is excluded, the opponent still must use a proper dispositive process—like summary judgment, directed verdict, or trial on the merits—before obtaining a final ruling. The lesson is simple: exclusion and disposition are not the same thing, and lawyers should object immediately if a court tries to turn a disclosure ruling into a surprise merits judgment.”
Christopher Garcia v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Garcia v. State, the defendant challenged the admission of the complainant’s prior statements after she failed to appear at trial in a family-violence prosecution. The court analyzed Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.49 and the Confrontation Clause, applying the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine. Looking at the full circumstantial record—death threats during the assault, repeated prohibited contact despite a no-contact bond condition, a jail call urging the complainant to help get him released, testimony that he had obtained a gun and watched places associated with her, and officers’ unsuccessful efforts to locate her despite her knowledge of trial—the court held the trial judge could reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that Garcia intended to, and did, procure her unavailability. The court therefore upheld admission of her prior statements and ruled that Garcia forfeited his Confrontation Clause objection.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a key witness disappears after threats, intimidation, or no-contact violations, courts may infer procurement and intent from the surrounding circumstances without direct testimony explaining the witness’s absence. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a detailed record of threats, prohibited contact, judicial orders, communications, and search efforts—or, if opposing the evidence, attack those links with specificity.”
Jonathan Fourie v. Kirsten Fourie
COA09
In Fourie v. Fourie, a husband filed a Montgomery County protective-order application against his wife while their divorce and custody case was pending elsewhere, even though a Harris County court had already denied a prior protective-order application based on the same family-violence allegations. The wife responded with a Rule 13 sanctions motion and introduced the prior application and denial order to show the second filing was barred by res judicata. The trial court examined whether the new filing was based on any materially new post-denial conduct, but the applicant and counsel failed to clearly distinguish the second case from the first. The court held the repeat application was groundless because it was precluded by the earlier ruling, and that the circumstances supported an inference of bad faith or harassment. It therefore denied the protective-order request and affirmed $5,000 in Rule 13 sanctions against both the applicant and his attorney.
Litigation Takeaway
“A party cannot relitigate a denied protective-order request in a new court using the same allegations and evidence. In family-law cases, lawyers must confirm there is a genuinely new factual basis before refiling; otherwise, res judicata and Rule 13 can turn a repeat emergency filing into a sanctionable tactic, with fee exposure for both client and counsel.”
Lincoln Lee Lankford v. Gregory Kevin Cline
COA09
In Lankford v. Cline, the plaintiff’s live petition alleged a stand-alone assault and battery claim, along with conspiracy-related and other derivative theories. The defendant filed a no-evidence summary-judgment motion under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i), but the motion challenged only conspiracy, aiding-and-abetting, theft, attorney’s fees, and exemplary-damages predicates. The Beaumont Court of Appeals compared the live pleading to the motion and held that a no-evidence motion must expressly identify the elements of the specific claim being attacked. Because the motion never challenged the elements of direct assault, the trial court could not grant summary judgment on that claim. The court reversed and remanded as to assault, while affirming the judgment on the claims actually addressed in the motion.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family cases that include tort-style claims, do not assume a no-evidence motion aimed at one theory will dispose of every related claim. Match the motion to the live pleading claim by claim and element by element. If a stand-alone claim like assault, conversion, or fraud is not expressly challenged, summary judgment on that claim is vulnerable on appeal.”
In the Interest of M.D.M., a Child
COA12
In In re M.D.M., the father tried to set aside a long-standing SAPCR child-support order by arguing the trial court never obtained personal jurisdiction over him because service in the original case was defective. The Tyler Court of Appeals separated subject-matter jurisdiction from personal jurisdiction and held the county court at law plainly had jurisdiction over the SAPCR and continuing authority to enforce support. On personal jurisdiction, the court relied on Rule 120a and general-appearance law, emphasizing that the father appeared at the original hearing, agreed to and signed the 2002 order, later participated in enforcement proceedings, and never filed a compliant special appearance. Because personal-jurisdiction objections are waivable and Rule 120a is the exclusive method to preserve them, his later service, due-process, and voidness arguments failed. The court also rejected his misidentification and HVAC-license complaints as inadequately briefed or unpreserved, and affirmed the order denying his motions and dismissing his pleadings.
Litigation Takeaway
“You cannot undo an old family-court order years later by relabeling a waived service complaint as a jurisdictional or due-process defect. If a party appeared, agreed to an order, signed it, participated later, or sought affirmative relief without first filing a proper Rule 120a special appearance, a collateral personal-jurisdiction attack is likely waived and dead on arrival.”
Marroquin v. Villarreal
COA03
In Marroquin v. Villarreal, the father sought to modify a prior joint-managing-conservatorship order by asking for sole managing conservatorship and supervised visitation for the mother. The court analyzed the request under Texas Family Code Section 156.101(a)(1), which requires proof of a material and substantial change in circumstances since the last order and proof that the requested change is in the child’s best interest. The appellate court emphasized that much of the father’s evidence involved incidents predating the 2022 order and could be treated only as background, not as proof of a new post-order change. As to newer allegations, the evidence was disputed: DFPS had ruled out abuse and neglect, testing was negative, and the mother denied the accusations. Because no findings of fact or conclusions of law were requested, the court implied all findings necessary to support the denial and held the record was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s decision. The denial of modification was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In a custody modification case, you must prove a real post-order change with concrete, corroborated evidence tied to the last controlling order—not just repackage old allegations or rely on disputed accusations. And if you lose a bench trial, request findings of fact and conclusions of law, or the appellate court will imply findings against you and make reversal much harder.”
Angelina Odhiambo and Dale Green v. Antony Odhiambo
COA12
After a divorce decree awarded Antony Odhiambo the Bullard, Texas property and required Angelina Odhiambo to vacate, she and another occupant remained in possession, leading Antony to file a forcible detainer action. On appeal from the possession judgment, the occupants argued the evidence did not strictly prove compliance with former Texas Property Code section 24.005(f-1) because the record did not directly show the notice-to-vacate mailing was deposited in the same county where the property was located. The Tyler Court of Appeals held that, although strict compliance with the statutory notice requirements is required, compliance may be proven by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inference. Because the record showed the property had a Bullard address in Smith County, the notice was posted there, and the certified-mail receipt reflected mailing from Bullard, the trial court could reasonably infer same-county mailing. The court therefore found legally sufficient evidence supporting the implied finding of compliance and affirmed the possession judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“In divorce-related eviction cases, strict compliance with Chapter 24 notice rules still matters, but appellate courts may accept a well-connected circumstantial record to prove compliance. Family-law lawyers enforcing possession of awarded real property should build a clean notice record with the decree, posting proof, mailing proof, and county-specific testimony whenever possible—especially where city or postal boundaries create room for attack.”
Michael A. Allen v. The State of Texas
COA01
In this criminal appeal with strong family-law crossover value, the First Court of Appeals upheld Michael Allen’s aggravated-assault conviction for causing his wife’s catastrophic head injury. The court treated the evidence as a cumulative mosaic: the wife’s near-contemporaneous outcry to her mother that Allen kicked her and sent her through a doorway, her distressed demeanor on the call, Allen’s own shifting admissions that he pushed, grabbed, shoved, or kicked her during the altercation, medical testimony that the subdural hematoma required major blunt-force trauma and was not consistent with a routine seizure or minor fall, and scene evidence showing a violent mechanism. Applying Jackson v. Virginia and deferring to the jury’s resolution of competing inferences, the court held the evidence was legally sufficient and also left intact the trial court’s admission of the mother’s testimony and trauma-causation expert testimony.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-violence protective-order, SAPCR, and custody cases, you do not need an eyewitness or perfect direct proof if you can build a coherent circumstantial record. Prompt outcry evidence, observable distress, qualified medical testimony ruling out accidental causes, party admissions, and scene corroboration can together persuade the court that an injury was inflicted rather than accidental.”