Weekly Digest
August 22 – August 28, 2026
47 opinions this week
Alper Uzmezler v. Ekim Stevens
COA03
In Uzmezler v. Stevens, the husband challenged a divorce property division that valued Anka Labs, a closely held technology business with significant intellectual-property assets, at $1.5 million based on the wife’s expert testimony. The Austin Court of Appeals held that the trial court acted within its broad discretion because both sides presented competent valuation evidence using recognized methodologies, and the trial judge was entitled to resolve the conflict by crediting the wife’s expert’s IP-focused analysis over the husband’s lower valuation. Because the adopted value was within the range of the evidence and supported by substantive and probative testimony, the valuation and resulting just-and-right division were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Business-valuation fights in divorce are usually won at trial, not on appeal. When both sides offer facially valid expert opinions, the trial court can choose either one, especially if the selected value falls within the evidentiary range. To have a real appellate issue, counsel must build and preserve specific challenges to methodology, reliability, assumptions, and findings—not just argue that the other side’s number was too high.”
Rice v. State
COA05
In Rice v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support a misdemeanor assault bodily-injury conviction arising from a custody exchange. The complainant testified Rice struck her arm while she was holding her phone, that the contact hurt immediately, and that she had soreness and tenderness for about a day to a day and a half. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court deferred to the jury’s role in resolving credibility disputes and weighing conflicting evidence, including video, photographs, and testimony suggesting Rice may have swatted only the phone. The court reiterated that bodily injury under Texas law includes any physical pain, however minor, and does not require bruising, bleeding, or medical treatment. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law-related violence allegations, minimal evidence of pain can be enough to support a bodily-injury finding, especially when paired with video, photos, or contemporaneous reporting. Lawyers should treat exchange incidents seriously: absent bruising or medical care is not dispositive, and credibility, corroboration, and careful record-building often decide the case.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Sherry Ann Kreiling and Derrie James Kreiling
COA07
In Kreiling, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the trial court rendered judgment at the end of the divorce trial when it orally announced a full, final, present disposition of all remaining issues after the parties placed most settlement terms on the record. Because rendition occurred then, the wife could not later revoke her consent before the written decree was signed. The court also rejected her Rule 301 challenge, concluding the decree conformed to the parties’ agreement and the court’s oral rendition, and it would not revisit conservatorship based on post-hearing events raised only in objections to entry. The final divorce decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a Texas divorce judge clearly disposes of every issue from the bench, treat that oral pronouncement as the judgment. After oral rendition, a party generally cannot undo an in-court settlement by withdrawing consent, and new facts arising later usually require a different procedural remedy—not opposition to signing a decree that matches the rendition.”
In the Matter of J.C.
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed orders waiving juvenile jurisdiction and transferring J.C. to criminal district court after three alleged aggravated sexual assaults. Applying Texas Family Code § 54.02, the court held the evidence was factually sufficient to support the finding that the welfare of the community required criminal proceedings. The court emphasized the violent, repeated nature of the assaults, J.C.’s removal of his ankle monitor, prior misconduct, threats, detention violence, and expert testimony that he posed above-average danger and had below-average amenability to treatment. Although J.C. had an extremely low IQ and some potential to benefit from treatment, the court concluded those facts did not outweigh the evidence of dangerousness, escalation, and weak rehabilitation prospects.
Litigation Takeaway
“Low IQ, youth, or diagnosable impairment will not by themselves defeat a protection-forward ruling when the record shows repeated violence, escalation, supervision failures, and poor treatment prospects. In family-law cases, lawyers should build or rebut restriction requests with concrete evidence of pattern conduct, risk, compliance history, and whether available services can realistically protect others.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Mary Brennan and John Jefferey Ralston
COA13
In Brennan v. Ralston, the wife tried to set aside a divorce mediated settlement agreement before entry of the final decree, arguing she agreed without full disclosure of marital assets tied to the husband’s LLC interests. The court held the trial court properly denied that request because the wife offered no admissible evidence to prove concealment, fraud, or any other recognized basis to avoid enforcement. Her expert affidavit was excluded as hearsay when the expert did not testify, and attorney argument alone was not evidence. With the husband presenting testimony that discovery had been made available and no assets were hidden, the trial court acted within its discretion in enforcing the MSA and signing the final decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to undo a Texas divorce MSA, treat the hearing like a trial: bring live witnesses, admit exhibits, and prove a recognized ground such as fraud or concealment. Suspicion, discovery frustration, and excluded affidavits will not defeat an otherwise compliant MSA.”
In the Matter of J.C.
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed orders waiving juvenile jurisdiction and transferring J.C. to criminal district court after holding the evidence was factually sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that the welfare of the community required criminal proceedings under Texas Family Code § 54.02. The court weighed the statutory transfer factors and emphasized that the alleged offenses were multiple violent aggravated sexual assaults against persons, supported by surveillance and strong DNA evidence. Although J.C. presented evidence of very low intellectual functioning and treatment needs, the court concluded those facts did not outweigh evidence of escalating misconduct, detention violence, runaway behavior, threats, substance abuse, and expert testimony that J.C. posed a high risk of violent reoffending and had below-average amenability to treatment. Because the transfer finding was not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, the court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Serious safety findings usually survive appeal when the record combines objective corroboration, a pattern of escalating misconduct, and expert testimony linking past behavior to future danger. Cognitive limitations or diagnoses alone will not defeat a transfer, custody, or protective-risk finding without a concrete treatment and supervision plan showing the person can be managed safely.”
In the Interest of Y.N.P., a Child
COA13
In *In re Y.N.P.*, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed appointment of foster parents as permanent managing conservators over Father, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to overcome the parental presumption in Texas Family Code § 153.131. Although Father completed services and had agency support, the court focused on unresolved severe injuries to a sibling in the same household, Father’s lack of candor with investigators, his continued cohabitation and alignment with Mother, and the weakness of his proposed safety plan. The court emphasized that a nonparent cannot defeat the parental presumption merely by offering a better placement, but here the record supported a finding that appointing Father would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development. The court also rejected Father’s constitutional complaint and standing challenge, and affirmed the judgment in full.
Litigation Takeaway
“The key lesson is that nonparents must prove impairment, not just superiority. Evidence of stability, bonding, and better services helps only after the statutory threshold is met; the real battleground is whether placing the child with the parent would create a significant risk of physical or emotional harm. For parents, service-plan completion alone may not carry the day if they remain aligned with the person tied to the danger or cannot present a credible safety plan.”
In the Matter of J.C.
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed orders transferring J.C. from juvenile court to criminal district court for three aggravated sexual assault cases. J.C. argued that his extremely low IQ and below-grade-level functioning weighed against transfer, but the court held the evidence was factually sufficient under Texas Family Code § 54.02 because the record showed repeated violent offenses against persons, strong DNA and identification evidence, absconding from supervision, detention misconduct, substance abuse, and expert testimony that he posed an above-average danger and was below-average in amenability to treatment. The court concluded that J.C.’s intellectual limitations were relevant but did not outweigh the seriousness of the offenses, his background, and the community-safety concerns supporting waiver of juvenile jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“When safety is the core issue, courts may give greater weight to concrete conduct, failed supervision, and expert risk testimony than to mitigation evidence like low IQ or developmental limitations. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a record around specific dangerous acts, compliance history, escalation, and realistic treatment prospects rather than relying on diagnoses alone.”
Ex parte Randy Louis Dupree
COA09
In Ex parte Randy Louis Dupree, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over an attempted appeal from the summary dismissal of an SVP detainee’s habeas application, but it could treat the filing as a mandamus proceeding because Dupree expressly requested that alternative relief. On the merits, the court applied mandamus standards and rejected Dupree’s as-applied constitutional challenge to GPS-monitoring requirements under Health and Safety Code section 841.082 and TCCO Policy 3.36 because he failed to develop a factual record showing those provisions operated unconstitutionally in his specific circumstances. The court therefore denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“If appealability is doubtful, ask the court to alternatively treat the filing as a mandamus proceeding—but do not expect procedural recasting to save a weak record. For family-law practitioners, the real lesson is to identify the correct appellate vehicle early and build a mandamus-ready, fact-specific record, especially for as-applied challenges to temporary orders, discovery rulings, or emergency custody decisions.”
Gonzalez v. State
COA10
In Gonzalez v. State, the appellant challenged a child-abuse conviction by arguing the State violated article 39.14 in connection with a therapist who had seen the child before the later outcry. The court did not reach the merits because the discovery complaint was not preserved: in the trial court, the defense argued the State should have investigated the therapist and developed exculpatory information, but on appeal the argument shifted to a narrower claim that the State failed to disclose the therapist’s contact information or notify the defense it was withholding it. Applying Rule 33.1 and noncomportment precedent, the court held those were materially different theories and the appellate complaint was forfeited. The court also upheld denial of mistrial on juror nondisclosure because counsel had not exercised sufficient voir dire diligence to uncover the juror’s relationship with the complainant.
Litigation Takeaway
“Preservation is theory-specific. In family-law discovery fights, a general complaint that the other side failed to investigate, search, supplement, or disclose will not necessarily preserve a narrower appellate complaint about a specific witness, provider, record, or contact detail. State the exact discovery failure, tie it to the correct rule or remedy, and obtain a ruling on each distinct theory.”
Scott Kenneth Higley v. Elesa Jo Jorgensen
COA03
In Higley v. Jorgensen, the father sought to reduce child support and modify conservatorship, claiming a material and substantial change in circumstances. The trial court found he failed to prove the required comparative change between the prior order and current circumstances, especially where his own income records did not clearly show a legally sufficient decline. The court also found the modification suit frivolous under Texas Family Code section 156.005 based on the lack of evidentiary support and the unnecessary litigation burden it imposed, and awarded the mother $14,222.50 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs. The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed both the denial of modification and the fee award.
Litigation Takeaway
“A modification petition needs proof, not just allegations. If a parent cannot present a clear apples-to-apples comparison showing a material and substantial change since the last order, the court can deny relief—and if the filing is weak, unsupported, or needlessly drives up litigation costs, the movant may also be ordered to pay the other side’s attorney’s fees.”
James Hale v. Lanesborough Corporation and Texas SFI Partnership 24, Ltd.
COA01
In James Hale v. Lanesborough Corporation and Texas SFI Partnership 24, Ltd., the plaintiff claimed repeated apartment fire alarms caused his hearing loss. The defendants filed a no-evidence summary-judgment motion challenging causation. The First Court of Appeals held that because medical causation required expert testimony, Hale had to submit admissible expert summary-judgment evidence, such as an affidavit or deposition excerpts. His expert designation and Rule 194 disclosure were only notice tools, not evidence, and counsel’s description of expected testimony did not raise a fact issue. The court also held the trial court acted within its discretion by hearing the motion after the docket-control deadline, effectively modifying that deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
“Expert disclosures are not evidence. If a no-evidence motion targets an issue that requires expert proof, you must put admissible expert testimony into the summary-judgment record or lose—even if the expert has already been designated. Also, do not assume a docket-control deadline will bar a late summary-judgment motion absent a concrete showing of prejudice.”
In the Interest of L.G.O.A.
COA09
In In re L.G.O.A., the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly used a judgment nunc pro tunc to add an omitted child-support start date to an agreed SAPCR order after plenary power expired. The original order set Father’s monthly support amount but left blank the date the first payment was due. Looking to the full record—including testimony from Mother and former counsel, the agreed nature of the order, the contemporaneous income withholding order signed during plenary power, and the parties’ later conduct—the court concluded the blank date was a clerical omission in memorializing the judgment actually rendered, not a judicial change creating a new substantive term. The court therefore upheld insertion of January 1, 2021, as the support commencement date.
Litigation Takeaway
“A nunc pro tunc can still fix an important omission after plenary power expires if the record shows the court already rendered judgment on the issue and the signed order simply failed to capture it. In family-law cases, lawyers should preserve contemporaneous proof—drafts, emails, withholding orders, and testimony—because the fight will turn on whether the defect is clerical or judicial.”
In re KinderCare Education, LLC, KinderCare Learning Centers, LLC, and Knowledge Universe Education, LLC
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying KinderCare’s request for a Rule 204.1 psychological examination of a minor plaintiff. The plaintiff sought mental-anguish and future medical damages and offered expert testimony that the child suffered PTSD and major depressive disorder caused by the underlying incident. KinderCare’s expert identified competing trauma sources in the plaintiff’s own treatment records and explained that records review alone could not reliably determine diagnosis or causation. Applying Rule 204.1 and the good-cause framework from Coates and related cases, the court found the child’s mental condition was plainly in controversy, the requested exam had a reasonable nexus to the disputed diagnoses and causation issues, and the needed information was not available through less intrusive means. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to order the examination.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a party puts a child’s or parent’s mental condition at issue through expert testimony, a Rule 204.1 exam becomes much more likely—especially when the records show competing causes and the movant’s expert can explain why file review, depositions, and treatment records are not enough. In family-law cases, this is a strong roadmap for both seeking and resisting compelled mental exams in custody, modification, and trauma-causation disputes.”
Julia Ann Poff v. William Harvey Poff
COA09
In Poff v. Poff, the Beaumont Court of Appeals considered a divorce decree that resolved both property division and SAPCR issues. After the appeal was filed, the parties’ only remaining minor child and the father died in a boating accident. The court held that those deaths made the conservatorship, possession, access, communication, and child-support issues moot because no live parent-child controversy remained and the court could no longer grant effective relief. But the appeal was not moot in full: the property division still affected the parties’ legal interests. Applying the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, and relying on implied findings because no findings of fact were requested, the court affirmed the trial court’s property division.
Litigation Takeaway
“In mixed divorce/SAPCR appeals, post-judgment events can wipe out custody and support issues without ending the entire appeal. Lawyers should reassess mootness immediately, separate live property issues from dead SAPCR issues, and make sure the trial record independently supports any surviving property challenge.”
In the Interest of E.R.T., a Child
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights after a two-year-old child presented with severe unexplained injuries, multiple old and new fractures, bruising, respiratory distress, and extreme malnourishment. The court held that the medical evidence, the child’s overall condition, the mother’s status as primary caregiver, her failure to obtain regular medical care, and her shifting explanations supported clear-and-convincing findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The same evidence supported the best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2), and the mother’s complaint about the de novo hearing was rejected because she failed to preserve error.
Litigation Takeaway
“You do not need an eyewitness to prove endangerment. In Texas family cases, objective medical records, injury patterns, caregiver exclusivity, delayed treatment, and inconsistent parental explanations can be enough to support severe conservatorship restrictions or even termination. Just as important, procedural complaints are worthless on appeal if counsel does not preserve them clearly in the trial court.”
In the Interest of Z.M., a Child
COA11
In In the Interest of Z.M., the father argued the trial court lost jurisdiction in a Department termination case because the statutory dismissal deadline under Texas Family Code Section 263.401 expired without a valid extension. The Eleventh Court of Appeals examined the actual procedural record, including the extension order and the monitored-return posture under Section 263.403, and held that the record showed a substantively compliant extension that preserved the trial court’s authority. Because the alleged defects were procedural criticisms rather than a true failure to satisfy the statutory prerequisites for continuing jurisdiction, dismissal for want of jurisdiction was not required.
Litigation Takeaway
“Deadline-based jurisdiction attacks rise or fall on the record. If you want to challenge or defend a Chapter 263 dismissal deadline, build a precise timeline, tie each order to the governing statute, and preserve objections specifically—Texas appellate courts will not treat every technical flaw in an extension order as jurisdiction-destroying if the record otherwise shows a valid statutory basis to keep the case alive.”
IMP Oak Hill LP v. Jordan Ajhaji Kpaka
COA03
In this Austin Court of Appeals case, a landlord nonsuited an eviction action after the tenant had already pleaded for attorney’s fees under Texas Property Code § 24.006(c) and after a potentially dispositive Rule 91a challenge exposed defects in the landlord’s notice-to-vacate theory. The court held that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162 and Villafani, the tenant’s fee request was a pending claim for affirmative relief that survived the nonsuit, so the trial court retained plenary power to decide fees even more than 30 days after the nonsuit order. Applying Epps, the court also concluded the record supported treating the tenant as the prevailing party because the nonsuit appeared to have been taken to avoid an unfavorable merits ruling, and it affirmed the fee award.
Litigation Takeaway
“A nonsuit does not necessarily end fee exposure. If the opposing party has already pleaded a clear, independent claim for attorney’s fees, that claim can survive dismissal under Rule 162 and keep the court’s power alive to award fees—an important lesson in family cases involving withdrawn modifications, enforcement actions, temporary-order disputes, or other claims abandoned after adverse motion practice.”
Villarreal v. State
COA10
In Villarreal v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a child’s forensic outcry admitted under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.072 is substantive evidence that may be considered for its truth, even when the child later fully recants. The child initially gave a detailed forensic interview describing sexual abuse, but more than two years later recanted and maintained at trial that the accusation was false. Applying Jackson v. Virginia and relying on Rodriguez v. State, the court concluded that once the article 38.072 predicate is satisfied, the prior outcry can alone support the verdict without corroboration. The recantation created a credibility issue for the jury, not a legal-sufficiency defect, so the conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“A later recantation does not automatically erase the force of a child’s earlier disclosure. If the prior statement comes in through a proper substantive evidentiary pathway, the factfinder may still rely on it heavily, making admissibility and foundation critical battlegrounds in custody, protective-order, and conservatorship litigation.”
In the Interest of M.B.
COA02
In *In the Interest of M.B.*, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order modifying probation and committing M.B. to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department under Family Code section 54.05. The State proved multiple probation violations, including retaliatory threats against a witness, an assault on that witness, a separate assaultive spitting incident, and school-attendance violations. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient because the trial judge could credit the witnesses, rely on corroborating officer testimony and M.B.’s partial admissions, and reject M.B.’s self-defense and denial theories. The court also held the disposition evidence was sufficient because the record showed escalating violence, prior firearm-related misconduct, chronic noncompliance, and failure of earlier, less restrictive probation interventions. M.B.’s complaint about the lack of a psychological evaluation was not preserved for appellate review.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want a severe remedy affirmed on appeal, build a layered record showing clear violations, corroboration, escalation, and why lesser interventions already failed. If you want to resist that remedy, do more than deny the allegations—develop a concrete competing narrative and preserve every procedural complaint in the trial court.”
Wally Yammine v. Propel Financial Services, LLC, as Agent and Attorney in Fact for Propel Funding National 1, LLC; and HK REO, LLC
COA02
In this appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the trial court improperly dismissed a bill-of-review case based on a hybrid motion to dismiss that was not tied to any recognized Texas procedural vehicle. The appellees argued lack of jurisdiction, failure to tender, and failure to state a claim, but they did not file or comply with Rule 91a, summary judgment, special exceptions, a proper plea to the jurisdiction, dismissal for want of prosecution, or the Baker v. Goldsmith procedure governing pretrial disposition of bills of review. The court emphasized that Texas trial courts do not have free-floating authority to dismiss civil claims on the merits simply because a party says the plaintiff should lose. Because no rule, statute, or recognized common-law procedure authorized the dismissal used here, the trial court abused its discretion. The court reversed the dismissal order and remanded without deciding the underlying merits of the bill of review.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family litigation, a strong merits argument is not itself a dismissal mechanism. If an opponent wants to knock out a bill of review, modification claim, enforcement-related pleading, or post-decree dispute, they must use the correct procedural vehicle—and comply with that vehicle’s rules. When a trial court grants an ad hoc “motion to dismiss” untethered to a valid rule, statute, or recognized procedure, that order is vulnerable on appeal.”
In the Interest of E.O., a Child
COA07
In *In re E.O.*, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support termination under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) against a noncustodial father. The Department’s proof focused on the mother’s methamphetamine history, relapse, and instability, which explained removal from her care but did not show that father knowingly placed the child in endangering conditions or knowingly allowed the child to remain there. Applying the parent-specific requirements of subsection (D), and following *In re N.G.* because of the future collateral consequences of a (D) finding, the court modified the judgment to delete the subsection (D) ground while affirming termination on the unchallenged grounds under subsections (E) and (N).
Litigation Takeaway
“Endangerment findings must be tied to the parent you are targeting. In termination, custody, or modification cases, one parent’s dangerous home or drug use cannot automatically be imputed to the other parent without proof of that parent’s knowledge, control, placement, or acquiescence. Always separately challenge or prove subsection (D) and (E) findings because they can have major future consequences.”
In the Interest of X.I.C., a Child
COA07
In this restricted appeal from a default parentage judgment, the Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed because substituted service under Rule 106(b) was defective on the face of the record. The petitioner obtained orders allowing substituted service at a Grand Prairie address and by text, but the supporting affidavits did not provide sufficient probative facts showing the respondent could probably be found there or that the proposed substituted methods would be reasonably effective to give notice. The court also held service failed to strictly comply with the first order because the order required both delivery at the residence and service by text, while the record showed only texting occurred. Given Texas’s strict-compliance standard for service in default cases, the defective service required reversal and remand.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want a default in family court, Rule 106(b) substituted service must be supported by detailed, fact-specific affidavits and carried out exactly as the order says—every step, every method, no shortcuts. Any mismatch between the motion, affidavit, order, return, or later address information can make error apparent on the face of the record and undo the judgment on restricted appeal.”
Thomas Lee Williams v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Williams v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to a criminal jury charge arising from an assault-family-violence conviction. Williams argued the charge was defective because the offense application paragraph authorized conviction on the assault elements without embedding self-defense. The court analyzed the charge as a whole, relying on Texas authorities holding that defensive issues may be submitted in separate paragraphs so long as the overall charge correctly instructs the jury. Because the very next paragraph submitted self-defense, placed on the State the burden to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt, and required acquittal if self-defense applied, the court found no irreconcilable conflict and no charge error. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Read adjudicative instructions and orders as a whole, not in isolated paragraphs. In family-law cases involving parallel family-violence allegations or convictions, do not assume a criminal judgment is vulnerable simply because self-defense was not repeated in the main application paragraph; if the full charge properly submitted self-defense and allocated the burden to the State, the conviction will likely stand.”
Moises Depazrobles v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Moises Depazrobles v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld admission of a defendant’s Spanish-language interview translated into English by a police-provided interpreter. The court analyzed whether the translation created an additional hearsay layer and, applying Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(2)(C) and (D) and Saavedra v. State, held it did not because the record showed the defendant understood, accepted, and used the interpreter as his conduit. The court relied on the defendant’s express confirmation that he understood the interpreter, the detective’s testimony about the interpreter’s certification and prior work, the absence of evidence of any motive to distort, and the defendant’s responsive words and conduct during the interview. On that foundation, the court held the translated statements were admissible as party admissions and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family cases, statements made through an interpreter may come in as the opposing party’s own admission without a second hearsay problem if you build a Rule 801(e)(2) foundation showing the party authorized or adopted the interpreter and the translation was reliable. The practical lesson is to develop—or attack—the record on interpreter qualifications, dialect, confirmation of understanding, opportunities to clarify, neutrality, and conduct consistent with comprehension.”
Nancy Marguerite Maxwell v. Steven Joseph Maxwell
COA09
In Maxwell v. Maxwell, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that a trial court could clarify a post-divorce retirement order to state the exact monthly amount payable from a former husband’s FERS annuity without impermissibly modifying the divorce decree’s property division. The decree awarded the former wife 50% of the community portion of the retirement benefits as of the divorce valuation date, but OPM later administered the order using a marital-fraction method tied to retirement, which swept in post-divorce service credit and salary increases. After hearing testimony from the husband and a QDRO specialist, the trial court found that OPM’s implementation invaded the husband’s separate property and entered an amended order fixing the wife’s monthly share at a specific amount. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Texas Family Code sections 9.006 and 9.007 allow clarification orders that implement the original division so long as they do not change the substantive ownership interest awarded. Because the amended order merely translated the original valuation-date award into an administrable dollar figure and prevented payment of post-divorce accruals, it was a permissible clarification rather than an unlawful re-division of property.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a retirement order is being administered in a way that pays a former spouse from post-divorce accruals, a Texas court can clarify the order under Chapter 9 by converting vague percentage language into a precise amount or formula—as long as the new order only effectuates the original decree and does not change the substantive property division. Draft retirement provisions with plan-specific precision and build a strong evidentiary record showing exactly how the administrator’s method departs from the decree.”
Rhonda Cherie Martin v. David Lee Martin
COA03
In Martin v. Martin, the wife appealed a final divorce decree after the trial court denied her request to continue trial when her attorney had withdrawn about two months earlier and replacement counsel appeared only on the eve of trial. The Third Court of Appeals held the denial was not an abuse of discretion. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 253 and the abuse-of-discretion framework from Villegas, the court looked at the full procedural history: the divorce had been pending for years, the withdrawal was agreed, the wife knew the trial date, and the record did not show diligence in obtaining new counsel or specific prejudice from going forward. The court also rejected her complaint about the husband’s late amended counterpetition adding a fraud claim because Rule 245 did not apply, and she failed to preserve any Rule 63 surprise or prejudice objection. Other appellate complaints were overruled as unpreserved or inadequately briefed.
Litigation Takeaway
“A continuance after counsel withdrawal is not automatic. In Texas family-law cases, the party seeking delay must make a record showing diligence, preserved objections, and concrete prejudice—not just that new counsel needs more time. If a late amended pleading creates real surprise, object specifically, move to strike if appropriate, and tie any continuance request to the exact additional preparation the amendment requires.”
Kacerova v. Garrett
COA03
In Kacerova v. Garrett, the Austin Court of Appeals considered whether a trial court could sign a later SAPCR modification order under Family Code Chapter 156 while an earlier SAPCR modification order was already on appeal. The appellant argued the pending appeal deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to enter the later order, so the earlier appeal remained live. The court rejected that argument, relying on Chapter 156’s continuing modification framework and authorities such as In re Reardon, Blank v. Nuszen, and Hudson v. Markum, while declining to follow the abandoned reasoning of In re E.W.N. Because the later order was valid and became the new operative order governing the parties’ rights and duties, the earlier appeal no longer presented a live controversy. The court held the earlier appeal was moot and dismissed it for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“A pending SAPCR appeal does not freeze the trial court’s power to hear a new Chapter 156 modification case. If a later final modification order is signed, it can supersede the order on appeal and moot that appeal entirely, so family-law lawyers must coordinate trial and appellate strategy at the same time.”
Carey Lynn Johnson v. Jon P. Herrera
COA01
In Johnson v. Herrera, the First Court of Appeals held that a trial court exceeded its authority by using a Chapter 157 enforcement proceeding to impose new post-judgment speech and contact restrictions that were not contained in the final SAPCR order. The original order barred harassment and negative social-media reviews, but the later enforcement order went further by requiring Johnson to obtain court approval before contacting Quest Diagnostics, its employees or attorneys, or making additional complaints to Quest or regulators. The court analyzed the distinction between enforcement under Texas Family Code Chapter 157 and modification under Chapter 156, concluding that enforcement may compel compliance with existing terms but cannot materially alter the parties’ rights or obligations. Because the added restrictions functioned as a modification without Chapter 156 pleadings or proof, the court reversed and struck those provisions, while dismissing the remainder of the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“If the relief you want changes the operative terms of a final SAPCR order, you must plead and prove a Chapter 156 modification—not try to slip new restrictions into a Chapter 157 enforcement action. In post-judgment family cases, courts can enforce existing orders, but they cannot add new no-contact, speech, or prior-approval requirements unless the case is properly postured as a modification.”
Armando Arredondo Jr. v. State of Texas
COA13
In this criminal appeal with strong family-law crossover value, the court held that the defendant waived any hearsay complaint about text-message exhibits because counsel affirmatively said there was no objection when the screenshots were offered and admitted, then objected only later when an officer began reading the already-admitted messages aloud. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a) and preservation principles from Ethington, the court concluded the objection was untimely and therefore did not reach the merits of whether the other side of the text conversation was hearsay or merely contextual. The court also modified the written judgment to correct an inaccuracy about the plea to an enhancement paragraph because the appellate record affirmatively showed the judgment did not match the truth of the record.
Litigation Takeaway
“Object when the exhibit is offered, not when the damaging contents are later read or emphasized. In abuse-related family cases involving texts, screenshots, records, and layered out-of-court statements, saying “no objection” to the exhibit will usually waive later admissibility complaints; if only part of the exhibit is problematic, request redaction, limitation, and a clear ruling at the time of admission.”
Pavelka v. State
COA03
In Pavelka v. State, the Austin Court of Appeals upheld admission of a complainant’s childhood journal entries in a child-sexual-abuse trial after the defense suggested through voir dire, opening, and cross-examination that her allegations had grown over time or were recently fabricated. Applying Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(1)(B), the court held the abuse-related entries were sufficiently consistent with her trial testimony to rebut an implied charge of fabrication, even without perfect detail-by-detail overlap. The court also held that surrounding journal pages showing names, dates, ownership, and other identifying information were properly admitted under Rule 901 for authentication and context. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in admitting either the substantive journal entries or the related identifying pages.
Litigation Takeaway
“Be careful not to open the door. In SAPCRs and protective-order cases, if your impeachment theme implies a child’s story was recently invented, coached, or expanded, prior consistent statements like journals, texts, notes, or prior disclosures may come in as substantive evidence under Rule 801(e)(1)(B). And even non-substantive surrounding pages may be admitted to authenticate the source material.”
In the Interest of C.F.S., a Child
COA04
In this SAPCR appeal, the appellant tried to challenge trial-court rulings from June and September 2025, but the clerk’s record contained no written, signed order or judgment—only docket entries referencing the judge’s notes. The Fourth Court of Appeals applied settled Texas law holding that appellate jurisdiction depends on a written, signed appealable order, and that oral rulings, docket entries, and informal notes neither create an appealable order nor trigger appellate deadlines under Rule 26.1. The court also rejected the appellant’s reliance on a later modified temporary order because temporary orders under Family Code section 105.001 are not subject to interlocutory appeal. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want appellate review in a Texas family-law case, get a written, signed order into the record first. Bench rulings, judge’s notes, and docket entries do not create appellate jurisdiction, and temporary SAPCR orders generally cannot be challenged by interlocutory appeal—so lawyers must focus on obtaining a signed order, preserving error, and evaluating mandamus or final-judgment strategy instead.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Darsi Rae Myers and Antonie Chris Vorster
COA06
In this Texas divorce appeal, the dispute centered on whether about fifty acres in Scroggins acquired during marriage was community property or the wife’s separate property. The trial court treated the property inconsistently, awarding it to Myers as separate property while also structuring a payout based on a finding that it was community. The Texarkana Court of Appeals applied the community-property presumption in Family Code section 3.003 together with the inception-of-title rule and held that the warranty deed, purchase-money note, and related title evidence naming Myers alone were clear and convincing evidence rebutting the community presumption, despite conflicting language in the deed of trust. The court also held Myers failed to prove reimbursement claims because her testimony about separate funds used for community expenses was vague, undocumented, and inadequately traced. Because the characterization error materially affected the overall just-and-right division, the court affirmed the divorce but reversed and remanded the property division for reconsideration.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not assume real property bought during marriage is automatically community. In characterization fights, deed and purchase-money documents can rebut the community presumption, but reimbursement claims still require organized tracing and documentary proof. A single characterization mistake can undo the entire property division on appeal.”
Hawley v. State
COA09
In Hawley v. State, the Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed convictions for continuous sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the admission of testimony from other child victims. The court held that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37, section 2, allowed the State to admit evidence of Hawley’s other sexual acts against children for any relevant purpose, including character conformity, because the charged offenses were among those covered by the statute. The court then conducted a Rule 403 analysis and concluded the testimony’s strong probative value—showing a recurring pattern of abuse in caretaking settings and bolstering credibility in a case dependent on victim testimony—was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The judgments were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“When abuse allegations turn on credibility and private conduct, pattern evidence involving other children can carry major probative force if it is tied to safety, risk, access, and method—not just bad character. For family-law cases, the practical lesson is that admission fights will often be won or lost on a detailed Rule 403 record about similarity, necessity, cumulativeness, and reliability rather than on broad prejudice objections.”
In re Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company, Allstate Texas Lloyds, Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, and James Rudish
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus relief after a trial court authorized Rule 202 presuit depositions against Allstate and a claims handler without any actual evidence supporting the findings required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202.4(a). The appellate court held that pleadings, attorney argument, attached but unadmitted exhibits, and a non-evidentiary hearing do not satisfy Rule 202’s proof requirement. Because Rule 202 is an extraordinary presuit discovery device, the petitioner had to present admissible evidence showing either that the depositions might prevent a failure or delay of justice in anticipated litigation or that their likely benefit outweighed the burden and expense. With no evidentiary record supporting either finding, the trial court abused its discretion, and mandamus was proper because the harm from unauthorized presuit discovery cannot be adequately remedied on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Rule 202 requires proof, not just a detailed petition and lawyer argument. If you want presuit discovery, set an evidentiary hearing and offer admissible evidence supporting one of Rule 202.4(a)’s required findings; if you are opposing the request and the court proceeds without evidence, mandamus is a strong and immediate remedy.”
Herrington v. State
COA05
In Herrington v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed an aggravated-assault conviction arising from a fatal shooting between live-in dating partners after rejecting the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on self-defense. Herrington claimed she shot her boyfriend while he was forcing his way through a window and threatening to kill her, but the court held the jury could rationally disbelieve that account based on inconsistencies among her 911 call, on-scene statements, and custodial interview, as well as forensic and digital evidence that did not fully match her version of events. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and Texas Penal Code sections 9.31 and 9.32, the court emphasized that once self-defense is raised, the State’s burden is one of persuasion and may be met through conflicting statements, physical evidence, and surrounding circumstances. Because a rational jury could reject self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, the court affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a client claims self-protective conduct in a domestic-violence incident, the case will rise or fall on whether the story matches the objective record. 911 audio, body-cam footage, medical evidence, scene reconstruction, and phone data can outweigh a facially plausible narrative, and appellate courts will rarely disturb a factfinder’s credibility call if those sources create meaningful contradictions.”
Hawley v. State
COA09
In Hawley v. State, the Beaumont Court of Appeals reviewed convictions for continuous sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child after the defendant challenged the admission of testimony from two other witnesses describing similar sexual misconduct involving minors. The court held that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37, section 2 allows the State to introduce other child-sex-offense evidence, including for character-conformity purposes, but that the evidence remains subject to Rule 403 balancing. Applying that framework, the court found the other-witness testimony highly probative because it showed a recurring pattern of abuse in similar relational and custodial settings, including access to children, secrecy, and comparable sexualized conduct, which corroborated the complainant’s allegations in a credibility-driven case involving delayed disclosure and private acts. The court concluded the testimony was damaging but not unfairly prejudicial in the Rule 403 sense, and it affirmed the convictions.
Litigation Takeaway
“When trying or defending abuse-related family cases, pattern evidence rises or falls on structure, not outrage. The winning approach is to tie other-incident evidence to concrete probative features—similarity, access, relationship, secrecy, grooming, delayed disclosure, and present child-safety risk—while building a clear Rule 403 record on why the evidence is or is not more probative than prejudicial.”
Hawley v. State
COA09
In Hawley v. State, the Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed convictions for continuous sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child after the defendant challenged the admission of testimony from two additional witnesses describing other sexual offenses against children. The court held that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37, section 2 expressly permits this type of extraneous-offense evidence in qualifying child-sex prosecutions, including offenses like those charged here. It further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403 because the testimony was highly probative of the defendant’s pattern of abuse, grooming, secrecy, and access to child victims, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The court also found the evidence legally sufficient and affirmed the judgments.
Litigation Takeaway
“When the governing rule or statute expressly allows pattern or other-incident evidence, the real evidentiary fight shifts to fit, similarity, remoteness, cumulativeness, and Rule 403 balancing. For family-law litigators handling abuse-related custody, modification, or protective-order cases, Hawley is a reminder to tie other-incident evidence to a concrete child-safety issue and to answer prejudice objections with precision rather than generalities.”
Gonzales v. Contreras
COA04
After his mother’s death, Lorenzo Contreras tried to evict his stepfather, Alvino Gonzales, from the home through a forcible-detainer action, claiming ownership under an affidavit of heirship and warranty deed and alleging Gonzales was only a holdover tenant. Gonzales denied any true landlord-tenant relationship and asserted an independent right to remain as the surviving spouse based on homestead and life-estate protections. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that justice courts can decide eviction cases only when immediate possession can be resolved without deciding title. Because deciding possession here required resolving whether Gonzales’s surviving-spouse homestead or life-estate rights defeated Contreras’s ownership claim, title and possession were inseparable. The court therefore held the justice court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the county court acquired no jurisdiction on de novo appeal, and both eviction judgments were void.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not use JP-court eviction procedure to shortcut a real property dispute when the occupant claims an independent spousal, homestead, probate, or life-estate right to stay in the home. If possession depends on resolving ownership or protected occupancy rights, file in a court that can adjudicate title first; otherwise any eviction judgment may be void.”
Lee v. Lundquist
COA04
In Lee v. Lundquist, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the key property to characterize was the spouses’ LLC membership interests, not the duplex later transferred into the LLC. Because the parties formed 9018 Wellwood LLC during marriage and received their membership interests at that time, those interests were presumed community property under Texas Family Code section 3.003. The wife’s tracing evidence showed only that separate funds may have been used to purchase the duplex later deeded to the LLC, but it did not prove that her membership interest itself was separate when created. Applying the inception-of-title doctrine, the court held the membership interests were characterized when issued, and the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the interests were community property.
Litigation Takeaway
“When an LLC is formed during marriage, separate-property tracing aimed only at the company’s later-acquired assets usually will not establish that the membership interest itself is separate. In characterization disputes, target the correct property interest, prove its inception date, and if tracing does not reach the ownership interest itself, consider reimbursement or offset theories instead.”
In the Interest of S.V., a Minor Child
COA05
In In re S.V., the Dallas Court of Appeals decided whether a mother’s child-support enforcement motion was timely under Texas Family Code § 157.005 when the two-year filing deadline fell on a Saturday, followed by Sunday and Memorial Day, and the motion was filed the next business day. The court held Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 4 applies to extend the deadline to the next non-holiday business day, so the May 31, 2022 filing was timely even though the support obligation terminated on May 28, 2020. Because the motion was timely, the trial court retained authority to confirm arrearages, reduce them and accrued interest to judgment, and award statutory attorney’s fees. The court also rejected the father’s service, amended-pleading, continuance, and other procedural complaints, finding no reversible error.
Litigation Takeaway
“When calculating the two-year deadline to confirm child-support arrearages under Family Code § 157.005, do not stop at the calendar anniversary date—apply Rule 4. If the last day falls on a weekend or legal holiday, filing on the next business day is timely. Practically, lawyers should carefully identify the true termination date of support, preserve proof of filing, and focus defense efforts on actual accounting or notice problems rather than weak weekend-deadline arguments.”
In the Interest of H.E.C. and E.G.C., Children
COA06
In this Texarkana appeal, a former stepfather filed an original SAPCR seeking conservatorship of his former stepchildren, arguing he had standing under Texas Family Code § 102.004(a)(1) because he shared a biological child with the children’s mother and that child was the older children’s half-sibling. The court rejected that theory after applying the plain text of Government Code § 573.022(a), which defines consanguinity as existing only when one person is the descendant of the other or they share a common ancestor. Because the stepchildren were neither the stepfather’s descendants nor related to him through a common ancestor, the half-sibling connection did not create consanguinity standing. The court refused to expand the statute based on policy or absurdity arguments, affirmed dismissal for lack of standing, and reversed and remanded the attorney’s-fee award because the fee proof did not satisfy Rohrmoos lodestar standards.
Litigation Takeaway
“Blended-family facts and equitable caregiving narratives do not create SAPCR standing. If a former stepparent is filing under § 102.004, confirm a true consanguinity basis—descendant status or a shared common ancestor—before suit; a biological child in common with the other parent does not supply standing as to that child’s half-siblings. Also, even when you win a jurisdictional fight, attorney’s fees still require detailed, nonconclusory lodestar proof.”
Ida Thomas, Willie Aron Pitre, and Beulah Giles v. Fidelity National Title
COA14
In this appeal arising from the sale of inherited real property, the heirs alleged that Fidelity National Title wrongfully distributed sale proceeds to at least one person who was not entitled to receive them. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that, although Fidelity’s summary-judgment motion attacked only negligence and breach-of-contract theories tied to its role as title insurer, the heirs’ live pleading could fairly be read under Texas fair-notice standards to assert a separate breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim based on Fidelity’s role as escrow agent responsible for holding and disbursing funds. Because Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c) forbids summary judgment on a ground not expressly presented in the motion, the trial court could not dispose of that unaddressed escrow-agent fiduciary-duty theory. The court therefore reversed and remanded as to the fiduciary-duty claim and affirmed the remainder of the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“Match the motion to the live pleading. If a neutral actor is alleged to have mishandled sale or settlement funds in an escrow or disbursing role, plead that fiduciary-duty theory clearly, and on defense, expressly move against it by name. A summary-judgment motion aimed only at negligence, contract, or title-insurer duties will not knock out an unaddressed escrow-duty claim.”
In re International Leadership of Texas, Inc. and International Leadership of Texas – Global
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff’s Rule 162 nonsuit was mandatory and immediately effective when filed before the plaintiff rested and more than three days before a Rule 91a hearing. The defendants’ Rule 91a motion to dismiss and plea to the jurisdiction were defensive pleadings, not claims for affirmative relief, so they did not prevent dismissal. The court also rejected the trial court’s outright denial of the nonsuit based on the suit being brought for a minor through a next friend, explaining that if an apparent conflict existed between the minor and the next friend, the proper step under Rule 173 was to appoint a guardian ad litem before acting on the nonsuit. Because the record showed no conflict finding, the trial court abused its discretion, and mandamus issued directing dismissal absent a conflict determination and ad litem appointment.
Litigation Takeaway
“A timely nonsuit is usually automatic: trial courts cannot keep a case alive just because a dispositive motion is pending or because a minor is involved. To defeat or delay a nonsuit, the opposing party must show a live claim for affirmative relief, or the court must identify an actual apparent conflict between the minor and the next friend and follow Rule 173 by appointing a guardian ad litem.”
Mouton v. State
COA14
In Mouton v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a 16-year-old’s recorded interview at Houston Police Department headquarters was noncustodial, so warnings under Miranda, article 38.22, and Family Code section 51.095 were not required. The juvenile argued the interview was effectively custodial because it occurred at police headquarters, she was separated from her mother, had to pass through security, and was questioned about serious criminal exposure. The court applied an objective reasonable-child standard and focused on the actual circumstances rather than the official setting alone: she voluntarily came with family, was not handcuffed or restrained, kept her belongings, the detectives were in plain clothes and unarmed, the door was unlocked, her mother remained nearby and could observe remotely, and detectives indicated she would be going home that day. Based on those facts, the court concluded a reasonable 16-year-old would not have believed she was under restraint to the degree associated with formal arrest, and it affirmed denial of the suppression motion.
Litigation Takeaway
“For family-law cases involving abuse allegations or child interviews, Mouton is a strong reminder that coercion arguments rise or fall on objective interview details—not labels like police station, CAC, or investigation. If you want a child’s statement credited, build a record showing voluntary attendance, lack of restraint, caregiver access, and a clear ability to leave. If you want to challenge the statement, focus on concrete signs of detention or isolation such as locked doors, blocked exits, caregiver exclusion, confiscated belongings, or statements implying the child could not end the encounter.”
Lecompte v. State
COA01
In Lecompte v. State, the First Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant could appeal an adjudication of guilt after deferred adjudication when he had signed a revocation-stage agreement expressly waiving appeal. Lecompte pleaded true to supervision violations, accepted the State’s recommendation of a two-year sentence within a two-to-twenty-year punishment range, and signed a written waiver of appeal that was also signed by counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial judge. The court explained that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(a)(2) does not by itself bar appeals from later adjudications after deferred adjudication, but ordinary waiver principles do apply. Relying on Ex parte Broadway and Blanco, the court held the waiver was knowing, intelligent, voluntary, and supported by consideration because Lecompte received the State’s sentencing recommendation at the low end of the range. The court therefore enforced the waiver and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a party knowingly signs a bargained-for waiver of appeal in a revocation or adjudication proceeding, appellate review may be gone for good. For family-law lawyers handling cases with parallel criminal exposure—especially family-violence cases—coordinate with criminal counsel before any plea, stipulation, or waiver is signed because the resulting adjudication may become functionally final immediately and shape custody, possession, protective-order, and property-division strategy.”
Rodriguez v. State
COA05
In Rodriguez v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a criminal judgment after rejecting challenges to the denial of a mistrial and to the qualifications of the State’s child-abuse expert, while also modifying the written judgment to correct clerical inaccuracies. The mistrial complaint arose after the prosecutor asked an improper redirect question implying another accused person had admitted sex with the complainant; because the trial court immediately sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard before any answer was given, the appellate court held the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the extraordinary remedy of mistrial. The court likewise found no reversible abuse of discretion in allowing the expert testimony. For family-law crossover purposes, the opinion’s most useful holding is that an appellate court may reform a written judgment to match the actual record when the discrepancy is clerical and the record clearly shows the truth of the trial court’s ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
“The best family-law lesson from Rodriguez is procedural, not substantive: if a decree or order contains a clerical mismatch with the reporter’s record, verdict, stipulation, or oral rendition, ask the appellate court to reform the order so the record speaks the truth rather than assuming reversal is required. The case also reinforces that curative instructions usually defeat mistrial complaints absent truly incurable prejudice, and that expert-qualification challenges need a strong record to overcome abuse-of-discretion review.”