Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In the Interest of E.K.Y.O.
COA04
In a SAPCR modification proceeding, the trial court ordered a father to pay $20,000 in attorney’s fees and costs. The father appealed, contending that his previously filed Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs—which was uncontested—exempted him from such an award under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145. However, the father had filed the Statement in a separate cause number involving the registration of a foreign judgment, rather than the specific modification case. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed Rule 145, concluding that indigency protections are case-specific and do not automatically follow a party into separate, even if related, litigation. The court held that because the father failed to file the Statement in the correct cause number, he was not shielded from the fee award and affirmed the trial court's judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Indigency status under Rule 145 is case-specific; to protect a client from fee awards or court costs, you must file a Statement of Inability in every individual cause number, as a filing in a related or precursor case will not provide protection in a separate proceeding."
Davis v. State
COA09
In Davis v. State, a defendant challenged the warrantless seizure of his cell phone during a child sexual assault investigation, arguing the evidence obtained from a subsequent search warrant should be suppressed. The Ninth Court of Appeals analyzed the seizure under the Fourth Amendment's exigent circumstances exception, which allows warrantless action to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. The court found that because the defendant admitted to using the phone to communicate with the victim and had already deleted messages and blocked her, officers had both probable cause and a reasonable belief that evidence faced immediate destruction. The court held the warrantless seizure was permissible to preserve the status quo until a warrant could be obtained, affirming the denial of the motion to suppress.
Litigation Takeaway
"To secure immediate preservation of digital evidence in family violence or abuse cases, litigators should build a record of specific "deletion risk"—such as prior deletions or admissions of blocking contacts—to justify emergency relief or turnover orders under an exigent circumstances framework."
Salinas v. Tovar
COA13
In Salinas v. Tovar, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court could compel a defendant to produce his cell phone and iCloud data for forensic examination in an invasion of privacy suit involving allegations of illegal recording. The court analyzed the "act of production" doctrine under the Fifth Amendment, which provides that the physical act of handing over a device is a testimonial communication that confirms the device's existence and the party's control over it. Because the defendant faced potential criminal liability, and the plaintiff failed to prove that his possession of the phone was a "foregone conclusion," the court held that the order compelling production violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. The court distinguished between permissible orders to preserve evidence and unconstitutional orders to affirmatively produce it.
Litigation Takeaway
"The Fifth Amendment's "act of production" doctrine can shield cell phones and digital devices from forensic discovery in civil cases if the act of turning them over confirms the party's possession of potentially incriminating evidence. To successfully compel production, a litigator must establish the device's existence and the opponent's possession through independent evidence—such as service provider records—to satisfy the "foregone conclusion" exception."
Protection of Sarah K. Wallis v. Alexis M. Etheridge
COA12
After Sarah Wallis applied for a protective order against Alexis Etheridge, the trial court denied the application but ordered Wallis—the unsuccessful petitioner—to pay $1,110 in attorney's fees to Etheridge’s counsel. Wallis appealed both the denial and the fee award. The Twelfth Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the protective order because Wallis failed to file a reporter's record, forcing the court to presume the evidence supported the trial court’s ruling. However, the court reversed the attorney’s fee award, ruling that Texas Family Code § 81.005 only authorizes fees against a party found to have committed family violence. Since there was no finding that Wallis committed violence, the trial court abused its discretion by shifting the fee burden to her.
Litigation Takeaway
"Prevailing as a respondent in a protective order case does not automatically trigger a right to attorney's fees. Under the Texas Family Code, fees are generally reserved for 'bad actors' found to have committed family violence; otherwise, a respondent must successfully pursue formal sanctions for groundless or bad-faith filings to recover their legal costs."
McCarver v. McCarver
COA12
After a husband failed to pay a $90,000 "financial security" judgment required by a divorce decree and premarital agreement, the wife sought a post-judgment turnover order and the appointment of a receiver. The husband attempted to block the order by asserting affirmative defenses such as waiver and release, arguing the premarital agreement's separate property protections shielded his assets. The Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order, analyzing the doctrine of res judicata. The court held that because the premarital agreement's terms were already litigated (or could have been) during the divorce, the husband was barred from raising those contractual defenses to challenge an enforcement proceeding. Additionally, the court clarified that a turnover order is a final, appealable judgment, allowing for standard appellate timeline extensions.
Litigation Takeaway
"You only get "one bite at the apple" regarding premarital agreement defenses. If a party intends to use a prenuptial agreement to protect assets or waive liabilities, those arguments must be fully exhausted before the divorce decree becomes final; once a turnover proceeding begins, the court will only consider statutory exemptions, not contract-based defenses that were already adjudicated."
F.M.H. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In this case, a mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to her two children after she failed to complete any court-ordered rehabilitation services, including drug testing and domestic violence classes. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the record after her appointed counsel filed an Anders brief, which argued that the appeal was frivolous. The court reviewed the mother's history of neglectful supervision, crack cocaine use, and sporadic contact with her children against the evidence that the children were thriving in stable, prospective adoptive homes. Ultimately, the court held that the mother's total failure to engage in her service plan and the children's best interests justified the termination of her parental rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"A parent's total failure to participate in court-ordered services and drug testing creates a nearly insurmountable hurdle on appeal, as the court will likely find no arguable grounds to reverse a termination when the children have achieved stability elsewhere."
Lomerson v. Lyle Reid & Associates, L.L.C.
COA07
In a property damage dispute involving complex water drainage issues, the plaintiff failed to timely designate expert witnesses required to prove causation. The defendants moved for a no-evidence summary judgment, arguing that without admissible expert testimony, the plaintiff could not meet his burden of proof. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6, which mandates the automatic exclusion of untimely evidence unless the proponent establishes 'good cause' or a 'lack of unfair surprise or prejudice.' The court held that the plaintiff's claim of 'mistake' or counsel inadvertence did not satisfy these exceptions. Because expert testimony was necessary for the technical issue of causation, the court affirmed the summary judgment, effectively dismissing the case.
Litigation Takeaway
"Missing an expert designation deadline is more than a discovery hiccup—it is a potential case-killer. Under TRCP 193.6, late-filed experts are automatically excluded from consideration at the summary judgment stage unless you can prove a specific legal exception. In family law matters involving business valuations, property tracing, or custody evaluations, failing to adhere to the scheduling order can result in a 'no-evidence' judgment that ends your claim before trial."
In re PVF Industrial Supply, Inc.
COA06
In a personal injury case with broad implications for family law tort and business disputes, the Texarkana Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant can designate a responsible third party (RTP) after the statute of limitations has expired. The trial court had denied the designation because the defendant did not identify the RTP in its initial disclosures. The appellate court conditionally granted mandamus relief, reasoning that Section 33.004(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code only bars late designations if a defendant fails to comply with a 'timely disclosure' obligation. Because the defendant’s Rule 194 disclosure deadline fell after the limitations period had already passed, there was no breach of duty. The court held that an erroneous denial of an RTP designation 'skews' the comparative-responsibility framework of the trial, making mandamus the appropriate remedy as the error cannot be adequately cured on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"A defendant's duty to disclose responsible third parties is governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, not the expiration of the statute of limitations; if your disclosure deadline falls after limitations expires, you are not barred from designating an RTP, and a trial court's refusal to allow that designation is a 'skewing' error that justifies immediate mandamus relief."
In Re Michelle Chase
COA05
In a Dallas County Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR), Michelle Chase challenged the trial court's jurisdiction. After her plea was denied, she sought a writ of mandamus from the Fifth Court of Appeals to compel a dismissal. The appellate court denied the request, finding that Chase failed to meet the high 'Prudential' standard: proving a clear abuse of discretion and showing that a regular appeal would not provide an adequate remedy. Additionally, the court struck her petition and record because they contained unredacted sensitive information—including Social Security numbers and children's names—violating Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.9.
Litigation Takeaway
"Seeking emergency mandamus relief for jurisdictional disputes is an uphill battle that rarely bypasses the standard appeal process; more importantly, a failure to strictly redact a child's sensitive information can result in the court striking your filings and delaying your case."
Howard v. Kimball
COA07
In Howard v. Kimball, the Seventh Court of Appeals addressed an "accidental finality" trap where a trial court order both denied a plea to the jurisdiction and included language stating the suit was "dismissed." To resolve this ambiguity, the appellate court applied Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.2, abating the appeal and remanding the case to the trial court for clarification. Under the Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. standard, the court analyzed whether the order clearly and unequivocally disposed of all parties and claims. Once the trial court issued amended orders explicitly stating the case would "continue to trial," the appellate court held that the order was interlocutory and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"To avoid "accidental finality" caused by clerical or drafting errors, always include explicit language in non-final orders stating that the matter remains on the active docket and "shall continue to trial." If you encounter an ambiguous order that inadvertently triggers an appeal, use a TRAP 27.2 abatement as a procedural tool to secure a trial court clarification and return the case to the active docket."