Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In re CHRISTUS Health Southeast Texas
COA09
In this mandamus proceeding, a hospital (CHRISTUS) attempted to intervene in a lawsuit involving a non-compete dispute between an anesthesia group and its former employees, arguing that the resulting injunction caused the hospital significant financial and operational hardship. The Court of Appeals analyzed the 'justiciable interest' test under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 60, which requires that an intervenor must be able to maintain the action (or a part of it) in their own name as a sole plaintiff. The court held that because CHRISTUS was not a party to the employment contracts, its collateral economic interest did not grant it standing to intervene. The trial court's decision to strike the intervention was upheld, affirming that mere economic impact is insufficient to force one's way into someone else's litigation.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family law litigation, third parties like business partners or grandparents cannot intervene simply because a court's order will cost them money or cause inconvenience; they must demonstrate a specific legal right that would allow them to sue for that same relief independently."
Hall v. State
COA10
Kenneth Wayne Hall appealed his convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and unlawful possession of a firearm, arguing that the trial court improperly prevented him from impeaching a witness with a prior inconsistent statement under Texas Rule of Evidence 613. The Tenth Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of whether the statement was inconsistent or admissible. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1, the court concluded that Hall had not specifically told the trial court that he was seeking Rule 613 impeachment, had not otherwise made the impeachment basis clear, and had not obtained a ruling on that particular complaint. Because the theory asserted on appeal did not match the complaint presented at trial, the court held that Hall waived the issue and affirmed the judgments.
Litigation Takeaway
"When attempting to use a prior inconsistent statement, counsel should expressly identify the evidence as impeachment under Texas Rule of Evidence 613, lay or offer to lay the required predicate, obtain a clear ruling, and make an offer of proof if the evidence is excluded. This is especially important in protective-order, custody, and other family-law proceedings driven by witness credibility; without a specific trial-court record, an appellate court may find waiver and never consider whether the exclusion was erroneous."
JAJWK, LLC v. Primeway Federal Credit Union
COA01
In this enforcement action, a judgment creditor (Primeway) utilized a post-judgment receiver to identify luxury vehicles held by non-party entities (JAJWK) but titled to the debtor. The trial court issued a turnover order voiding JAJWK's liens on the vehicles and ordering their sale. The Houston First Court of Appeals reversed, analyzing Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 31.002 (the turnover statute). The court held that the statute is a procedural mechanism, not a substantive one, and cannot be used to adjudicate the property rights of third parties or 'clean up' title. Because the property was in the possession of a non-party and not under the debtor's exclusive control, the trial court exceeded its authority and violated due process.
Litigation Takeaway
"The turnover statute is not a shortcut to extinguish third-party liens or claims. To challenge the validity of a non-party's interest in property—even if you believe it is a sham—you must initiate a separate plenary action like a declaratory judgment or a fraudulent transfer suit rather than relying on a summary turnover motion."
In re A.Y.
COA01
The Texas First Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's decree terminating a mother’s parental rights due to child endangerment and failure to complete a court-ordered service plan. The case arose after the mother brought her infant to a residence where a violent shooting occurred and tested positive for methamphetamines during two separate pregnancies. The court analyzed whether her conduct and her failure to follow the service plan—which she blamed on medical bed rest—met the "clear and convincing" evidence standard. The court held that the mother’s persistent drug use and exposure of the child to dangerous environments provided sufficient grounds for termination, concluding that the child's best interests were served by the stability of a drug-free foster home.
Litigation Takeaway
"A parent’s pattern of behavior, particularly ongoing drug use and associating with violent individuals, creates a high hurdle that medical or administrative excuses for non-compliance with a service plan cannot easily overcome. Courts prioritize a child’s immediate need for safety and stability over a parent's claims of 'substantial compliance' or physical limitations."
In the Interest of I.H. and K.H., Children
COA13
In this Texas appellate case, an appellant (J.W.) filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss their appeal and requested that the court tax costs against the party who incurred them. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(d), which establishes that, absent an agreement between the parties, the court must tax costs against the appellant. Because J.W. did not provide evidence of an agreement with the appellee regarding costs, the court denied the request to deviate from the default rule. However, because J.W. had filed a valid Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs under Rule 20.1, the court held that no costs would actually be assessed. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was shielded from costs due to their indigent status.
Litigation Takeaway
"When seeking a voluntary dismissal of an appeal, an appellant cannot unilaterally decide how court costs are distributed; without a formal agreement from the other party, the appellant is responsible for costs by default. However, maintaining a current Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs is a critical protection for indigent clients, as it overrides the default taxation rule and prevents the assessment of appellate fees."
In the Interest of S.D.F. and K.M.F.
COA06
In this Texas modification case, a mother filed to modify a previous court order, alleging a 'material and substantial change' in circumstances. Although her petition specifically requested certain changes to child support and possession, the trial court's final default judgment granted additional relief not explicitly mentioned in her pleadings, including an increase in monthly support. The Father appealed, arguing he lacked fair notice of these specific requests. The Sixth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that in suits affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR), the 'best interest of the child' is the primary consideration. The court held that general pleadings invoking the court's jurisdiction over the child's welfare allow the judge broad power to adjust any terms of support or possession, regardless of technical pleading deficiencies.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never ignore a legal notice or motion to modify based on the assumption that the court is limited to the specific requests listed in the petition. In Texas family law, the 'best interest' standard gives judges wide latitude to rewrite child support and custody orders once their jurisdiction is invoked by a general allegation of changed circumstances. Failing to answer a 'minor' petition can result in a major, unexpected legal obligation that is nearly impossible to reverse on appeal."
T & T Construction and Development v. Delossantos
COA14
T & T Construction and Development (T&T) sued multiple defendants alleging misrepresentations regarding sewer and water services for a property purchase. The defendants filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment specifically attacking the element of 'reliance.' T&T subsequently amended its petition to swap theories for fraud-by-nondisclosure and negligent misrepresentation, then argued the summary judgment motion was ineffective because it did not explicitly address the newly added claims. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed whether a no-evidence motion can reach later-added causes of action that share common elements. The court held that because 'reliance' was an essential element of both the original and the newly pleaded claims, and because the claims arose from the same factual nucleus, the no-evidence motion was broad enough to cover the amended petition. The court affirmed the dismissal of all claims because T&T failed to produce evidence of reliance.
Litigation Takeaway
"You cannot avoid a no-evidence motion for summary judgment by simply amending your pleadings to new legal theories if those new claims share a common essential element (like reliance) already targeted by the motion; when faced with such a motion, you must provide actual evidence rather than relying on procedural maneuvers."
In Re Kelvin Lorran White
COA05
Relator Kelvin Lorran White sought a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to rule on pending motions and comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a regarding a motion to recuse. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed whether the trial court's subsequent referral of the recusal motion rendered the petition moot and whether a delay of less than one month constituted an abuse of discretion. The court held that the Rule 18a issue was moot because the trial court acted after the mandamus was filed. Furthermore, the court denied the remaining claims because the Relator failed to provide a record showing a formal demand for a ruling or an unreasonable period of delay.
Litigation Takeaway
"To compel a trial court to rule via mandamus, you must create a meticulous record showing a formal demand for a ruling and an unreasonable delay (typically months, not weeks); however, simply filing a mandamus petition can often 'break the pocket veto' by prompting a trial judge to finally take the required action."
City of Houston v. Castillo
COA14
After a motor-vehicle collision involving a City of Houston employee, the plaintiff sued under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA). The City filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, arguing the plaintiff failed to negate the 'emergency' exception to the waiver of immunity and that the plaintiff judicially admitted the officer's immunity. While the City's interlocutory appeal was pending, the trial court issued a discovery order. The Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff is not required to preemptively negate TTCA exceptions unless their own pleadings plausibly implicate those exceptions. Crucially, the court also determined that a Rule 91a motion challenging immunity is a jurisdictional challenge that triggers an automatic statutory stay of all trial court proceedings under Section 51.014(b). The court affirmed the denial of the dismissal but granted mandamus relief to vacate the discovery order entered during the stay.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a governmental unit appeals the denial of a Rule 91a motion based on immunity, it triggers an automatic stay of all trial court proceedings under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(b). Any orders signed during this stay, such as discovery or scheduling orders, are subject to vacatur via mandamus. Additionally, when suing a governmental entity, avoid pleading facts that suggest an emergency or 911 response unless you are prepared to affirmatively negate those specific immunity exceptions in your petition."
In the Matter of E.A., a Juvenile
COA10
In this case, a sixteen-year-old (E.A.) challenged a juvenile court’s decision to transfer his murder prosecution to an adult criminal court. E.A. argued that his below-average IQ and lack of a formal juvenile record should have kept him in the juvenile system. The Tenth Court of Appeals analyzed the transfer under Texas Family Code § 54.02, specifically evaluating the minor’s 'sophistication' and 'prior history.' The court determined that E.A.’s actions—such as hiding the murder weapon and fleeing the scene—demonstrated a legal sophistication and an understanding of right and wrong that outweighed his test scores. Furthermore, the court held that a history of nearly thirty school fights and numerous police visits to his home constituted a 'prior history,' even without formal arrests. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer E.A. to criminal court.
Litigation Takeaway
"In juvenile transfer proceedings, 'sophistication' is a legal determination based on conduct—like concealing evidence—rather than just an IQ score; additionally, school disciplinary records and non-arrest police contacts can be used to establish a 'prior history' sufficient to justify adult prosecution."